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Abstract
This thesis discusses transparency as a rule and a principle in the World Trade
Organization. Transparency is used in many contexts within the organization in order to
describe phenomena ranging from Agreement provisions to soft law or general principle
and from the obligation of member states to publish national trade laws to civil society
participation in the WTO. I argue that they all these transparency variations are linked as
they relate to the organization’s democratization potential.
This thesis has three goals: First, it offers an overview of scholarship discussing
legitimacy problems in the WTO. Second, it describes, assesses and offers ideas for
improvement for the four different forms of transparency –internal, external,
administrative and legal- in the WTO. Third, as a contribution to the debate on
transparency and legitimacy in the WTO, the thesis proposes a theoretical framework
combining composite democracy and transparency in the WTO to discuss the link
between the two concepts.
I argue that the four transparency dimensions help make the WTO a more democratic
organization. At the international level elections are currently impossible, but other
governance rules and practices can advance the degree of democratization of
international institutions. Under the theory of composite democracy, democratization is
best explored not through the exclusive focus on elections but taking into account other
factors, such as adherence to the rule of law, adequate representation, minority
participation avenues and transparency. I will examine if and to what extent the WTO’s
“transparencies” correspond to the non-electoral composite democracy parameters.
My methodology is based on reviewing legal scholarship and WTO data analysis,
focusing on treaties, case law, official speeches and website announcements. This thesis
aims to ultimately explore how the democratizing potential of transparency can expand
the WTO’s normative space to become more inclusive and effectively address the
organization’s legitimacy problems. Improving all the different rules and practices that
WTO scholars and diplomats call “transparency” can help with WTO’s legitimacy issues:
making the WTO more open and inclusive and trade regulation information easier to
access and understand can make the WTO a more democratic institution, and therefore
more legitimate. The normative conclusion of this thesis is that more transparent regimes
are more democratic.
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Introduction

“Origin of the World Trade organization
They needed a god of trade. From his throne on Olympus, Zeus surveyed
his family. He did not have to ponder long. Hermes was the god for the
job. Zeus gave him sandals with little gold wings and put him in charge of
promoting the exchange of goods, the signing of treaties, and the
safeguarding of free trade. Hermes, who would become Mercury in Rome,
was chosen because he was the best liar.”
Eduardo Galeano, Mirrors1
If it were ever to compete for an Oscar, transparency would probably be nominated in
the ‘best supporting actress’ category.
Andrea Bianchi2

During the forty or so years of the GATT era, trade tariffs were negotiated among
member states behind closed doors. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 was
not just an Agreement but an intergovernmental organization, whose exclusive mandate
was the reduction of cross-border trade tariffs (it also extended progressively to a number
of other trade barriers). Such tariffs were renegotiated every few years in short but
intense negotiating sessions, collectively grouped as trade rounds, during which countries
would offer reductions on export tariffs and curbing of other foreign trade-impeding
measures. In between trade rounds, other negotiations among GATT members would
offer steps of progress towards the professed ultimate goal of the treaty: the elimination
of tariffs in trade. The main economic rationale behind the GATT was that collectively its
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

EDUARDO GALEANO, MIRRORS: STORIES OF ALMOST EVERYONE 39 (Mark Fried trans., 2009).
Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: the Concept of Transparency in International Law, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013).
3
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]
2

1

members could lower the artificial price distorting mechanisms that are tariffs, reduce
domestic protectionism and thus make trade more prolific and profitable for their
countries. At least that was the idea behind GATT.
When one looks at the economic practices of GATT members during the GATT years, it
is easy to identify a plethora of price distorting practices that did the opposite of what
GATT was promising. 4 Practices of protecting domestic industries and subsidizing
several sectors of production were common, especially among the stronger GATT
constituents, namely the United States, the European Communities, Canada and Japan.5
This paradox of commitment towards eliminating tariffs and other barriers while
maintaining protectionist policies at will demonstrates that, although it was portrayed as
such, the GATT mantra was never seen as a win-win strategy at least by many powerful
GATT member states. We could say that the true mandate of the GATT was to eliminate
tariffs when and where it was to the benefit of those who were better able to get their way
during GATT negotiations.
The prevalent structure of negotiations during the GATT years, from 1947 to 1995 was
one of concentric circles of negotiations: in the center were the GATT’s top players: the
US, the EC, Japan, and Canada.6 Sometimes other strong external trade performers or
major importers joined them but that circle never looked very different than an old-boy’s
club. The room where they met in was adjacent to the office of the GATT’s top officer,
the director general, and was painted “goat vomit green.” 7 Similar to an “English
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

See among many Nicolas Lockhart & Andrew D. Mitchell, Regional Trade Agreements under GATT
1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 217 (N. Lockhart & A.
Mitchell eds. 2005). Frank Schoneveld, The EEC and Free Trade Agreements–Stretching the Limits of
GATT Exceptions to Non-Discriminatory Trade? 26:5 J. WORLD TRADE 59-78 (1992).
5
Also known as the Quad.
6
THEODORE H.COHN, GOVERNING GLOBAL TRADE: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT AND
CONVERGENCE (2002) Amrita Narlikar, Law and Legitimacy: The World Trade Organization, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (D. Armstrong ed... 2009). Michael Daly & Hiroaki
Kuwahara, The Impact of the Uruguay Round on Tariff and Non‐Tariff Barriers to Trade in the ‘Quad 21:2
THE WORLD ECONOMY 207-234 (1998).
7
Referring to a small conference room adjacent to the Director General’s office in Geneva, see JOHN H.
JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2006),
and Amrita Narlikar & John S. Odell, The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: the Like
Minded Group in the World Trade Organization in NEGOTIATING TRADE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 132 (J.
Odell ed..., 2006), referring to officials who, in addition to being unfamiliar with the Green Room process,
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gentlemen’s club”, the room smelled of cigars and cigarettes. When those who frequented
the Green Room came to a decision on concessions, these results were then
communicated to the lesser players, who would then need to quickly decide how to
react.8 More often than not, these pre-agreements were negotiated primarily in the Green
Room, as smaller countries were always reminded of two things: first of all, agreeing on
common frameworks and new products and lowering tariffs is like Vitamin C, it does
nothing but good. Second, since the GATT decision-making structure was based on
consensus, nobody really wanted to be blamed for being the one opposing what everyone
else seems to be agreeing on. No trade minister or GATT diplomat wanted to be
remembered as the one who killed the Agreement, or the one who shot down the Round.
As Richard Baldwin put it, during the GATT, the developing countries’ strategy was
“don’t obey, don’t object.”9
All of this changed immediately after the Uruguay Round. The Round itself was more
extensive in what was agreed on than the collective results of the forty years of GATT
negotiations. New Agreements were signed in various new areas of products. With minor
exceptions, almost every conceivable area of international trade was put on the
negotiating table. At the end, not only did the GATT members conclude agreements in
Services, Intellectual Property and other issues, but they decided to re-launch the
organization with a new name, that now truly corresponded to what the GATT always
was: an intergovernmental organization. The godfather of the new beast was John
Jackson and he named it “the World Trade Organization” or WTO.10
The WTO was not just the renovation of the GATT house. The negotiators of the
Uruguay Round tore the house to the ground, and rebuilt it from scratch, keeping around
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
did not have the necessary skills in English to participate. See also Debra Steger, The Future of the WTO:
the case for institutional reform, 12:4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 803 (2009).
8
For a comparison, see: WTO Website, Map of disputes between WTO Members
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=none&sense=e , PAUL
BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 28 (2009).
9
Richard E. Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to
Global Free Trade 29:11 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1451-1518 (2006).
10
PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 31 (2009), see also id. how the New
York Times at that time reported the name as MTO, or Multilateral Trade Organization before the decision
for the name was finalized.
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the GATT Agreement as amended. Keeping the GATT around was almost as if the only
thing in an entire house that they kept was the couch, reupholstered. Developing
countries in the newly built house got a breakthrough agreement signed, the Agreement
on Agriculture. Not only were agricultural products their main exports, but most of their
populations depended on better market access for these products as they were
simultaneously the source of their income and food. The Agriculture Agreement was a
reason to celebrate11: developing countries, routinely excluded from being taken seriously
in the GATT, living in the basement, were now given their own room in the new house.
Or so they thought. Soon enough they realized that the new Agreements still allowed the
developed countries to control international markets. Using average instead of individual
tariffs as a benchmark still allowed developed countries to support any agricultural
products they desired. Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, when products and
services travelled a lot faster, the effects of essentially sustaining the pre-Agricultural
Agreement status-quo were now felt a lot more. Slow trade in key products such as meat,
crops and textiles became in the nineties even slower. Not only had the developing
countries not gotten a room in the house. They were still living in a corner at its
basement. And a crowded basement it was.
The frustration on these take-it-or-leave it Green Room deals did not only come from the
populous group of the WTO developing member state representatives. It also came from
their peoples, who now experienced harsher realities and had to downgrade the lifestyle,
which they could afford through earning 1.5 US dollar per hour.12 Frustration of farmers
in Asia, Latin America and Africa soon turned into despair. Also crammed in the
basement were various interest groups such as the consumers of hormone injected beef,
pharmaceutical conglomerates, epidemics’ patients, labor unions and advocates against
marine species extinction. A very diverse group was still being left out of the much
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

Donna Roberts, Implementation of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures: The First Two Years. NO. 14588. INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE RESEARCH
CONSORTIUM (1998). See also the critique a few years later from Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing
Inequality: the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries 27 COLUM. J.
ENV. L. 433 (2002). Clive Potter & Jonathan Burney, Agricultural Multifunctionality in the WTO—
Legitimate Non-Trade Concern or Disguised Protectionism? 18:1 J. RURAL STUD. 35-47 (2002).
12
See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 236 (2009) for one such
example.
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bigger organization, the WTO, as they were during the GATT, and they were not
happy.13 The new Agreements resulted in a proliferation of industries, consumers, traders
and producers affected by the WTO. The basement was jam-packed.
It took the basement denizens only four years before they started to shake the entire
house. The next negotiations’ round about to be launched in Seattle in 1999 went down in
flames. It was eventually launched in Doha, Qatar, shortly after September 11.14 As this
round continues, academics and economists have agreed that the reason for its premature
launch was the September 11th momentum, summarized in a Pink Floyd mentality of
“united we stand, divided we fall.” The series of failed ministerial conferences that
followed the launch of the round prompted many commentators to say that the round
should have already been declared dead. Yet the representatives of coalitions of stronger
countries together with WTO top officials insist on trying for years now to resuscitate the
chances of eventually agreeing. To date, this has not happened.
The first question for the legal academics who identify this legitimacy crisis as worthy of
discussion should be the following: does the answer to the problem, the shaking WTO
house, lie in finally having a serious discussion about how to move its basement
inhabitants upstairs and give them better, nicer rooms? In other words, is a fundamental
rethinking of current policies and negotiating strategies enough to assist the WTO out of
its legitimacy crisis, help conclude the Doha Round, or at least help launch a new,
successful round? Or, are the house tremors that we are witnessing not the product of the
wall banging of the frustrated basement inhabitants, but instead, a problem with the very
foundations of the house, which, in addition, was there to begin with, even during the
GATT? Are legitimacy disparities in the WTO due to the growing gap between the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei, The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly, 72:1
JOURNAL OF INT’L ECONOMICS 151-175 (2007): 151-175.!WILL MARTIN, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1996).Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain:
Implications for Future Negotiations in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 285300 (D. Kennedy, J. Southwick eds. 2002). Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy
Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405-424 (2005).
14
See for a more contextual perspective on the trade rounds and Ministerials launched after Uruguay
Robert Wolfe, Crossing the river by feeling the stones: where the WTO is going after Seattle, Doha and
Cancun 11:3 REV INT’L POLIT. ECON. 574-596 (2004).
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Global North and the Global South, or the Agreements and the philosophy of the
organization itself? This is not an easy question to answer.
Ideas on where the WTO should go from here have come from many directions. Those
who over the years occupied the post of the Director General of the WTO have insisted
that negotiating just a bit more, staying around the table just a day longer can and should
produce the desired results.15 Many trade ministers and other high-ranking officials,
including former Director General Mike Moore, insisted on results-oriented strategies,
such as concluding another agreement and launching another round, motivated
sometimes by an insatiable desire for personal success. 16 The former US Trade
Representative Bob Zoellick decided that when the WTO does not work as intended and
consensus is difficult to come by, the best route is for the United States to conclude
Preferential Trade Agreements, treaties on one-to-one or in groups of countries that are
willing to move forward with trade liberalization. John Jackson, a legal academic and the
WTO’s godfather, contends that the solution lies in refocusing on the WTO rules, and its
dispute settlement process, the crown jewel of the organization in order not to let the old
school diplomatic processes destroy what was built after years of negotiations.
Martin Wolf, chief economist of the Financial Times, purports that, although there may
be some distributional and other practical problems with liberal policies of International
Financial Institutions including the WTO, overall standards of living continue to be
raised, so we should keep at what we are doing. Because of such institutions life is
getting better as time goes by. At the same time, he suggested that pursuing trade
governance without forcing more trade rounds is a better strategy for moving forward.17
Dani Rodrik, an economist from Harvard, argues that the better performers amongst the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

See Kevin P. Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round 15:1 REV.
62-85 (2007), Giovanni Anania & Jean-Christophe Bureau, The Negotiations on
Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects." 32: 4 EUR.
REV. AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 539-574 (2005). See also for a more detailed account: KENT A. JONES,
THE DOHA BLUES: INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND REFORM IN THE WTO (2010).
16
See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS passim. for examples of such
desire for success (2009).
17
See Dani Rodrik, Martin Wolf: Doha is Weakening the WTO, blog entry April 15 2011
http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2011/04/martin-wolf-doha-is-weakening-the-wto.html.
INT’L POLIT. ECON.

6

poor nations are the ones who did not adopt the WTO rhetoric wholesale, but rather
followed an anti-WTO path to their current relative prosperity, for example by adopting
quotas and subsidizing their infant industries and weaker sectors until they can stand on
their own feet in the global markets. Rodrik further notes that the ability of trade
liberalization, as is presented by WTO proponents as a cure for development, has been
largely exaggerated as it is unequipped to assist least developed and developing countries
to take the first step out of their state of poverty.18 Finally, he suggests that the world
trading system has to allow for diversity in national institutions and standards, permit the
protection of nation-specific social arrangements and not insist on a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to national trade approaches.19
Representatives of Oxfam, a confederation of NGOs against worldwide poverty and
injustice, argue that smaller developing countries and least developed countries should
insist on a hardline approach in order to find space in global markets for their agricultural
products.20 Developing countries, despite their significantly diverse positions on many
products and agreements, decided during the Cancun Ministerial Conference to form a
joint front to deal with developed country coalitions, mostly the EU-US alliance.21 Their
national constituencies, similarly to those of the developed countries, are usually
prepared to stand in support of any policies that will make their products more
competitive in global markets. Usually, for citizens of poorest nations this means that
they are in opposition to the WTO and its policies. Unions coming from developed
countries want the WTO to adopt labor standards in order to allow for domestically
produced goods to compete with manufactured by cheap labor in Latin America, Asia
(especially China) and Africa to a lesser extent.22 Workers from the last three continents
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE: AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED: REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE UNDP 3 (2001) “In this vision, the WTO would no longer serve as an instrument for
the harmonization of economic policies and practices across countries, but as an organization that manages
the interface between different national practices and institutions.”
19
Dani Rodrik, A Plan B for Global Finance, THE ECONOMIST, GUEST ECONOMICS FOCUS COLUMN
(March 12th 2009).
20
See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 145, 198, 206 (2009).
21
Known as the G-20. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case7_e.htm.
22
Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 61 (2001).
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want the exact opposite: for the WTO to refrain from establishing such labor standards.
Finally, there are those who express an extreme political message and would like the
WTO to “just die.” 23
Many of these positions, even if they are not helpful in solving the legitimacy problems
of the WTO, allow us to at least get a better glimpse at what is at stake when trade rules
are being negotiated and adopted. This thesis aspires to add to those viewpoints that
purport that solving common problems in a collective manner and through multilateral
institutions is always superior than its opposite. As such, having a multilateral trading
regime is a worthwhile cause, since through negotiations and cooperation trade can help
raise standards of living when transactions are fair and equitable. The WTO can be a
strong organization that provides a forum for permanent negotiations, trade monitoring
and dispute resolution. John Jackson’s favorable attitude towards the WTO legal system
is a position adopted by this thesis.24
Many of the WTO rules and practices can be revised to work better and help the WTO
with its extant problems. Revisions through multilateral negotiations may not always be
feasible, but the interpretation and implementation of the rules can still make a difference
in improving the WTO legal system. This thesis will focus on one set of such rules,
which in the WTO appear under the same “name” but have varying content and
importance: transparency. Upon initial observation, transparency appears to be an
overarching theme that member states and their representatives as well as the WTO
Secretariat and its numerous committees and divisions reiterate with considerable
frequency. Transparency has been used in the WTO by diplomats, lawyers, scholars,
NGO representatives and judges to describe four different phenomena: participation of
non-state actors in WTO processes; effective participation of developing countries in
WTO decision-making; one of the operating principles for the WTO’s small
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Wilkinson, Rorden, and Steve Hughes. "Labor standards and Global Governance: Examining the
Dimensions of Institutional Engagement." GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259-277 (2000).
23
WTO Dying a Slow Death, http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-08-04/wto-dying-slow-death, Forget
Doha, it’s the WTO that must change or die, http://europesworld.org/commentaries/forget-doha-its-thewto-that-must-change-or-die/#.VY1i-6Y77SI
24
JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006) introduction.
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administration, resulting in the frequent publication of GATT and WTO documents; and
the obligation of WTO member states to publish their trade rules and maintain judicial
review mechanisms for their implementation.
Transparency and participation have been closely linked in international trade regulation
ever since the WTO’s creation in 1995.25 In the last three decades, the WTO and, to a
certain extent, its predecessor, the GATT, has opened up and now provides a vast
quantity of data to governments, industries and individuals seeking information on the
administration of international trade. The website of the WTO attracts 1.4 million visits a
month26, and during the course of 2013 alone, over 2,000 pages on wto.org were created
or updated. In addition, the organization even has over 100,000 “likes” on Facebook.27
Concomitant with this increase in information dissemination, the number of disputes
brought before the Dispute Settlement Body that involve violations of transparency
obligations in the Agreements has increased significantly over the last twenty years.28
Especially after the Cancun Ministerial, increased emphasis has also been given to
rectifying developing country participation problems in WTO negotiations, otherwise
known as internal transparency. Finally, transparency has been linked to the WTO
Secretariat in the context of discussions on the so-called “good governance” principles.
The choice of this particular norm (which appears either as a contractual obligation, a
guiding principle or a desideratum) was due to the stance of WTO member states and
officials towards transparency. Their attitude towards transparency is saturated with a
considerable amount of controversy. The obligation of WTO member states to publish
their laws has been hailed as the “best insurance policy against protectionism” by a
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former WTO Director General.29 At the same time, requests for direct access (even
through a controlled closed-circuit video system) to the works of the decision-making
bodies or the adjudicatory process in the WTO have been met with strong resistance from
all but very few member states. The WTO frequently publishes an overwhelming amount
of documents, almost impossible to decipher without proper training in law and
economics of trade, but the first stage of negotiations of such documents has been for
years restricted to the representatives of no more than ten member states. The latter is
extremely troublesome in an organization that has 160 member states and accounts for
more than 99% of global trade.30 As citizens we are either provided with a huge portion
of transparency, impossible to metabolize, or none at all.
In this dissertation, transparency is not used in the traditional sense. Section C in Chapter
I will further explain the analytical categories transparency refers to as a keyword.
Overall, it is used to discuss a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from secrecy to openness,
and including power asymmetries and participation. The reason transparency is used in
this particular manner is first, because the official WTO rhetoric refers to transparency in
this manner, in the GATT Agreement, in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, in official
speeches from the WTO Director General and other WTO officials, and finally, in the
minutes of the General Council, reflecting the WTO member states’ attitude towards the
term. Such expansive use of the term aspires to contribute to a better understanding on
the context that affects WTO’s legitimacy, as well as to illuminate different aspects of the
WTO’s legitimacy problems.
As we will examine, the term “transparency” is used in a number of different contexts
within the organization in order to describe phenomena of varying normative weight and
meaning, ranging from Agreement provisions to soft law or general principle and from
the obligation of member states to publish national trade laws to civil society
participation in the WTO. These contexts in which transparency appears are rather
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fragmented and do not seem as organically connected to each other. However, I argue
that they are all linked as they relate to the organization’s democratization potential. In
that respect, I argue that there is a reason why improving all the different rules and
practices that WTO scholars and diplomats call “transparency” can help demonstrate
more aspects of the WTO’s legitimacy issues. Moreover there can be a loose linkage
between democracy, transparency and legitimacy. In abstract, the three concepts can be
seen as overlapping circles. My working hypothesis will be that a discussion on various
transparency forms in the WTO can illuminate various aspects of the organization’s
legitimacy problems and that attention to the WTO’s transparency processes can clarify
the relevance of openness and participation in the WTO.
This thesis is partly a critical response to the extant debate on legitimacy in the WTO and
partly a continuation of the debate in a new direction. This book has mainly three
ambitions: First, I would like to offer an overview of scholarship discussing legitimacy
problems in the WTO, with a particular emphasis on scholarship that discusses
legitimacy and transparency. Second, I would like to describe, assess and offer ideas for
improvement for the four different forms of transparency in the WTO. As my research
will show, the organization’s track record on transparency is not optimal. Despite this
focus on transparency, there remain deficiencies with respect to full participation in the
WTO by several integral parties, namely developing countries and citizen-consumers. On
one hand, the majority of developing countries have yet to fully enjoy the benefits of
joining in the WTO model because the “Green Room” remains inaccessible for a large
number of WTO member states due to negotiating asymmetries and resource constraints,
and their usage of the dispute settlement system is more limited than their developed
counterparts.31 On the other hand, the desire of the citizen-consumer to participate in the
business of the WTO has been frustrated by a lack of external transparency. Although
there have been over one hundred attempts by individuals and associations (representing
organized

consumers,

professional

unions,

environmental

groups,

industry

representatives and academics) to affect the outcome of WTO disputes through the
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submission of amicus curiae briefs for the Panels’ and Appellate Body’s consideration,
only very few have been considered. The failure in administrative transparency in the
form of access to reasoned decision making, with respect to these failed attempts, stains
the organization and strains its relations with its constituents.
Finally, I would like to contribute to the debate that discusses transparency and
legitimacy in the WTO and argue for a theoretical framework to discuss the link between
the two concepts. I argue that the four transparency dimensions mentioned above are not
unrelated but can be understood under a single overarching theme. All the different
transparencies can contribute to make the WTO a more democratic organization. At the
international level elections are currently impossible, but other governance rules and
practices can advance the degree of democratization of international institutions. Under
the theory of composite democracy, democratization is best explored not through the
exclusive focus on elections but taking into account other factors, such as adherence to
the rule of law, adequate representation, minority participation avenues and transparency.
I will examine if and to what extent the WTO’s “transparencies” correspond to the nonelectoral composite democracy parameters.
The theoretical approach for the examination of transparency through composite
democracy sans elections, is based on Montesquie’s and Madison’s governance
paradigms of separation of powers and checks and balances. My methodology is based on
reviewing legal scholarship and WTO data analysis, focusing on treaties, case law,
official speeches and website announcements. Thus, this thesis aims to ultimately explore
how the democratizing potential of transparency can expand the WTO’s normative space
to become more inclusive and illuminate more aspects of the organization’s legitimacy
problems. Making the WTO more democratic can be linked to the improvement of rules
that fall under WTO’s “transparency” definitions in order to ensure that: developing
countries will not continue to be systematically excluded during the first step of
negotiations, the Green Room; civil society participation in the WTO will not be treated
as a nuisance; the WTO’s administration will function in a better way; and product rules
will be communicated usefully to traders and consumers who want to make informed
12

decisions. This can make the organization, its administration, diplomats, and the citizens
of the countries that are members to the WTO be in a more favorable position to
negotiate, implement and discuss these rules at a national and international level better.
The normative conclusion of this thesis is that more transparent regimes can be more
democratic. By exploring transparency in all its manifestations, this thesis aspires to
provide a model of analysis of composite democracy at an international level, and a case
for comparison with other international organizations, which also lack direct electoral
legitimacy. Democratization does not directly address the extant problems with trade
rules, such as the treatment of subsidies or quotas or tariffs on agricultural products, nor
the fact that the WTO Agreements are laden with references to a commitment towards a
“liberal” trading system. When better decisions on trade rules are not possible, we can at
least focus on improving the process of decision-making in hopes that keeping all
avenues of communication open and political discourse more informed, better rules might
follow. In a sense, this is a process-oriented argument, arguing that legitimation results
from process, or emphasizing “through-put” legitimacy32. There is also a derivative
content-oriented aspect in the democratizing potential of transparency. When concessions
and rules that are negotiated in a more transparent manner, it may be more difficult to
reach consensus, but when consensus is achieved, the rule will be more representative of
the interests of more countries, and that may decrease its violation potential.
Furthermore, promoting transparency as a means of democratization can act as a
substitute for the lack of direct democratic legitimation at the international level.
Transnational regimes, or regimes of transnational governance such as the WTO affect a
very large number of stakeholders, member and non-member governments, multinational
corporations, other organizations, numerous unions such as trade and labor unions and
the global civil society, the aggregate of all citizens affected either directly or indirectly
by trade policies. The WTO, similarly to other transnational regimes, lacks direct
legitimation through elections at it is the case for national democracies. However, such
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regimes can exhibit other democratization elements, especially through meaningful
commitment to principles such as openness and the establishment of platforms for
transnational actors’ participation. 33
A number of very important issues are linked to the major themes discussed in this
dissertation. First, the Global South position towards transparency and participation in the
WTO remains a very crucial dimension on the issue. In particular, legal scholarship,
political discourse and public opinion in the Global South have expressed their stance
towards the WTO and its legitimacy problems, often extending this analysis to the
concept of openness, transparency and participation. The Global South in and of itself is a
very diverse legal and political terrain and cannot be discussed under a single rubric. The
position of India and Brazil for example in the WTO is markedly different than that of
smaller economies, such as for example Colombia, Vietnam or Nepal. As such, the
discussion of Global South perspectives needs to be tuned to the differences across and
within states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This analysis is crucial to international
trade regulation but remains outside the scope of this dissertation.
Another important issue that does not fall within the scope of this thesis is civil society
empowerment and the legitimacy concerns with respect to organized civil society and
NGOs in particular. Accountability and representativeness of NGOs have been
questioned extensively. More specifically, it is not clear who is represented by NGOs,
that have the potential of becoming elite institutions whose mandates only in theory
embody noble causes, while in practice they engage in lobbying with tactics similar to
those of for-profit institutions. Finally, the credibility of organized civil society has been
put in question due to many scandals, especially economic in nature, that have been
revealed throughout the last three decades. All these large issues will not be discussed in
this thesis. Rather, the discussion will only briefly focus on the organizations that have
submitted amicus curiae briefs and have participated in WTO Ministerial Conferences
and insofar this is relevant to the WTO’s external transparency.
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Finally, this thesis will not discuss the very crucial for international trade regulation issue
of national performance with respect to Article X transparency. As with the two
aforementioned issues, national transparency mechanisms at the border as well as within
domestic markets are essential to the function of cross-border trade. However, a
comprehensive survey of national Article X mechanisms, while a worthwhile project, can
also be in and of itself the topic of a dissertation (or an even larger project). It requires,
first and foremost, a familiarity with domestic legal systems of the 160 WTO member
states and an analysis of de jure and de facto administrative and judicial practices and
mechanisms and publication of laws at the national level. Thus, it will not be examined in
the context of this dissertation.

Methodology
Transparency as a norm and an administrative principle has been explored both in the
field of international law, and more specifically within WTO law. The normative
parameters of transparency have been discussed in an illuminating manner and
scholarship has produced a number of thought-provoking accounts, both at the level of
rule formation and at the level of rule compliance.
The following matters are discussed under the term “transparency” in the WTO: less
effective participation of developing countries in WTO decisionmaking

(“internal

transparency”), openness, publications and participation of non-state actors, civil society
and individuals in the WTO (“external transparency”), transparency as an administrative
principle invoked in the selection and operations of various WTO bodies, such as the
Secretariat, the Dispute Settlement Body and the General Council (“administrative” or
“institutional transparency”), and transparency as an obligation to publish national laws
and maintain judicial remedy mechanisms for traders, assumed by WTO member states
in Article X of the GATT and its equivalent in other WTO Agreements (“legal
transparency”). Moreover, transparency in the WTO normatively takes the form of: soft
law, as part of the organization’s operational dogma and as an administrative principle;
general principle of international law in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 c) of the ICJ
15

Statute;34 and, treaty obligation, in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 a).35 It remains
unclear whether transparency at any level has acquired customary law status. Such a
theory has neither been articulated nor has it been tested during adjudication.
The emergence of normatively relevant transparency with the participation of civil
society is mostly discussed under the auspices of Global Administrative Law (GAL) and
its theoretical counterparts, as well as rationalist and realist approaches. Many legal
scholars have elaborated on both external and administrative transparency in the WTO,
such as Steve Charnovitz and Panagiotis Delimatsis.36 Some of these accounts integrate a
socio-legal perspective to explain global governance, institutional evolution and
preferences and look upon civil society contributions and the emancipation of developing
countries within the world trading system under a favorable light. However, their analysis
is restricted to soft law aspects of transparency, as well as a more traditional
understanding of the principle that directly links transparency to either publication of
documents or civil society participation.
Scholarly work that discuss internal transparency exclusively in the context of WTO law
and development37 moves away from positivism and seeks a better understanding of
development and the needs of developing countries in the WTO context. This internal
transparency debate and the discussion on the developing countries’ position, which has
produced a deadlock for the organization’s negotiations, has been explored under the lens
of “law and development.” Such approach can benefit a lot from becoming more WTOspecific. Once this discussion is more exclusively focused on the WTO, similar problems
to those described under “internal transparency” can be found in the analysis of
Preferential Trade Agreements and Accession Protocols. Some WTO scholars have
elaborated separately on WTO Plus accession agreements, and more particularly the
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Chinese Accession Protocol and transparency issues.38 Preferential and regional trade
agreements are not generally discussed within the internal transparency paradigm.
Finally, legal transparency, Article X and equivalents and Article X case law is mostly
discussed from a positivist perspective, often sidestepping sociological elements, which
are discussed in other contexts (more often in economics’ studies and sometimes in Third
World Approaches in International Law- or TWAIL scholarship) but not as elaborately.39
Within the WTO, the dominant neoliberal pro-trade ethos on one hand refutes the
significance of internal and external transparencies. WTO officials and Global North
diplomats and trade ministers have stubbornly ignored the former for decades, until
having reached a veritable deadlock in Cancun, a deadlock whose effects are felt until
today; and reducing the latter to a non-issue during internal meetings. Administrative and
legal transparencies on the other hand are generally perceived as conducive to the
acceleration of trade liberalization and are promoted with the proliferation of relevant
case law and trade monitoring bodies.
The international trade regime dates formally to the 1940’s and has long legal, political
and economic histories. The legitimacy problems that the organization is facing cannot be
discussed only from a legal perspective without consideration of the political and
economic histories. The quest for a structured understanding of the three different
perspectives has led mostly the GAL scholars to find a sanctuary in familiar territory:
constitutionalism. The constitution in the national context is the framing document,
which combines economic programs and political aspirations in a higher-level contract
among the people (or the people and their government). Thus, although not optimal, the
constitutionalism turn is understandable.
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My argument is premised on the understanding that transnational regimes, or regimes of
transnational governance such as the WTO include multiple levels of exercise of
authority and affect a very large number of stakeholders either directly or indirectly with
trade rules and policies. They do so with both contractual rules and soft law principles or
guidelines. As such, the WTO as a transnational regime exhibits two fundamental
characteristics: it is a polyarchy, a relative but incomplete regime with few democratic
elements, describing itself as “popularized and liberalized […],inclusive and […]open to
public contestation”40 and its normative reach can be described as polynormative, ranging
from guidelines to contractual obligations. The numerous forms of transparency in the
WTO also display these two characteristics: polyarchy in the sense that transparency
appears at various levels of governance and involving numerous actors, and
polynormativity because of the varying legal nature of transparency forms.
Moreover, the different forms of transparency in the WTO appear to have a common
thread that runs through all of them. Their side-by-side comparison shows certain shared
properties. First, the current inconsistencies with respect to each of the transparency
forms do not become obvious in the debate that discusses each one separately, but when
examined alongside. For example, Canada’s legal transparency record is one of the best
in the WTO: Canada provides very detailed access to information on trade tariffs to
traders and has a user-friendly process in place online for the reporting of trade distorting
practices. However, before we give Canada a high score for transparency performance, it
might be relevant to know that Canada has always been a member of the Quad, and has
taken a very long time to publish the text of CETA, its most recent and very important
Preferential Trade Agreement with the European Union.41
Second, a direct comparison of how different forms of transparencies has evolved shows
common histories that coincide with the emancipation of global civil society, the
refinement of their arguments and the systematic push for accountability of national
governments and international organizations, the lack of tolerance for exclusionary
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tactics and the expansion of democratic discourse space at a global level to match that
which may exist at the national level in many countries. Not only global civil society
protested the WTO’s policies during the Seattle Ministerial, but simultaneously NGOs
and groups of academics were submitting amicus curiae briefs and shortly thereafter, in
the Cancun Ministerial, developing countries assumed an equally strong stance against
practices compromising internal transparency.
Third, demonstrating the interconnectedness of different transparency forms and their
relationship to democratization gives developing countries more terrains to pursue fair
and meaningful integration of their economic needs at the WTO level. Effective
strategizing to end the pervasiveness of the Green Room negotiation process can be
directed both towards more powerful member states, as it happened in Cancun, and
towards the WTO Secretariat who facilitates such meetings.
Beyond discussing all transparencies in unison in order to get a better picture and find
more ways of improving the WTO’s and its members’ transparency performance, the
four transparency dimensions are linked through a single thread, an overarching concept:
their democratization potential. A sociological approach in law that refocuses the
transparency analysis in the WTO from constitutionalism to democratization seeks to not
limit participatory platforms to those allowed by the GATT and other normative forms.
Instead, an analysis that includes both legal and other transparencies in the context of
democratization will allow multiple and innovative participatory forms to emerge and be
proposed by developing country members outside the “rigidness” of an analysis based on
constitutional consolidation. Instead, the fluid notion of democratization is proposed as
the main analysis framework.
All the phenomena labeled as transparency in the WTO carry a number of characteristics
prevalent in democratic regimes, such as participation and meaningful information.
Whether these amount to constitutional principle is a derivative point: first we have to
understand the democratizing potential of transparency and how it can expand the WTO’s
normative space. In other words, if there exist principles that have emerged above the
19

WTO Agreements, first we must understand how these principles add to the existing
normative framework, and then assess their possible constitutional quality. The
appropriate framework has to steer clear from nationally embedded public law and
national notions of the constitution. In the absence of elections at the global level,
composite or compounded democracy offers a full list of other potential democratic
functions in governance. It extends beyond voting, for example into the executive
representation, horizontal mutual control, associative and expert representation, and
legitimacy based on individual rights. My argument stems from theory of deliberative
and participatory polyarchy.42 At the supranational level the main case-study for such
polyarchy is the European Union. Democratic elements that increase legitimacy of
decision-making in the European Union are traced across different processes and organs.
The WTO is a very different case for such elements. In the WTO they are all found under
the concept of transparency.
By definition, transparency as a concept implies a higher degree of visibility, access and
openness. This allows for the evaluation, and to some extent the measurability of the
democratization of the WTO. Transparency is a prominent principle in Madisonian or
composite democracy analysis, as it enables the flourishing of a system of checks and
balances. When evaluating a model of governance that is labeled as “democratic”, these
models of composite democracy look at election processes, representation in government,
good governance, observance of rule of law principles, good administration and access
and participation opportunities for citizens. As a result, modern democracies are
aggregates of numerous elements that extend above and beyond voting. Vertical
legitimation through national elections is only one of numerous democratic legitimation
elements. Legitimacy in a compounded, composite, Montesquieian or Madisonian
democracy needs to extend beyond voting, into the executive representation, horizontal
mutual control, associative and expert representation, and legitimacy based on individual
rights. I argue that in the WTO, four out of these five elements of composite democracy
currently exist under the rubric of transparency in its four different forms, internal,
external, legal and institutional.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42

ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1973).

20

To each of the four forms of transparency corresponds to a different facet of composite
democracy. There are very few links between vertical legitimation and external
transparency as well as intermediate democratic legitimation (or secondary vertical
legitimation) to the extent that governments of democratic member states represent the
interests of their citizens periodically legitimized through national elections. Internal
transparency parallels horizontal control (mutual at a political level and structural at the
permanent review bodies). The participation of NGOs and experts in the WTO relates to
both secondary vertical legitimation and associative or expert representation present in
composite democracy. Finally, Article X, directly assigning informational and
adjudicatory resources for traders exhibits elements of individual-rights based
legitimacy.43
Among intergovernmental organizations, the WTO is a model example to discuss
transparency and composite democracy. It remains outside the United Nations system,
has a unique structure and a very active dispute settlement system. The WTO manages
international trade, and issue-specificity allows a better examination of international
regime consolidation into more democratic forms. Its unique history of transition from
the GATT to the WTO adds an additional layer in a composite democracy analysis, since
its evolution has been visible in a legal and institutional level, by the conclusion of new
agreements and the creation of a new organization. Another similarly unique organization
is the European Union, with the difference that it is regional and not global and it
conducts periodic elections, which most, if not all intergovernmental organizations do not
do. The WTO an intergovernmental organization in the sense of traditional Public
International Law and according to its constitutive documents, and is distinct from the
plethora of UN-based organizations. Finally, the WTO Agreements have several
transparency provisions similar to Article X and a substantial amount of case law
discussing the transparency obligations, another unique feature of the WTO for the
examination of transparency.
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The working thesis of my dissertation is that large asymmetries (or deficits) exist with
respect to each of the four transparency forms after evaluating each one in the WTO. The
WTO as an organization as well as its member states suffer overall by transparency
shortages, despite the robust institutional discourse that argues the opposite.
Transparency has strong democratic and transnational capacity through the inclusion of
non-state stakeholders such as NGOs, corporations, scientists, trade unions and
individuals in the WTO. Additionally, developing country participation is at the heart of
the debate for the WTO’s future and resolution of the development issue is essential to
the survival of the WTO. But the WTO falls short in a meaningful integration of
transnational aspects and a direct confrontation with the needs of developing countries in
its normative impetus and largely foregoes the democratization potential that
transparency offers.
Through this analysis, this thesis aspires to provide a model for application of composite
democracy at an international level, and a case for comparison with other international
organizations, which also lack direct electoral legitimacy. At a larger scale, the normative
conclusion of this dissertation is that global governance as exhibited in international
organizations can be more democratic even in absence of elections and transparency is a
key feature of democratization without direct legitimation. More transparent regimes can
be linked to democracy and legitimacy. This legitimacy can be substantive (resulting in
better rules- also known as output legitimacy), procedural or “through put”44 legitimacy
(ensuring at least a proper participatory and deliberative decision-making process), but
also a substitutive legitimation element, in the absence of input (direct democratic)
legitimacy.
Such a composite democracy analysis cannot solely rely on a collection of previous
theoretical accounts on transparency, since none of them has evaluated the aggregate
democratizing potential of transparency, nor have they provided a full account on the
transnationalizing effects transparency has had on the WTO as an intergovernmental
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organization (focusing instead at the constitutionalizing effect). Such analysis directly
picks up from Deborah Cass, and Howse and Nicolaides.45 Cass in her work briefly
alludes to transparency in the democratization context, while Howse and Nicolaides focus
on democratization in a more abstract way.
Transparency is analyzed as a norm within the legal, political and economic frameworks
in the WTO. My analysis extends beyond the traditional sources of international law and
I argue that normative impetus can potentially be traced in transparency forms that have
not distilled to any form of law (not even soft law). In an evaluation of democratization
of transnational regimes, phenomena such as the proliferation of regional agreements that
de facto exclude non-parties WTO member states, and WTO Plus-Minus Accession
Protocols are as relevant as amicus curiae briefs, publication of documents and formal
trade openness monitoring. Each of those WTO transparencies is relevant to an aspect of
composite legitimization. Thus the WTO as a transnational regime at some levels has the
potential to become a polyarchy 46 , a relative but incomplete democratic regime,
“popularized and liberalized […], highly inclusive and extensively open to public
contestation.”

Outline
This thesis begins in the introduction with a brief description of the legitimacy challenges
that the WTO is currently facing, further elaborating on the notion of the WTO as a house
whose foundations are shaking. Chapter I reviews transparency as a concept in law
generally before offering an overview of the WTO-specific transparency definitions,
which depart from traditional understandings of the word. Chapter I continues by
summarizing the focus of the Sutherland Report on transparency. The Sutherland Report
has been, to date, the most comprehensive WTO-initiated account on legitimacy
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concerns. Transparency is prominently featured in the report, yet, analyzed in a
fragmented manner. However, the Sutherland Report provides an initial map of the
different transparency forms in the WTO.
Next, Chapter I examines the relevant to transparency and global governance literature
from International Law and International Relations, extending the discussion to
Positivism in international Law, Global Administrative law, International Public Law,
Constitutionalism in WTO, Critical International Law and Societal Constitutionalism.
Chapter II introduces composite democracy as a framework of analysis for transparency
in the WTO. This chapter focuses on the concepts of composite democracy and
legitimacy in international regimes. It traces each of the elements of composite
democracy in the various transparency forms in the WTO- both transparency parameters
discussed in the Sutherland Reports, but also others, appearing in WTO political
discourse, and WTO legal scholarship.
Chapters III, IV, V and VI offer an in-depth analysis on each of the various forms of
transparency. These chapters describe the history and current state of each of the four
transparency forms, and they offer an evaluation of their performance with respect to
their democratizing potential. Chapter III discusses internal transparency deficits stricto
and lato sensu. “Internal transparency” originally referred to developing countries’
participation problems in the WTO. However, the types of asymmetries that cause the
systematic exclusion of developing countries appear in other areas of WTO law, and in
particular the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among WTO member states
and the varying degrees of commitments that candidate members are asked to assume
during their accession process. This I will call transparency lato sensu and it will be
explored in the last two parts of Chapter III.
Chapter IV shifts towards external transparency, information for and participation in the
WTO of non-state actors, NGOs, corporations, and individuals that constitute civil
society at-large. Here, I examine participatory platforms, both formal and informal, at the
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various WTO fora as well as, most importantly, during the dispute settlement process
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs.
Chapter V explores administrative transparency, namely the different formations of the
General Council, the highest permanent executive organ of the WTO as well as the
selection and operations of the Secretariat, the Panelists, the Appellate Body members
and experts participating in the dispute settlement process.
Finally, Chapter VI focuses on the treaty-based requirement for member states to publish
their trade-related laws and regulatory measures and to maintain administrative and
judicial mechanisms to resolve and remedy any trade related issues both at the border and
in the domestic market. More specifically, this chapter discusses the legal obligations of
member states to disclose their legislation and other trade affecting measures and
maintain transparent national trading regimes, the various monitoring mechanisms in the
WTO that are geared towards supervising market openness and rule compliance of WTO
member states and the dispute settlement reports that have been issued after claims for
transparency obligation violations.
The last chapter offers a thorough evaluation of the four different forms of transparency
and their contribution to democratization. Although a number of innovative and very
useful steps have been taken within the WTO, they still fall short of addressing the
pressing problems surrounding international trade regulation, and in particular the lack of
direct legitimation through elections, that is, democratic legitimacy and the failure to
provide for a viable normative platform for developing countries in order to benefit from
international trade. The discussion then returns to the merit of democratization as a more
useful framework of analysis for global governance principles. Finally, keeping in mind
current legitimacy problems, this chapter offers a diagram for the way forward for the
WTO, on how to improve its transparency record and commitment to pluralistic
governance that will bring the organization closer to a democratic paradigm.
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A closer look into the WTO’s legitimacy problems, or The WTO at 20, the
GATT at 68: a teenager or a golden-ager?
The larger context in which this doctoral dissertation is situated relates to the most
fundamental pillars in international law: the degrees of sovereignty erosion, the ensuing
legitimacy deficits and the patterns of transnational regime formation. By looking at
transparency in different forms with varying normative weight within the WTO I hope to
offer an insight into the origins and sources of modern international law. The question of
the roots of contemporary international law is closely coupled with that of its legitimacy.
It is essentially a history of transition from the “Old World” to the “New World.”
In the “Old World” exists the Westphalian-centric understanding that only agreements
among sovereigns could bind them and all their citizens. International law, the only law
beyond national law, was reduced to treaty law or, exceptionally, custom understood as
binding and emerging from state practice. 47 The central question in the Old World
understanding was: why should international law subjects follow rules?48 The answer was
almost exclusively traced in sovereign will, or a version of the idea of “justice” or
“humanity” which legitimized norms. In the “New World”, law emerges from layered,
multidimensional, polycentric normative “hubs”, including but absolutely not limited to
the nation-state. In this poly-normative world, the focal point of legitimacy shifts.
Countries no longer form the entire mosaic; they are mere pebbles. The source of
normativity is fragmented, scattered among actors who utilize formal and informal,
usually cross-jurisdictional avenues to find solutions to legal questions and to regulate
themselves and others.
A number of different narratives have been used to describe the transition to the New
World. Some are positive (sometimes almost naively so), as is for example Fukuyama’s
End of History and the Last Man, or Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Thomas
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Friedman chronicles the success stories of the New World, he marvels on the speed of it
and its methods, its “golden straightjackets”49, while he identifies that there are some
“emotions” and “anxieties” that triggered a backlash. However, modern capitalism as he
describes it has built-in internal mechanisms to deal with the problems that it creates:
Friedman observed that the South Jersey beefsteak tomatoes were replaced with waxy
pink ones because they can ship better and last longer, but the solution is for the farmers
to simply set up a website and buy them online with a credit card. Zambian cotton
farmers however, whose cotton is of superior quality to that of their US counterparts
don’t have computers readily available- nor FedEx to deliver it.50 In fact, the absolute
lack of infrastructure prohibits producers to source their products to the markets of their
neighboring countries.51 Such problems with capitalism were identified, among many, in
Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine, Ulrich Beck’s What is Globalization and Eric
Hobsbawm’s The Age of Extremes. As Hobsbawm posits, the western world in the
nineties was not only in depression, it was also in denial about it.52 An idea very popular
in the 1970s and 1980s was that transferring employment to new places (geographically)
because of industrialization would free up resources and direct labor towards new,
possibly better sectors. Instead, as both Beck and Hobsbawm observe, the new
industrialization of the nineties created “rust belts” when industries moved out.53 Such
rust belts continue to exist both in the developing and the developed world. The new
paradox (which has now ceased to be a paradox) is that Colombian textile workers and
auto-industry employees in Detroit are jobless due to the same international disease:
Globalization.
Globalization is a word that has been used most frequently in all contexts where powerful
changes have occurred. Globalization is seen as a process and as a state of affairs of a
world order. For many disciplines in the humanities globalization, or the events that set it
in motion began roughly during the early eighties. Since then, certain key historical
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events have been referenced to pinpoint and describe globalization more. As a substantial
amount of ink has been used to discuss globalization, here we will briefly summarize
very few events and developments that have been relevant to the evolutionary trends in
international law and international trade regulation.
The proclaimed triumph of western government structures was initially coupled with a
theory of the victory of permanent peaceful coexistence. Hobsbawm says, the crisis was
boiling underneath the euphoric surface: soon came the realization that the end of the
Cold War did not mean the end of conflict. The UN intervention in Yugoslavia conveyed
clearly that the post-1989 end-of history narrative was misled. The nature of conflict
moved from being inter-border to progressively becoming intra-border. As a result, many
more forms of internal turmoil or dissent, even peaceful protests, became newsworthy.
International organizations were confronted with many humanitarian catastrophes, in
Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia and a lack of sufficient legal tools to reach decisions
on how to address the crises. In a true battle of Old versus New, deadlocks in the UN
Security Council stemming from the Cold War divide were coupled with new
understandings of humanitarian intervention.54
In the nineties we also witnessed the emergence of a global civil society steered not from
affiliation with political camps but a widespread sharing of information. Citizens became
“netizens”55. Further, the communication boom brought by the expansion of global media
and the internet called attention to the disproportionate distribution of power and wealth,
which withstood the fall of the Berlin Wall. The awareness of a worldwide rich/poor
divide coincided with the transformation of industrial capitalism to a “new capitalism”
coupled with record-high rates of unemployment.
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exist.”57 Globalization also resulted in the normative and fiscal depletion of the welfare
state, so that it could no longer cushion employment supply and demand asymmetries. 58
The expansion of the global media and the growth of Internet access did not only inform
the world of its inequalities. The Internet is “more than just a cheap and immediate form
of communication” since it “offers a solidarity in cyberspace that may be hard to achieve
geographically.” 59 It enables the civil society to network and mobilize using the new
communication potential. 60 As Ulrich Beck rightly notes “things which used to be
negotiated and decided by managers and academics behind closed doors and with no
attempt at justification, must now suddenly have their consequences justified in the biting
wind of public debate.”61 The internet and the global media made this public debate
possible.62 Social movements and NGOs utilized this potential like “spiders uniting and
tying down lions.” 63
The two major events that framed this era were the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/9) and the
terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11). The world in less than twenty years moved from
celebration to grief and back to celebration quite a few times. International law was
challenged in unique ways as a result. However, this was hardly the first stress test for the
field during the last century. The two World Wars had contributed a fair amount to
enormous changes in the international law landscape, as did for example environmental
degradation and satellite technology: the proliferation of international organizations, the
emergence, establishment and consolidation of human rights’ law, arms control treaties,
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fields like environmental and space law are all products of major events of the last
century.
Treaty proliferation, the fragmentation of International Law and more elaborate accounts
on international institutional law are some of the areas where International Law focused
in the last twenty years. After having signed a considerable amount of treaties in the
nineties, now it is time to carefully examine whether extant cross-border problems can be
better solved through new agreements, or we need to find sophisticated ways of better
implementing the old ones. In international trade regulation, this question is progressively
becoming one of the key themes in analyzing how will the international community move
forward and out of the current crisis. Before describing the problems the WTO is facing
in more detail, we will explain the title of this chapter: is the international trading system
a mature and sophisticated treaty regime that dates back to the end of World War II? Or
was 1995 a rupture moment, and the WTO has started on a clean sleight its own history?
The ad hoc dispute settlement process of the GATT Panels was more diplomatic in
nature, as was the GATT as an organization as a whole. It focused on products (not
services, nor intellectual property, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, nor rules of
origin, or agriculture like the WTO) and the elimination of tariffs on the products covered
in the GATT was extensive.
In the early 1980s, after the Tokyo Round of negotiations, proposals for the legalization
of the diplomatic aspects of the GATT were placed at the forefront at the negotiating
agenda. More specifically, three major pillars were discussed: first, the formalization of
the dispute settlement process, including an appeals process and the creation of a
permanent Appellate Body was proposed (and later, adopted). Panel and Appellate Body
reports would be adopted automatically, unless there was consensus to the opposite
(unlike the GATT, where any member, including the ones to the dispute, could veto the
decision). Second, trade monitoring would no longer be conducted in an informal basis,
but by the Trade Policy Review Body, under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and in
periodic fashion, depending on the size of each member’s economy. Finally, a long list of
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non-covered products were being negotiated, and these negotiations resulted to a series of
new Agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture, the GATS on Trade in Services,
the TRIPS on Intellectual Property products, and numerous others.
The GATT never ceased to exist, it is still one of the main WTO Agreements and its rules
are applied as they were since 1947. However, the system has transitioned from being
based on diplomatic ethos and informal processes to one of formal mechanisms. The
Agreements of the WTO’s legal architecture create a labyrinth. The “Final Act” of the
Uruguay Round concluded the trade negotiations and stated the agreement to create the
WTO. 64 The WTO was then created through the “Agreement Establishing the World
Trade organization.” Annexed to the WTO Agreement are more than fifty agreements,
among which is the GATT 1994. The GATT 1947 is incorporated in the 1994 GATT.
This structure is anything but straightforward and the complex landscape of the WTO
Agreements have been discussed in the literature.65
Currently, most of the legal aspects of transnational trade fall within the jurisdiction of
the WTO for its member states. It currently has 160 member states, with another 23
countries on an accession track. The total membership potential of 183 countries is
almost global: over 99% percent of world trade, world GDP and world population are
represented in the WTO. Considering the inescapable nature of cross-border trade, the
reach of the WTO is impressive. The organization is committed to the growth of
international trade, while adhering to various trade-related principles such as the
commitment to sustainable development, inclusion of developing countries in the world
economy, raising standards of living and allowing for the optimal use of the world’s
resources. Its scope is “to provide a common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated
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legal instruments.”66 The WTO preamble mentions the organization’s direction towards
“the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”67 More
specifically, its mandate is to
“facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further
the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements[…], provide the framework for the implementation,
administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements[…],
provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in
the Annexes to this Agreement […],provide a forum for further
negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade
relations[…], administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, […] administer the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism […]. 68
Considering that the overwhelming majority of countries is either already a member of
the organization69 or has applied to become one, one can argue that more the majority of
international trade regulation is performed under the WTO umbrella.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was the WTO’s predecessor, began
in 1947 as a platform for the extension of bilateral agreements on tariffs in trade to all of
its members.70 The GATT emerged from the failed International Trade organization
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(ITO) negotiations with twenty-three founding members.71 It was originally called an
agreement and not an organization in order for the US Congress to approve the
participation of the United States in the Agreement. Progressively, it evolved to include
institutional structures that made discernable that it was not a simple contract among
states but the constitutive document of an organization. In the five decades of its
existence before the founding of the WTO, the GATT was reviewed periodically in seven
negotiation rounds. In 1995, the Uruguay Round resulted to the emergence of a new
international organization. The creation of the WTO happened in a rather unique and
unusual fashion in international law. The organization became the surrogate of the
GATT, but the original GATT (GATT 1947) remained in force.
Table 2 GATT and WTO Negotiation Rounds
Duration

Name/Location

Main area of negotiations

1947

Geneva

Tariffs

1949

Annecy

Tariffs

1951

Torquay

Tariffs

1956

Geneva

Tariffs

1960-1961

Dillon Round

Tariffs

1964-1967

Kennedy Round

Tariffs and anti-dumping

1973-1979

Tokyo Round

Tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade

1986-1994

Uruguay Round

Tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade, rules,
services, intellectual property, dispute
settlement, textiles, agriculture, the
creation of WTO, WTO Agreements

2001-current date

Doha Development

Agriculture, Development, Intellectual

Round

Property and others

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
State Department officials invented the Protocol of Provisional Application to bring it to effect.” DOUGLAS
A. IRWIN ET. AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 96 (2008).
71
Id. 98-122.

33

The basic GATT legal principles did not change for five decades, with some exceptions
such as the addition of the section on Development. Moreover, some plurilateral
agreements (with less than full GATT membership) were signed under the auspices of the
GATT. Progress in international trade negotiations is usually achieved during extensive
periods of high-level trade negotiations called “Rounds”. These rounds last for years.
Negotiations are not done on an issue-by-issue basis but progress is made in packages.
Thus, the negotiation Rounds introduce an all-or-nothing single undertaking approach to
negotiations. Agreements are concluded through trade-offs among GATT and WTO
member states. Both political and economic considerations affect the outcomes of
negotiation rounds.
The trade negotiation rounds from 1947 until 1995 had as a main goal to reduce tariffs. In
addition to tariff reduction and/or elimination, the Kennedy Round included discussions
on the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Tokyo Round discussed non-tariff barriers to trade
and the Uruguay Round, the longest GATT Round, resulted in the creation of the WTO
and the adoption of the WTO Agreements. The Uruguay Round in a sense achieved the
impossible: agreements were procured in a large number of areas, and the emerging
organization was a structure that the 23 original GATT members could not have
envisioned. Almost the entire agenda of this negotiation round was concluded
successfully. The Agreements of the WTO’s legal architecture created a labyrinth. The
“Final Act” of the Uruguay Round concluded the trade negotiations and stated the
agreement to create the WTO. 72 The WTO was then created through the “Agreement
Establishing the World Trade organization.” Annexed to the WTO Agreement are more
than fifty agreements, among which is the GATT 1994. The GATT 1947 is incorporated
in the 1994 GATT. This structure is anything but straightforward and has been discussed
in the literature.73
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The complexity of the new organization, and the proliferation of multilateral (binding to
all member states) and plurilateral (binding amongst a subset of the member states)
agreements into a large number of new areas such as trade in services, agriculture,
investment and technical barriers to trade demonstrates that the WTO is not merely an
improved version of the GATT. This idiosyncratic legal system exists entirely outside the
United Nations umbrella, unlike the overwhelming majority of intergovernmental
organizations. Over the years it has grown, both in the tariff amount reductions, the
number of concessions, the amount and types of products regulated, the types of
regulations and practices that it characterizes as trade-distorting and the countries
involved. In the 1980s it became evident that the 1947 structure was insufficient to deal
with this growing body of commitments and emerging legal questions. The Uruguay
Round of negotiations, out of which emerged the successor to the GATT, the WTO,
became the most visible example of the transition from the Old to the New World: the
diplomatic ethos and the informal dispute settlement of 1947 was replaced by a system
priding itself on its dispute settlement process, including a permanent Appellate Bodyhailed as the crown jewel; numerous trade monitoring bodies became institutionalized;
the agreements on trade no longer included only commodities but extended to services
and intellectual property, specialized agreements were concluded on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, customs, antidumping and more.
Although the size of the WTO secretariat has doubled in size and the WTO delegations
have proportionately increased, it is still an elite administration of less than six hundred
employees74 and another six hundred or so liaison officers and representatives to WTO75
located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva, which manages international trade.
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The institution of the Director-General was maintained. The Panels became formalized in
the Dispute Settlement Process, with compulsory jurisdiction and a permanent Appellate
Body was established. Many elements remained the same, but an even larger number of
things changed fundamentally.
It became evident very quickly however, that the New World roses were packed with
thorns: developing countries’ interests were finally taken more seriously into account
through the conclusion of the Agriculture Agreement. However, tariff reductions were
agreed on a basis of averages. This gives the opportunity to still protect certain sectors
with high tariffs and quotas, while completely liberalizing others that are of significantly
less importance. The textile industries of many developing countries began to suffer as
soon as Chinese products, in significantly more competitive prices hit the global markets
when the Textiles Agreement came into force. As the world became more globalized and
knowledge began to travel with great speed across the globe, it also became evident that
not only was poverty not eliminated by participation in the world trading system but also
the gap between the rich and the poor still seemed unbridgeable.76
Dispute Settlement also took time and resulted in retaliatory rights within the winner’s
domestic market. This meant that the breaching state could continue to disregard WTO
rules during litigation, and the decision would not have retroactive effect. Violations
could go on for years at a time. Smaller countries who managed to survive the long
litigation process and win, as it happened with Antigua and Barbuda, then were given the
right to retaliate against their opponents, but only in the domestic market. Antigua and
Barbuda, who won a case regarding gambling services, 77 could only retaliate against US
products in its domestic market. Such a result hardly made a dent in the US economy.
Having lost was rendered meaningless.
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The political, legal and economic position of developing and least-developed countries in
the WTO has not improved at all from their participation in the world trading regime.
Developing countries were promised by joining the GATT and the WTO de minimis to be
included as equals in the organization’s organs and processes and to be able to better,
through free trade, their peoples’ living conditions. Developing counties’ treatment was
originally a direct result of the history of colonialism but also the de facto position of
developing countries which accessed only limited resources of wealth, comprising mainly
of primary products. Later on, with the formation of the G77 group, and the negotiations
of UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order, the GATT Contracting Parties,
partly responding to almost two decades of pressures from their developing members,
partly due to concerns of progressive replacement by UNCTAD, chose to adopt Part IV
of the GATT, under the title “Trade and Development.” The next major step regarding
development in the GATT was the adoption of the Generalized System of Preferences,
which was made permanent through the adoption of the Enabling Clause during the
Tokyo Round. However, the efforts of developing countries to achieve meaningful to
their economies trade concessions that would enable them to benefit from participating in
the international trading system have not produced any significant results to date.
The Green Room negotiations continued to take place after the creation of the WTO and
developing countries continued to be confronted with prefabricated take-it-or-leave it
agreements. These legitimacy issues furthered the idea that the organization suffered
from a significant compositional flaw: a very small number of diplomats and
international technocrats, working within the legacy of the original architects of the
WTO, namely a handful major WWII-era neoclassical economists, are now the key actors
of the international financial system. This “elite administration” has not been elected and
remains unaccountable for advancing normative changes in the area of international trade
that affect the lives of a very significant fraction of the world population. Moreover, the
negotiating asymmetries and diverse needs of member states cannot be synchronized with
the very rigid consensus rule with respect to decision-making. It was time for developing
countries to utilize the consensus rule and block further decision making en masse.
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This happened first in the Seattle and then in the Cancun Ministerial Conference.78 In
Seattle, the impasse was reached when the US government attempted to put labor
standards on the table. US President Bill Clinton, during an interview right before he
arrived to Seattle for the Ministerial said that he was going to push the agenda of labor
standards in the WTO, which he repeated when he addressed the WTO trade ministers
the next day. The “trade and labor” scenario alienated almost all developing nations who
still counted on cheap labor as a means to remain competitive in the global economy. It
was bad enough that the case of Shrimp-Turtle had put fishing nets under scrutiny.
Developing countries could not afford more production methods to become an
impediment to their export trade. The Ministerial was intended as the launching pad for
the next negotiations round, and it failed. In Cancun, developing country representatives
took their frustration one step further when they met with Quad ministers and more
specifically the US Trade Representative as a united front. The Doha Round, officially
called “the Doha Development Round” was eventually (and- as it appears in retrospect,
prematurely) launched in 2001 in Doha. Negotiations have reached a stand-still, and until
today, there is still a rift in at least three important areas (Agriculture, Intellectual
Property, the framework of Special and Differential Treatment). 79 The Doha Round is
still ongoing and many commentators have argued that it is de facto terminated, due to
the continuing inability of WTO member states to reach any agreement.
Another important event of the late nineties was China’s accession. China, which
withdrew from the GATT in the 1950s, applied to accede to the WTO and its accession
negotiations became the center of attention for the largest trading countries.

80

Its

accession protocol was to become the most complex accession document to an
international organization to date.81 The accession of China, a country with a very strong
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trade profile, a large national and cross border economy and population, revealed many
of the negotiation imbalances that existed within the organization. In addition to China,
another 23 countries acceded to the organization since 1995. Recently, Russia also
completed its accession negotiations.82 The accession of China and Russia changed the
dynamics between developed and developing countries in the WTO.
Brazil, Russia, China and India continue claim developing country status in the WTO.
Due to large parts of their populations living in poverty, these countries, despite their
high GDP claim that developing countries’ privileges should extend to them. Giving the
same treatment to the BRICs group as the Least-Developed Countries (LCDs) hardly
makes any sense in terms of the dynamics of international trade. The two groups have
neither comparable trade volumes nor similar critical products. China’s and Russia’s
accession also shifted the WTO dynamics by re-aligning the negotiating blocs. In the
WTO, the Quad used to dominate the negotiations for many decades, something that is
clearly reflected in WTO rules. Most Favored Nation is a great rule for the West, but
leaves the rest virtually without any tools to protect infant industries and essential
domestic commodities. With China and Russia acceding, this picture changed: two large
countries with a strong negotiating presence in the WTO joined Brazil and India, and
together with the Middle income countries can block agreements that are catering to the
Quad, and request for treatment of commodities that is more sensitive to less
industrialized societies and markets not directly following a capitalist model.
A small step was taken when the Quad was replaced by the so-called Five Interested
Parties. The change was highly symbolic: Japan was ousted from the group and was
replaced by India and Brazil. Also, India and Brazil decided to put aside their diverging
trade interests and join forces with other developing countries to oppose their exclusion
from the Green Room. This larger group was called the G-20.83 Originally, this seems
like a move towards the right direction. However, India and Brazil are two large
economies. They are part of the BRICS group (named after the initial letter of each of its
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members), together with Russia, China and South Africa. Their trade needs and
negotiating priorities are very different than other developing countries.
Exclusion continues to be the WTO’s modus operandi. Bali like previous Ministerial
conferences was not the setting for meaningful trade negotiations among all member
states, but rather involved the usual informal meetings among some member states and
the continuous exclusion of others. Moreover, the Bali Agreements show the persisting
lack of desire on behalf of the developed world to reach meaningful consensus over
development needs and more specifically on products essential to developing countries,
such as cotton, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. The WTO preambular
commitments to raise standards of living and share the growth in international trade
remain an empty letter, as developed countries still enjoy the majority of benefits from
joining in the international trade regime, while simultaneously being able to afford to
sidestep- almost without consequence- WTO rules when those are not to their benefit.
Trade ministers from smaller countries were traditionally excluded from talks with the
“big boys.” However, two things are different in the WTO era. First, the economic
backlash of liberalization put people in the developing world out of jobs faster, at greater
amounts without creating opportunities for participation in alternative product markets.
Modern technology made it possible for states with resources to exploit them, and the
returns in production were tenfold. This annihilated the contribution of small farming
units in large parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa to world trade and resulted in sharp
GDP drops and widespread poverty. Globalization put national markets dependent on
smaller production units in distress.
Second, the inability of trade representatives from the developing world to do anything
about this situation was broadcasted on real time across the world. Government ministers
were sitting idle for hours and days at a time outside the rooms where the select few were
negotiating. Journalists who sat with them took pictures and wrote reports, which the
next day, or the next hour reached local media. The news of exclusion spread like
wildfire, and dissatisfaction with the WTO, its policies and methods grew. Trade
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ministers could no longer politically afford to return to their countries empty-handed.
This landscape remains unchanged to this day. For more than a decade, developed and
developing countries have not achieved any meaningful consensus on how to move
forward together in the WTO in a manner that is conducive to developing countries’
needs.
The exclusion of less powerful WTO members also occurs through the proliferation of
regional trade agreements as evidenced by the current ongoing trade negotiations, among
others, between the US and the EU and the US and Canada. When more powerful WTO
members with large trade volumes cannot achieve their desired goals of tariff reduction
through multilateral negotiations, they resort to regional trade agreements. More
specifically, when countries with larger economies are faced with frustration expressed
by developing countries during the WTO formal and informal negotiations, instead of
seeking ways to achieve meaningful consensus on key products for developing countries
at the multilateral level, they decide to sign bilateral or regional agreements amongst
themselves in products that interest them. These agreements are allowed by the WTO but
are traditionally left without any scrutiny from the WTO monitoring bodies, although
their provisions can sidestep cardinal WTO rules. Thus, in practice their compatibility
with WTO law is never checked, neither by the General Council nor by the Panels and
Appellate Body, allowing potential collusions among the members of such agreements.
Not extending Most-Favored Nation treatment to anyone but the parties of regional and
preferential agreements can be identified as an obliteration of the fundamental rules of
WTO law at the expense of all non-parties to these agreements. As a result, developing
countries (together with any other country excluded from such agreements) remain
particularly powerless before the collusive tactics of the richer member states. The
proliferation of regional trade agreements compromises both WTO rules per se as well as
the multilateral process of WTO trade negotiations and exacerbates the WTO’s
legitimacy problems.
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Civil society dissatisfaction with the WTO at a global scale started soon after the creation
of the organization. 84 One of the very first instances of this backlash against the WTO
occurred in November 1999 in Seattle, during a ministerial meeting that would launch the
next round of negotiations.85 Inside the doors of the negotiating rooms, it was starting to
become clear that the negotiating priorities of developing countries were very diverse,
while the Quad (EU, US, Japan and Canada) had lost their stature in the WTO, to be
replaced by middle-income countries, together with India and Brazil. Outside the doors of
the ministerial the anti-WTO, anti-globalization events were also broadcast by activist
internet media sources (most notably the Indymedia project) that emerged while the
protests were occurring.86 This internet coverage of the events changed the landscape of
global events coverage altogether87 and Seattle became “synonymous with tear gas and
gridlock”88 Ironically, as the WTO’s court, the Dispute Settlement Body was developing
its transparency jurisprudence, and as the organization was publishing most of its
documents online, the backlash of protests- the so-called “external transparency issue”widened.
NGOs demanded to have their voice heard in a formal fashion, during the trade
negotiations and the dispute settlement. The impressive volume of the WTO Agreements
was negotiated and decided upon almost in obscurity, in the traditional diplomatic
fashion of treaty negotiations. In 1995 few news reports, mostly from large newspapers,
published relatively short announcements for the creation of the WTO. Shortly thereafter,
the extent of trade regulation authority that was transferred from nation states to the WTO
became discernible to a large number of stakeholders around the world: the intended
beneficiaries of tariff reductions, workers, farmers, environmental groups, consumer
groups and individual consumers, students and concerned citizens, among many, realized
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84

David Sanger, ECONOMIC VIEW; Global Food Fights: The Worst Are Yet to Come, NEW YORK TIMES
(25 July 1999).
85
Interestingly, the Seattle events reflected criticism and civil anger directed against the WTO as much as
globalization itself. See Storm over globalisation THE ECONOMIST U.S. ed... 15 (27 Nov. 1999).
86
Indymedia and Indybay History http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2005/03/11/17262451.php by
indybay (Friday Mar 11th, 2005).
87
Paul D. Almeida & Mark I. Lichbach., To the Internet, from the Internet: Comparative Media Coverage
of Transnational Protest, 8:3 MOBILIZATION 249-272 (2003).
88
Joseph Kahn, The Next Center of the World, NEW YORK TIMES (28 January 2001).

42

that they could no longer rely on their local politicians for produce regulation, nor get
plausible answers from their governments on practices adopted or participate in debates
that directly impacted on their lives. Voting and debating on trade issues in national
democracies mattered much less. Most of the debate and the decisions on tariff reductions
and non-tariff trade laws (such as environmental and health related regulations) that
affect civil society at large, occurred either a while ago in Uruguay, or on a daily basis in
Geneva.
Left without a voice in matters that affect everyone’s lives significantly, civil society
groups took to the streets most notably during the meetings of WTO member states’
ministers in Geneva and Seattle. Since then, civil society groups have tried to raise their
concerns with respect to the international trading system at large but also specific
regulations, on numerous occasions. The WTO, reluctantly at first, tried to open its doors
to civil society. Soon it became evident that institutions such as the WTO Public Forum,
participation of NGOs in Ministerial Conferences and the much-contested amicus curiae
brief issue before the Dispute Settlement Body have done little to address the severed
connections between the WTO and civil society and serve merely a decorative function.
The lack of meaningful participation of civil society actors and genuine consideration of
their concerns remains an important issue in the WTO to this day, further aggravating its
legitimacy problems.
Developing countries feel locked in a trade system that they see as filled with
commitments and obligations, giving no useful returns; the same negotiation processesin the form of the trade round- that brought about the WTO have been at a stalemate for
almost two decades. In addition to the shareholders, stakeholders are becoming visible
and are demanding a voice at the table. Furthermore, the line separating the WTO
shareholders and the stakeholders is becoming progressively blurry. WTO member states
and civil society organizations have joined forces, as is evident in the case of Oxfam and
its relationship with developing and least developed countries.
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This dire situation has not left the WTO administration entirely indifferent. In 2005, the
WTO Secretary General Panitchpakdi commissioned a report on the occasion of the
organization’s tenth birthday, supervised by a former WTO Secretary General, formally
under the title “The Future of the WTO” but informally known under its supervisor’s
name as the “Sutherland Report.” The report describes a fragment of the aforementioned
marginalizing phenomena, insisting that the WTO is addressing them adequately and
does not have a legitimacy problem as an organization. The WTO has found itself in
crossroads. As noted in the Sutherland Report:
Generally, the efforts to create new partnerships between state and nonstate players in the global arena have been marked by tensions. The simple
ideological divide that market the global political order during the Cold
War has been replaced by more complex alliances among a larger and
more diverse body of actors.89
At the same time, in 2001 a new international organization, the Advisory Center on WTO
law or ACWL is created with a mandate to provide “advice, support and training to
developing and least- developed countries.” It has to date prepared over 900 legal
opinions and assisted developing countries in 38 cases in Dispute Settlement.90 Still, there
is a long way to go. The limited use of dispute mechanisms and the oftentimes observed
reluctance to enforce adopted reports of the DSB and give tit-for-tat to developed
countries (such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the ECBananas III case) shows that developing countries have not found themselves yet in a
peer-to-peer position with developed ones.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, by Peter Sutherland et
al., The Future of the WTO, Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium, Published by the
WTO (2004), hereinafter The Sutherland Report Paragraph 181, page 41.
90
ACWL website www.acwl.ch/e/documents/Quick%20guide%202011%20for%20website.pdf.

44

Another noticeable shift reflective of legitimacy concerns was occurring on the focus of
the cases before the newly established Dispute Settlement Body.91 The cases brought
before the DSB were no longer strictly cases of tariffs but they extended to alternative
considerations, most notably public morals, 92 human, animal or plant life and health93,
the environment94, consumer protection and the assistance for developing countries95.
Other problems that arose immediately after the birth of the WTO were related to other
smaller issues, that nevertheless reflected the larger systemic ones. In short, in the first
five years of its existence the WTO managed to shift the focus of global protest and
global political debate and become a focal point of contestation for not only international
trade law but international law in general.
In 2015, ten years after the publication of the Sutherland report, the legitimacy crisis has
paralyzed the WTO’s Ministerial Conferences. Instead of insisting on new agreements
and concessions, the organization has to first address its extant problems. Changes in the
voting process (or lack thereof) or additional concessions for developing and least
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developed countries (such as the ones agreed upon during the Bali Ministerial
conference) may not be sufficient any more to resolve the crisis. Something also has to be
done for the ever-increasing list of Preferential Trade Agreements Most importantly,
WTO member states must concentrate on remedying the exclusionary precedent that has
lasted for decades and has tainted the organization in a structural manner. The longer
these issues remain without serious consideration or confrontation, the longer the crisis
will persist, and worsen.
Against this backdrop we will discuss transparency in the WTO. Both the WTO and its
self-proclaimed opposition, namely a large number of NGOs, have developed narratives
to discuss the legitimacy crisis facing the organization from the inside, with the inability
to reach further agreements until developing nations are satisfied, and from the outside,
with unpleased civil society keeping a close eye. One of the most significant narratives,
which emerged during the last few years of the GATT and was amplified in the WTO
was a multidimensional commitment on transparency. The formation of transparency as
the WTO’s own institutional narrative was evidenced in the organization’s most recent
self-assessment report, the Sutherland Report. Transparency according to the WTO has a
dual role: first, it signifies a commitment to openness of market regulations- and thus
becomes insurance against protectionism. Without clear and transparent rules and
procedures in the markets of member states, trade-distorting practices can prevail.
Second, transparency is the institutional response to critics who see the WTO as an elite
institution, the organization purports that it publishes its documents and has set up a few
events to introduce its work those interested. Civil society and citizens of WTO member
states also ask for more transparency from the organization insisting that most decisions
are still made behind closed doors without sufficient consideration of the interests of
everyone affected.
The question of whether transparency in the WTO mitigates (and how) legitimacy
deficits falls under the exploration of the sources of normativity in the contemporary
world and the pertinence (if any) of the Westphalian world order, as well as the
progression from one to the other during the twentieth century. First, legal transparency
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creates obligations for WTO member states that are supposed to benefit consumers and
traders. Second, external transparency argues for the introduction of transnational actors
in the WTO decision-making process. Administrative and internal transparencies also
evidence the evolution of International Law in the direction of better governance and
developing country emancipation. Before we examine each of these in detail, it is
important to outline the various ways that legal scholarship has analyzed transparency in
the GATT and the WTO.

47

I.

A Context for WTO Transparency in International Law and International

Relations Discourse

A.

Introduction

This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive review of the literature related to
transparency, legitimacy and global governance with respect to the WTO. Before
discussing transparency in the WTO, the first part offers a brief analysis on transparency
as a concept in law generally. Next follows a brief overview of transparency as defined
specifically in the WTO context followed by an overview of the Sutherland Report, the
commissioned report discussing WTO’s first decade. This is the first and most complete
to date official institutional account acknowledging transparency forms that go beyond
Article X of the GATT and its equivalents. Part E is a summary of transparency and
global governance scholarship from many different scholarly groups, ranging from
positivism in International Law to rationalism, critical International Law and Regime
theory. The emphasis on this part is on public law theories and more specifically,
constitutionalist approaches that currently appear to be the most prevalent account on
transparency forms.

B.

A brief outline of transparency as a legal concept

Transparency is a familiar concept in law, especially in the fields of administrative and
corporate law. Open-meeting laws and sunshine laws 1 oftentimes set minimum
procedural

requirements

for

decision-making.

Such

legislation

embodies

the

understanding that in the Rule of Law, citizens, shareholders and stakeholders, interested
parties at large need to be informed about decisions that actually or potentially affect
them, and in many cases need to be given the opportunity to participate, either in an
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advisory or a decisive role in the decision-making process. In many instances, if such
transparency rules are not followed, the decisions ensuing are rendered void. In effect,
citizens cannot be ambushed with new regulations without their knowledge and/or
consent.2
Transparency in general is a term that cannot be defined easily 3 , which is ironic
considering that dictionary definitions relate transparency with ease to perceive or detect.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, transparency is defined as “Openness; clarity; lack
of guile and attempts to hide damaging information.”4 It is often associated with shedding
light on something that was formerly obscured5 and, in law it is related to the disclosure
of information, the clarification of information and the explanation of its meaning. In this
sense, it is central to the more general notion of the Rule of Law.
In public administration the main goal of transparency is the publication and in general,
the disclosure and clarification of information. In national administrative law, it takes the
form of a right to information, which includes the obligation of authorities to publish
their decisions and the right of the administrated to receive explanations when decisions
concern them; the form of obligation to report on behalf of the administrators; and the
provision of a communication avenue between the administrator and the administrated.
Thus, transparency includes two levels of knowledge: the primary element of disclosure
of information and the secondary element of explaining the rationale behind the
information disclosed.
Another useful way of defining transparency is by looking at its opposites. Transparency
can be juxtaposed with both corruption and confidentiality. In the first case, it is almost
self-evident that any disclosure that aims at combating corruption is an improvement and
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should be welcome. Transparency should be introduced in a meaningful and fair manner,
aiming at improving administrative structures and adding to the long-term benefits of
citizens, instead of being used in a fragmented fashion only to satisfy populist demands
and utilized for political reasons and demagogy.
The relationship between transparency and confidentiality is more complex. The
concealment of information may have an operational purpose or value that cannot be
easily discounted. Such a value became obvious in the CableGate case when Wikileaks
published a large number of diplomatic correspondence, whose classification could be
essential in the function of governmental external policy.6 A similar case that examined
the value of disclosure versus that of public order protection was the case of the Pentagon
Papers7 in 1971, which is one of the most important cases examining national security
and a court order restricting speech. At the time the New York Times and the Washington
Post published excerpts of a study requested by Secretary of Defense under the Johnson
Administration, Robert McNamara on the Vietnam conflict consisting of both historical
analysis and classified government documents. After the publication of few articles out of
a forty seven-volume report, then president Nixon and Attorney General John Mitchell
obtained an injunction forcing the times to cease the publication. The case went all the
way up to the Supreme Court, which decided that the US government failed to
demonstrate the burden of proof required in First Amendment cases.8 Overall, with
respect to decisions of disclosure of information that may be of sensitive nature, there
should be a number of reasons for the information to remain confidential. These could be
related to private information, physical and mental health or safety of individuals, or
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public order and national security, to name a few.9 In such cases, the competing interests
of those that confidentiality is geared to protect should be balanced against the gains from
transparency.10
Arguably, three distinctions can be made on transparency rules, based on their normative
strength, their relational nature and their content. Depending on whether transparency
norms are enforceable rules or aspirational commitments, they can be distinguished in
hard law transparency rules and soft law transparency guarantees/pledges. Depending on
which parties it involves, transparency can be internal, external and administrative.
Depending on the content of the transparency rules, they can be procedural or
substantive/regulatory.

Table 1

Possible Transparency Classifications

Normative strength of rule
Soft law transparency
Hard law transparency

Relational nature of rule
Internal transparency
External transparency
Administrative
transparency

Content of rule
Procedural transparency
Regulatory transparency

Soft law transparency usually appears as a general principle, either in the form of a good
governance commitment at the political level (documents and codes related to the
practice of an organization11 or speeches of high ranking administrators), or a preambular
general principle. In this form, it has the least normative effect, and it can be used (at
best) either as a guideline of persuasive value to shape the behavior of the actors it can
affect or as an interpretative tool for the better understanding of concrete rules, in case
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this somehow becomes relevant before a tribunal, which examines obligations of parties
in light of their commitment to transparency. 12
The other form transparency can take is hard law, that is, binding commitment. It can be
either a procedural or a regulatory obligation, or a combination of both. In the domestic
context, procedural transparency rules impose the obligation for different administrative
bodies to follow a specific procedure, make their meetings open to the audience or certain
interested or affected parties or to publish the results of such meetings and to publish the
rules that underlie their decision-making. This form of transparency helps to add to the
predictability of decisions.
At the international level procedural transparency has achieved a hard law status usually
in the area of arbitration and dispute settlement, as far as it concerns the choice of judges
and the following of formal procedures.13 In some cases, it also establishes elements of
the “right to be heard” for interested parties and more specifically, organized groups of
civil society, professional associations, unions, or NGOs. A third, more hybrid form of
transparency, which departs slightly from the soft law category, is “administrative
transparency.”
In international law, soft law transparency can be further distinguished into internal
transparency, when it affects the conduct of diplomatic negotiations and other relations
among member states to the organization, and external transparency, relating to the
“public relations” of the organization, namely its outreach to the general public.
Transparency can be of regulatory or substantive in nature when the obligation to
disclose, publish, inform on a certain matter is self-standing. That is, if the organization
or network or actor or state fails to be transparent by not publishing a specific decision or
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law, it is solely accountable for that omission, regardless of whether this caused harm to a
certain individual or other organization.14
Consideration of context along with balancing potentially conflicting interests become
crucial in circumstances when transparency is competing with corruption concerns as
well as when confidentiality is at stake. For example, when a majority political party
insists on adopting certain rules during elections that seem to be designed to promote
transparency, one should examine whether this request is geared towards disempowering
smaller minority parties or dissent within the country. Similarly, in the domestic context,
trials often take place behind closed doors when the rights of vulnerable groups (such as
children) are at stake. At the international level, we should be cautious when transparency
provisions that are tailored to the needs of western states are being imposed upon
developing countries.15

C.

Defining transparency in the WTO

Traditionally transparency is coupled with disclosure of information. In the WTO context
it has acquired a more expanded meaning. It includes the possibility of expanded
participatory rights for citizens and consumers or external transparency; and also refers to
the position of developing countries’ with respect to decision-making, also called internal
transparency. Administrative transparency is the closest type to the traditional definition,
as it refers to publication of documents and disclosure of information from the WTO
administration. Finally, in the GATT and other agreements are articles under the title
“Transparency” that refer to the publication of national trade related laws and the
existence of administrative and judicial review mechanisms for decisions that relate to
tariffs. These last two categories invite less debate over their content.
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Internal transparency was defined in Paragraph 10 of the Doha Declaration as “the
effective participation of all Members” referring specifically to developing countries.16 I
call this aspect “internal transparency stricto sensu” as it is the one traditionally accepted
in the WTO. I argue that similar characteristics to internal transparency stricto sensu
appear elsewhere, and thus a proper examination of the term needs to extend to two more
categories: Acceding countries and Preferential Trade Agreements. The reasons for this,
further elaborated on in the chapter on Internal Transparency are threefold. The first
relates to the text of the Doha Declaration, which does not name developing countries
explicitly when it mentions problems of effective participation. Instead the reference
made is to the expanding membership of the WTO. Second, the preferential treatment of
development and developing countries, regional, bilateral and other plurilateral trade
agreements and accession protocols that give incoming members obligations on top of
what they sign for in the WTO Agreements is similar: they are all deviations from classic
MFN and National Treatment. Third, in all three cases we can observe a stronger versus
weaker state paradigm, in other words power imbalances are easily decipherable.
External transparency is a term originating outside the WTO. In fact, WTO member
states have strongly refuted that any effort from non-state actors to participate in the
WTO can be called a “transparency” issue. It remains unclear why there is such strong
opposition to calling for example the amicus curiae submissions a transparency issue.
WTO member states have not explained why they object the terminology. In their
objections they cite the intergovernmental nature of the WTO and they often say that if
they had wanted more involvement for civil society, they would have written that into the
WTO Agreements. Most likely, civil society has clustered all the requests made towards
the organization into the three greater ones: more participation, more consideration of
areas affected by trade (such as the environment) and more transparency. As the door to
the WTO for citizens, consumers and NGOs is a very narrow one, and publication of
documents may very well be the only actual product of transparency, the other two,
participation and consideration of trade-related interests were tagged on to the first one.
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Added to that is the non-transparent informal (and infrequent) practice of corporate
interest participation in dispute settlement.
I use the term “civil society” in this dissertation in the broadest sense possible. It includes
both organized civil society (NGOs, labour and consumer unions, interest groups and
lobbies), as well as citizens, academics, “netizens” (those who become active in online
fora, blogs, twitter, instagram, etc), protesters (organized and individual), members of
political parties and coalitions. In a sense, I aspire to include any politically motivated
participants and stakeholders in world trade. This may imply that corporations are also
actors included in civil society. The reason behind such an expansive definition relates to
amicus curiae briefs and their admissibility in the WTO dispute settlement process. I
realize that it may be controversial to include in the same group both environmental
groups and big oil corporations, or human rights’ NGOs and big pharmaceutical
corporations. However, if the WTO were to institute a process for the submission of
memoranda that ask to be heard in the dispute settlement, as with national courts,
standing should be as expansive as it is possible. Moreover, in the design of such a
mechanism, special attention should be given towards ensuring access to the Dispute
Settlement Process- perhaps with a two-tier mechanism for individuals and non-profit
organizations versus for profit institutions.
The only two transparencies that have been discussed by the Panels and the Appellate
Body have been legal transparency, since the 1980s and external transparency, with
respect to amicus curiae briefs. For the latter, the Panels and Appellate Body have not
used the term “transparency” in reports.
The following table summarizes the terminology used in each of the following chapters.
Transparency
Internal stricto
sensu

Definition
Internal transparency stricto sensu refers to decision-making deficits
of developing countries in the WTO. It highlights the significance of
trust in the WTO institutional processes, such as negotiations,
decision-making, dispute settlement and trade monitoring that the
representatives of member states should have in order for the WTO
55

Internal lato
sensu

External

Administrative

Legal

system to function productively.17
Internal transparency lato sensu is introduced in this thesis as an
extension of decision-making deficits. Power imbalances in the WTO
that have led to developing countries’ exclusion have also created
other asymmetrical outcomes, specifically in the areas of new
member accession and preferential trade agreement proliferation.
External transparency refers to the relationship of the organization
not with its own member states, its shareholders, but with anyone else
affected by the rules and procedures introduced under its auspices,
the stakeholders. Although generally civil society is understood to be
represented by NGOs, this thesis will discuss not only the
interactions of the WTO with the organized civil society, but it will
look at all possible communication and information flows between
the WTO and citizens of WTO member states and non-member
states, namely the public at large.
Administrative transparency refers to transparency aspects in the
administrative level of the WTO. The functions of the WTO are
carried at the political level by the diplomats who are employed by
WTO member states and at the administrative level by the WTO
secretariat, namely the permanent staff of the WTO. The Secretariat
assists the main organs consisting of diplomats in their function. In
addition, the Secretariat with its legal officers assists the Panelists
and Appellate Body members during the resolution of trade disputes.
The transparency issues that arise in this context are mainly related to
the selection of the WTO employees, judges and other participants in
the administration of international trade.
The obligation of WTO member states, outlined in Article X of the
GATT and its equivalents in other agreements, to publish their traderelated legislation and the rule of law obligations to maintain
adequate recourse mechanisms for traders and consumers in order to
resolve issues that may arise in transnational trade matters, at the
border upon the entry of products and in the domestic market.

Table 2 Transparency forms in the WTO

D.

The Sutherland Report

Transparency existed as a rule in the GATT, Article X, since 1947, but was officially
brought to the forefront of institutional discussions with the Sutherland Report no earlier
than 2005. In view of the WTO 10th anniversary in 2005, then Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi commissioned a report from a consultative board consisting of the former
Director-General of the WTO, Peter Sutherland and a few select members of
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governments, academics and policy-makers. The result was a report entitled “The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium.” Previously, in
1983, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel similarly commissioned the “Leutwiler
Report”, which actively pushed towards the initiation of the Uruguay Round and the
establishment of a robust multilateral trading system. The Sutherland report looks at the
functioning of the WTO as an institution. Although the report is not directly related to the
Doha deadlock, the assessment of institutional parameters has as a goal among other
things to find productive avenues that can be used to address the issues underlying the
Doha negotiations’ problems.
The report purports to be an evaluation of the WTO and to discuss legitimacy concerns
concerning the WTO. In its nine chapters, the report discusses central issues such as the
relationship between the WTO and Globalization and Sovereignty (Chapters I and III),
the erosion of non-discrimination mostly due to national protectionism and regional and
preferential trade agreements (Chapter II), the problems of the consensus voting rule,
political reinforcement, process efficiency and the WTO’s variable geometry (Chapters
VII and VIII), the relationship of the WTO with other international organizations
(Chapter IV), transparency and civil society participation (Chapter V), the dispute
settlement system (Chapter VI) and challenges and improvements of administrative
nature for the Secretariat and the Director General (Chapter IX).
Even though the report includes some (albeit very limited) constructive criticism for the
WTO, it largely is an apologetic document, a defense of the WTO 18 and those aspects of
globalization that provide fertile ground for the economic paradigm under which the
organization operates. It has been criticized as a “trade liberalization gospel”19 which is
“trapped in [its] functionalist straightjacket.” Its conclusions are seen as unconvincing20
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as being an attempt to defend “the status quo by WTO insiders.”21 Indeed, the members
of Consultative Board are linked to the WTO, the report was written only by them,
without the participation of civil society actors, and it even mentions that one goal of the
report is to “revisi[t] some of the fundamental principles of the trading system that, in our
view, have been greatly misunderstood or misrepresented.” 22 Among the academics
discussing the Sutherland Report, a small fraction who have or have had an institutional
affiliation with the organization are the only ones who agree with the analysis and
conclusions of the Report.23 The usefulness of the Sutherland Report does not lie in
providing answers for the legitimacy problems of the WTO, as it seems to be giving the
WTO a perfect score. However, it helps delineate some issues, and thus we can sketch a
rough territory where the WTO needs improvements.
Several themes transpire from the scholarship discussing the Sutherland Report. First,
scholars point out that the report did not adequately address the central issue of
development in the WTO, in the form of the negotiating asymmetries for developing
countries as well as the incomplete and fragmented understanding of development needs,
coupled with a blind trust on the trade liberalization paradigm. For as long as trade
negotiations resulted in lower trade tariffs, the legitimacy issues facing the international
trading system (the GATT at the time) remained less visible. Developing countries
voiced their frustration in a number of occasions, but the institutional response, reflecting
developed countries’ convictions was that as long as developing countries stay on the
trade train, they will eventually gain some speed, reduce poverty and create prosperity for
themselves. Since 1995 and the Uruguay Round results, we have yet to witness a
successful trade round. Legitimacy as a derivative of trade negotiations and their
resulting tariff reductions is no longer a plausible narrative in WTO discourse. Thus, in
the ten-year anniversary of the WTO, the Sutherland Report had the opportunity to
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reframe the issue of development in the WTO. In view of the Doha Development Round,
the Report could take advantage of the opportunity and revisit the liberalization
paradigm. Instead, citing a number of “empirical studies” and in sync with the Report’s
tone, development and internal transparency concerns are barely addressed. It is their
own

“autarkic,

inward-looking

policies”

and

“their

own

protection”

that “undermined the developing countries’ export performance by creating a ‘bias
against exports.’”24 Countries who benefit from preferential rules become “over-reliant
on preference.”25
The “it’s-not-us-it’s-you” tone of the report continues during the second theme, which
dominated the criticism of the report. The openness of the organization towards civil
society and NGOs is deemed satisfactory; the Secretariat does not have sufficient
resources to do more; and, some of these organizations are intransparent themselves. This
type of reasoning was greatly criticized, and rightfully so, in the literature. Such a line of
argumentation, besides not addressing but fueling legitimacy problems, it also carries
little normative value and does not contribute to a good governance model.
Another major point of discussion for academics engaging with the Sutherland Report
was the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the proposals for its reform. The Panels
and Appellate Body are perhaps the only example in international law of such a prolific
system of adjudication, and a high rate of implementation. Implementation is successful
when countries have- even theoretically- the opportunity to cross retaliate in their
markets, should another country be found non compliant with WTO law. However, some
implementation problems remain when smaller economies are involved in dispute
settlement, developing countries still underutilize the system. Generally the Sutherland
Report moved in the right direction with respect to pointing out some institutional
concerns and offering suggestions to address them.
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Finally, the Report falls short of explicitly and systematically discussing larger
institutional problems and power asymmetries in the WTO, as well as the balance
between legitimate national concerns for regulation and the principle of nondiscrimination. State sovereignty has been eroded through participation in the WTO. The
WTO has a long reach and affects a large segment of the domestic legal orders of its
members, because of the pervasive nature of trade. Unlike environmental treaties, or
agreements on the law of the sea, trade touches almost any activity. Additional
Agreements, especially TRIPS, TBT and GATS can leave economists hard-pressed to
think of areas where the WTO has no relevance. The Sutherland Report adopts an
analysis that treats the WTO as one of many intergovernmental organizations and the
reduction of state sovereignty as a product of the proliferation of organizations. This
obscures the fact that trade regulation is highly intrusive on national legislations and
since the Uruguay Round the WTO has extended its reach in a vast area of jurisdiction.
As such, national parliaments are de facto sidestepped. Any legitimacy discussion surely
does not need to propose the demise of the current trading system, intrusive as that
system may be or seem. Instead, the Report could have pointed out avenues for the
repoliticization of interest areas in order to re-introduce debates and participation of
stakeholders that would have been part of national deliberation processes had the WTO
not acquired jurisdiction in these areas. Both for underestimating the deflation of
sovereignty, and for failing to remedy the legitimacy issues that deflation causes, the
report falls critically short.

1.

Transparency in the Sutherland Report

Transparency as a theme in the WTO is prominently featured in the report, as it occupies
an entire chapter (out of nine in total). Additionally, transparency-related issues are
scattered throughout the report in the other eight sections. The Sutherland report directly
addresses external transparency and it alludes or discusses less elaborately all other forms
of transparency that will be discussed in this thesis, namely internal, legal, and
administrative.
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First and foremost, the report explicitly refers to external transparency in Chapter V,
entitled “Transparency and dialogue with civil society.” The report here mentions that:
176. A distinct feature of the tremendous transformation that has taken
place in the global order over the past two decades has doubtless been the
expanding role of civil society. The rise of mass democracy, or what some
have called the “global associational revolution” was particularly
powerful in the decade of the nineties as the UN world conferences
galvanized the forces of civil society globally in a bid to promote a more
inclusive, participatory and transparent system of global governance. This,
amidst a growing sense that many global problems could only be
effectively addressed through a partnership of state and non-state actors.
177. This new partnership has not been without its tensions. The concerns
of civil society organizations for more meaningful and substantive
participation, the anxieties of sovereign governments about the invasion of
their hitherto uncontested space, and the challenges faced by global
institutions in reconciling their mandates and legal frameworks with these
new realities are still very much alive.
178. Even so, the new partnership has in many ways been a welcome and
beneficial experience. It has focused political and public opinion on the
importance of trade and often has revealed key intersections between trade
policies and economic, foreign, social and other policy areas. At the same
time for those who recognize the large benefits the multilateral trading
system has brought to hundreds of millions of people across the globe, it
has often been a frustrating and discouraging experience. While some nongovernmental organizations have sought to acquire the necessary
expertise on trade issues to make a productive contribution, others have
not, being content to protest the existing order.26
Altogether, the chapter on civil society has been characterized as “disappointing.”27 This
last part should be read together with a perplexing excerpt from the conclusions of the
report. The report there mentions that “[t]he Secretariat is under no obligation to engage
seriously with groups whose express objective is to undermine or destroy the WTO.”28
This is a very troubling statement. Assuming that the Sutherland report is not referring to
criminal organizations (which naturally can be excluded as they do not contribute to
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public debate), it is reasonable to expect some serious contributions from organizations
that may oppose segments (even large ones) of the WTO’s mandate. If such organizations
care enough to submit proposals that oppose the current WTO status quo in a courteous
manner and maintain such a level of discussion, it is unclear why these organizations
should not be engaged with. If this note simply refers to organizations who perpetrate
crimes (such as the destruction of public property in protests), then it is unnecessary. This
excerpt gives the wrong message about the WTO, namely that the organization might not
engage, at all, with voices from the inside or the outside that directly oppose its mandate,
so the only possible debates can occur with anyone who thinks the WTO has to continue
working as it does.
Generally, it is the organization’s responsibility to filter voices from civil society, and
establish transparent and legitimate mechanisms and thresholds to distinguish among all
NGOs willing to participate. Moreover, the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, the only
Ministerial to date that took place during huge protests at its doors, did not fail because of
those who were dressed as turtles and yelled “Kill the WTO.” The death came from the
inside: the developed/developing country divide, Charlene Barshefsky’s (the US Trade
Representative at the time) decision to reach a final declaration in a smaller group setting,
and Bill Clinton’s hijacking of the conference’s agenda in a direction that developing
countries could not accept.29 To turn this around and accuse NGOs for their lack of
transparency, or direct attention to national mechanisms of citizen participation does not
address the WTO’s legitimacy problems. Instead, it discusses other actors’ legitimacy
problems.30
Amicus curiae briefs are interestingly absent from the part discussing criticisms of WTO
jurisprudence. 31 Only the chapter discussing the relations with other international
organizations briefly mentions that:
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“[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO, due to its special
characteristics and being self-contained in its jurisdictional
responsibilities, offers no legal space for cooperation with other
international organizations except on a case-by-case basis derived from
the right of panels to seek information. The Board endorses the
maintenance of this policy.”32
It is unclear why the report does not elaborate the issue of amicus briefs, which we will
discuss in the Chapter on external transparency. The limited discussion in the Report,
compared to Appellate Body practice is even deemed to be a “step backwards.” 33 In any
event the briefs were by the time of the publication of the Report an informal, not
officially endorsed yet frequent practice before the Appellate Body. The report came out
in 2005, after the 2001 General Council decision opposing the briefs, but nevertheless
relating them to the notion of transparency. The absence of any analysis is troubling.
Framing civil society participation and external transparency in such a wide framework
initially appears to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the issue of global civil
society mobilization and participatory mechanisms in world affairs. However, this
analysis obscures the unique to the international trading system protests, objections and
formal and informal requests for participation as well as the WTO-specific challenges
with respect to civil society participation.
For example, seen under this light of a general expansion of civil society role in world
affairs, the amicus curiae brief issue that will be discussed in a following chapter
acquires a different significance: the response of WTO member-states, the Secretariat and
the Sutherland Report moves along the lines of the legal personality and the subjects of
public international law and intergovernmental organizations under a Westphalian
perspective. States and states only can participate, following the formal mechanisms of
participation outlined in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, in any disputes, either as
claimants and respondents, or as third parties. This official response, reiterated over the
last two decades in several occasions however represents the role of civil society and
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NGOs in the WTO inaccurately. The WTO Agreements contain several formal
mechanisms for the participation of transnational actors, and others that were established
through case law and will be discussed in this thesis. Extending this case law to include
amicus curiae briefs, seen under the light of traditional international law and the system
of international organizations, is a big stretch.
The Sutherland Report itself places “business and consumers” at the center of
stakeholdership in multilateral trade negotiations.34 To be absolutely clear on the report’s
intensions vis-à-vis civil society, they add the word “rightly” in this part.

35

The

opportunity to envision a role for these stakeholders in formal mechanisms is greatly
missed.36 If civil society participation is placed under the light of the WTO law and case
law, then it appears to fall within acceptable institutional margins, together with scientific
opinions, consumer preferences and corporate interests. In this respect, it has also been
observed that the WTO is focused on producers and exporters, who have many incentives
to support protectionism37, much more than it is on consumers and citizens.38 Beyond
obscuring the external transparency deficits, the report also fails to recognize the uneven
focus of the WTO rules and the economic paradigm that it puts forward on only one side
of the stakeholders, namely businesses. Even more, it is the consumers that would mostly
benefit by the lowering of tariffs, and currently, businesses lobby at a national level to
increase protectionism. The Report overall fails to capitalize at the NGO potential to be a
“direct, transnational interface or voice mechanism where citizens and consumers can
transmit concerns and obtain information about WTO activities and decisions.”39
Another aspect of external transparency discussed in the Sutherland Report relates to
opening of Panel and Appellate Body meetings to the public. This positive attitude
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towards transparency in the dispute settlement has a very large number of supporters40
mostly from non participants (civil society and academics) but also from some WTO
representatives, as it can initially be done on a voluntary basis with state consent (as it
currently happens) and progressively open up the process, perhaps by only requiring one
state to request the opening of the meetings during the process, or, in the traditional WTO
decision-making fashion, establish that all larger meetings are open unless consensus
exists among parties to a dispute to the contrary. It has also been observed that
uncoupling the WTO Public Forum or Public Symposium from the WTO Ministerial
Conference reduces the former to a “show-and-tell” event, instead of taking the
opportunity to build civil society into the negotiating process.41 The conclusion in the
Transparency chapter is positively supportive to the WTO, even providing a long passage
on the necessity of secrecy for negotiations,42 or the idea that there is such as thing as
“excessive transparency.”43
Chapter V contains some discussion on internal transparency, that is, negotiating
asymmetries among WTO member states, especially present in the tension between
developed and developing countries.44 Internal transparency ironically is discussed in the
context of justifying the need for secrecy of negotiations. Interestingly, despite the Doha
Development Round and its challenges, and its explicit mention in Paragraph 10 of the
Doha Declaration, the report does not elaborate on how internal transparency is
compromised in the WTO by the treatment of developing countries.45
Paragraph 222 of the report interestingly notes that developing countries participate much
more in the Dispute Settlement Process than in the GATT, and “developing countries –
even some of the poorest (when given the legal assistance now available to them) – are
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increasingly taking on the most powerful. That is how it should be.” This statement is
largely exaggerated. In fact, a number of countries have never participated in the dispute
settlement system, not even as third parties. Isolated examples like that of Antigua and
Barbuda show that perhaps the system works, but it works for those who use it, which is
not the overwhelming majority of the WTO. Also despite its victory against the United
States during dispute settlement, the subsequent effective inability to implement the,
report should warrant a revision of the implementation rules. When cross-retaliation is
allowed only within the domestic market of the winner, and the winner is a micro-state,
then cross-retaliation is meaningless: no sector can be large enough to harm the strong
state that stood on the other side of litigation. That is not “how it should be.”
Once again in the report, the opportunity is missed to discuss at a pragmatic level how to
bring developing countries not up to speed with trade, but on equal footing with their
peers at an institutional level.46 The repeated failures to conclude a negotiating round in
Doha and later in Bali demonstrate that the institutional and collective reluctance to
tackle internal transparency as a serious issue comes at a high cost that threatens the
WTO’s main function. This institutional reluctance is evident in the Sutherland Report.
The Green Room issue is barely addressed. Emphasis is instead placed on need for
confidentiality, a discussion on variable geometry and a gospel for the current negotiation
arrangements that perpetuate the internal transparency deficits and are, in relative terms,
archaic, since they are reminiscent of the GATT days.
Some discussion on Least-Developed countries appears later in the report47 but not
exploring their real problems with the WTO. They are mentioned as “unfortunately,
insignificant in terms of world trade (even collectively).” However, as it appears from the
Doha Round, collectively they can contribute to blocking further decision-making and
their accession process takes a very long time (despite their ‘insignificance’) as we will
see in the chapter on accessions and internal transparency lato sensu.
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It is important to note here that even though the Sutherland Report rightly observes that
the institutional and monetary resources of the WTO are not unlimited, this does not
mean that focus on one form of transparency necessarily needs to occur at the expense of
the other.48 This perspective fails to capture that institutional and pecuniary constraints
reflect a lack of support from member states, another issue that should be remedied. Also,
considering the extent of the WTO’s legitimacy crisis, addressing these legitimacy
problems should be a first priority for the organization, both at the internal and at the
external level.
The Sutherland Report does not discuss asymmetries caused by accession, although the
Chinese candidacy has brought many of the internal transparency issues during accession
processes into light.49 The Report does focus on Preferential Trade Agreements and
regionalism.50 Although it mentions that the vast majority of the PTAs and RTAs have
not been notified and all but one have never been examined to check their compatibility
with the WTO Agreements, the Report does not encourage the organization to expose this
state of affairs.51 It engages in a discussion on whether such agreements promote or
undermine the world trading system, only to conclude that the evidence and research is
inconclusive. The systemic reluctance to discuss regional trade agreements remains. We
can hypothesize that this occurs at the expense of the less powerful players in the WTO.
52

Insofar PTAs are not even notified with the WTO, and power asymmetries are caused

and perpetuated by PTAs the transparency deficit in this respect is massive, and it results
both from the lack of disclosure and marginalization of member states.
Chapter V discusses legal transparency when it defers to WTO member states for the
management of civil society voices and concerns in national parliaments. In this context,
the Sutherland report mentions that governments are under the obligation to openly
discuss their trade-related legislation, which is linked to the obligation embodied in
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Article X of the GATT and its equivalents.53 With respect to the relationship of Member
states and civil society, the report notes:
“It must continue to be recognized that the primary responsibility for
engaging civil society in trade policy matters rests with the Members
themselves. While the WTO's relations with civil society have their own
integrity and dynamics, they are inextricably bound with government /civil
society relations at the national level.54”
Fourth, aspects related to administrative transparency are discussed in Chapter IX,
entitled “The role of the Director-General and Secretariat.” The Sutherland report
acknowledges that the WTO Secretariat is “one of the smallest among major international
institutions”55 but interprets its small size as an institutional constraint, rather than a
caveat to the organization’s legitimacy. Instead, the report notes in paragraph 361 that
“the legitimacy of decision-making is adequately protected by the consensus principle.”56
The Secretariat could assume greater responsibility in ensuring that the information
published publicly and internally is meaningful in the way it is presented to citizens of
WTO member states and traders that have their own systemic constraints in using the vast
amount of data produced and presented by the WTO, with increased emphasis on
consumers, developing and least-developed countries.57 The selection of the members of
the Secretariat is limited to the senior positions of the Director-General’s deputies58
without any word on the selection of the remaining more than five hundred employees.
Moreover, the “pro-trade ethos” of the Secretariat does not allow a fruitful dialogue and
the formation of internal dissent clusters. Instead, similarly to the Sutherland Report the
Secretariat is there to defend the status quo.59
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E.

WTO and Transparency in International Law and International

Relations’ discourse
Academic discourse focusing on the legitimacy problems facing international
organizations has been around for some time. Legitimacy concerns and discussions were
coupled even during the birth and early years of those institutions.60 The failure of the
League of Nations, coupled with the Second World War became an early symbol of the
problématique of international institutions: the League of Nations was one of first
permanent structures created after international negotiations that failed shortly thereafter.
The UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT/WTO have been dealing with
legitimacy problems throughout their history. Dissatisfaction and disappointment ensue,
together with long discussions on how to remedy the problems that these institutions face,
and review their normative frameworks and agendas. The peak period of legitimacy
discussions are mostly the last forty-five years. With respect to the international trading
system that timeframe is slightly smaller- legitimacy-related discourse did start as early
as the late sixties, however, the vast volume of scholarship appeared in the late eighties
and peaked after the nineties- during the Seattle and surrounding events and the initiation
of the Doha Round of negotiations.
Both in the international and the domestic domain, the formal and informal exercise of
political authority produces normative outcomes whose legitimacy is constantly tested.61
Under the notion of the Rule of Law, a number of principles have emerged in order to
ensure legitimate decision-making. Transparency, openness or disclosure of information
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is an important form of substantiating legitimacy. In the WTO, it is formally become both
a rule binding member states to publish their trade rules and an institutional commitment
on behalf of the organization itself. Transparency and legitimacy discussions first crossed
paths at the domestic level. In international law, Global Administrative Law
systematically defined and explored a normative space where transparency was one of
few prominent principles. A significant number of scholars in WTO law, International
Law and International Relations have also examined transparency in their work. A
fraction of the contributions on transparency in International Law and International
Relations frequently refers to the WTO, either exclusively, or to compare it with other
international organizations, more specifically the EU and the World Bank and IMF. Some
scholars have dealt specifically with transparency in the WTO.
After summarizing the scholarship directly reacting to the Sutherland Report and its
transparency issues, I will group the scholarly contributions into five large categories62:
first, positivism, realism and rationalism; second, mainstream WTO law and
transparency; third international public law; fourth, critical public international law; and
fifth, societal constitutionalism. Furthermore, the third group, international public law,
has a number of significant variations within its domain, which will be addressed in a
separate chapter.
The table below summarizes the positions of the four groups with respect to each group’s
position on seven key questions. The first column presents the attitude towards global
governance as the overall discourse platform in which discussions on the WTO should
take place. Here the two main camps are those who assume that the WTO is an
intergovernmental organization, analyzed under traditional international law (with
emphasis on state sovereignty and the doctrine of pacta sunt servanta) and those who
discuss WTO law in the context of some form of “global governance” theoryintroducing more variables.63 The second column summarizes the degree of emphasis on
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the WTO’s legitimacy problems, which ranges from almost non-existent to central. The
third issue is the strength of a link between legitimacy and transparency. The fourth
question, based on the four transparency forms, is which types of transparency are
analyzed. The next two questions are what are the positions of these groups towards
sovereignty and civil society in the WTO (or at the global level generally).

Classic International
Law/Rationalism/Reali
sm/ Positivism/
Trade Law

International Public
law
∗ GAL
∗ IPA/IPL
∗ Constitutionalism
-see Table 3.
Critical Public
International Law/
Opposition to IPL/
Sutherland Report
reactions

Societal
Constitutionalism

WTO and
Global
Governance
NO (or
tautology
between global
governance
and
international
community)
YES
(resembling a
domestic
public law
order)
YES (critical
of existing
structures,
transnationalist
elements)

YES
(transnational
constitutionali
zation)

WTO and
Legitimacy
problems
Not as
pronounced
and crucial

Relation of
Transparency
to Legitimacy
Loose link

Transparency

Sovereignty
of States

Civil Society in
the WTO

Sutherland
Report

Emphasis on
legal and
internal. Some
administrative

YES- only
states can
bind
themselves

Filter through the
nation state

Agreement in
spirit, some
criticisms on
trade law related
issues

Crucial but
“public-law
like” Global
Governance
can help
solve them
Crucial,
unclear how
(if) global
governance
will (can)
handle the
erosion of
the nationstate and
power
asymmetries
Crucial
(socio-legal
analysis
necessary)

Strong link

Emphasis
mostly on
external, and
then internal

YES with a
global
polity

Element of
deliberative or
representative
democracy

Medium/
Strong link

Emphasis on
internal and
external

YES-eroded

Important as part
of transnational
actors, at times
amorphous, at
times more
organized

Disagreement in
parts,
opportunity to
extrapolate
publicness in
others.
Stronger
reaction and
criticism

Medium link

Discussion on
deliberative
polyarchy and
knowledge,
capacity for
action and
power of
implementatio
n

YES (but
national
constitution
s are
structurally
inadequate
to deal with
global
problems)

YES (massive
externalincluding civil
societyintervention will
trigger the
internal process
of change

N/A

Table 3 WTO Transparency Theoretical Approaches

The following analysis will discuss each of these groups in detail.
1.

The scholarly debate on the Sutherland Report
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Transparency has been discussed in the context of the extensive debate following the
Sutherland report. Transparency as a theme in the WTO is prominently featured in the
report, as it occupies an entire chapter (out of nine in total). Additionally, transparencyrelated issues 64 are scattered throughout the report in the other eight sections. The
Sutherland report directly addresses external transparency and it alludes or discusses less
elaborately all other forms of transparency that are discussed in this thesis, namely
internal, legal, and administrative. After its publication, a number of scholars organized
symposia discussing the missed opportunities of the report to address legitimacy issues
raised in the report, and criticizing it for missing the mark on legitimacy concerns in
global governance and trade governance, praising the organization instead. Some of these
contributions, led by Jan Klabbers,65 identified global governance deficits and serious
concerns with respect to developing countries, the dispute settlement process and civil
society participation in the WTO. Many scholars from the GAL and IPA/IPL projects
participated in the symposia. As the main lens of this discussion was to address the
problems of the WTO as an institution, they extended the debate on the law of
international organizations (IOs), examining institutional structures and deficits of IOs
and comparing different IOs and their practices. These works are understandably critical
of the self-evaluation of the WTO.
The Sutherland report was criticized as an apologetic document, a defense of the WTO
and those aspects of globalization that provide fertile ground for the economic paradigm
under which the organization operates, a “trade liberalization gospel” which is “trapped
in [its] functionalist straightjacket.” Its conclusions are seen as unconvincing as being an
attempt to defend “the status quo by WTO insiders.”66 With respect to transparency,
despite the observation in the Sutherland Report that the institutional and monetary
resources of the WTO are finite, focus on one form of transparency should not occur at
the expense of the other. The critiques of the Sutherland report related to transparency
mostly discuss the issue of internal transparency and more particularly, developing
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country meaningful and equal participation in WTO processes. They also focus on
external transparency and civil society participation. The majority of these contributions
are appropriate responses to the Sutherland Report, which suffers from an almost
absolute lack of critical self-reflection.
Pauwelyn noted that report does not elaborate on how internal transparency is
compromised in the WTO by the treatment of developing countries. Instead it
demonstrates an incomplete and fragmented understanding of development needs,
coupled with a blind trust on the trade liberalization paradigm.67 Wolfe emphasized the
negotiating asymmetries among WTO member states, especially present in the tension
between developed and developing countries. Moreover, the “pro-trade ethos” of the
Secretariat does not allow a fruitful dialogue and the formation of internal dissent
clusters. Instead, similarly to the Sutherland Report the Secretariat is there to defend the
status quo. 68 Kuijper criticized the report for another form of internal transparency
deficits, caused by Preferential Trade Agreements and regionalism. Although the vast
majority of the PTAs and RTAs have not been notified and all but one have never been
examined to check their compatibility with the WTO Agreements, the Report does not
encourage the organization to engage in a discussion on PTAs and RTAs. The systemic
reluctance to discuss regional trade agreements remains at the expense of the less
powerful players in the WTO. 69
The report purports that the openness of the organization towards civil society and NGOs
is deemed satisfactory and the positive attitude towards transparency in the dispute
settlement has a very large number of supporters. The Sutherland Report itself places
“business and consumers” at the center of stakeholdership in multilateral trade
negotiations but not as participants, as Klabbers correctly points out. 70 Charnovitz
concurs that the opportunity of envisioning a role for these stakeholders is greatly missed
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and adds that the WTO Public Forum has been reduced to a “show-and-tell” event,
instead of taking the opportunity to build civil society into the negotiating process.71
Pauwelyn notes that WTO is focused on producers and exporters, who have many
incentives to support protectionism, much more than it is on consumers and citizens and
the Report overall fails to capitalize at the NGO potential.72 Finally, Shaffer observes
Secretariat could assume greater responsibility in ensuring that the information published
publicly and internally is meaningful in the way it is presented to various stakeholders
that have their own systemic constraints in using the vast amount of data produced and
presented by the WTO, such as consumers or developing and least-developed countries.73
On a similar tone, external transparency has been discussed by Delimatsis.74
2.

Positivism, Realism and Rationalism

In order to approach the positivist approach to transparency, I will first look at positivism
in legal theory in general and give an overview of its history. Positivism in the domestic
legal context and positivism in international law exhibit a number of significant
differences, mainly due to the lack of centralized enforcement in the international
community. As such, this chapter will continue to examine the positions of positivists in
international law before moving to positivism in WTO law more specifically. Finally, I
will discuss positivist accounts of transparency in WTO law. Two more theoretical
streams, realism and rationalism will be briefly discussed in this chapter, as in many
instances the argumentation of positivists approximates that of realists and rationalists.75
Positivism stems from the 19th century withdrawal from natural law and focus on written
decisions and laws by the government as the only ones having the legal power to regulate
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human conduct. In the tradition of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin76, H.L.A. Hart insisted
on the separation of law as it is and as it ought to be.77 Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law78
follows in the same tradition and so do contemporary positivists such as Coleman and
Raz. 79In the tradition of H.L.A. Hart80, positivists often distinguish between primary
rules (under the understanding that law is a command) and secondary rules, or rules of
enforcement.
In international law, the concept of sovereign equality and resulting lack of hierarchy,
which further produces lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms have had a strong
influence on positivist theories. During the first half of the 19th century the departure
from natural law approaches resulted in the emergence of two positivist legal traditions.81
In continental Europe, first Jellinek and Triepel, followed by Kelsen introduced
methodological legal positivism in international law, while in the Anglo-American
tradition, Austin and H.S. Maine and later to some extent H.L.A. Hart posited that
“international legal science” should focus on “positive custom of nations as actually
practiced.” 82 The continental tradition recognized reciprocity as the foundation of
international law, as evidenced through the express and tacit consent of states in treaty
and custom. Kelsen argued that a pluralistic view of legal systems is not attainable.
Instead, national and international law form a single and hierarchical legal system. 83
However, the entire edifice relies on the existence of a “Grundnorm”, a basic norm whose
characteristics are reminiscent of natural law rather than positivism proper. 84 Hart
conceded to Kelsen that international law can be conceived as a decentralized system of
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law with no secondary rules.85 The Anglo-American positivist tradition embraced the
natural law foundations of international law more openly and acknowledged that
international law is not law in the strict meaning. Thus, both the sources’ thesis and the
separation thesis were obscured by reference to a common shared morality in
international relations.86
Despite the fact that positivism in international law was never “genuine” as it was
strongly diluted with natural law elements, its initial theses on sovereignty, the dualistic
separation between national and international law and the exclusivity of legal personality
for states remain central to many approaches in contemporary international law.
Koskenniemi observes this paradoxical turn and posits that positivism and naturalism are
not as separate as they appear in the writings of their respective proponents. Rather, they
are relational and have significance only in opposition to each other. 87 The resulting
inconsistencies continue to be the problem in the theories, which insist on the primacy of
treaty as a contract and the codification of international law. This Westphalian-centric
attitude renders contemporary international law analysis murkier. For transnational
phenomena that are still in the process of formation (for example civil society
participation at the international level), positivism gives an answer to those who do not
think these are normatively relevant. They resort to the mantra that international relations
are still the exclusive domain of sovereign states.
The more theoretically elaborate perspective on positivism is discussed by Palmeter and
by Trachtman. This section will focus on these two, as well as Richard Steinberg’s
analysis on internal transparency issues in the WTO, mainly because in their work the
link between transparency and legitimacy is more clearly evidenced, albeit a loose one.
The next section will discuss other formalist approaches on transparency from the
mainstream WTO scholarship.
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The positivist scholars examine transparency as a rule in WTO law mainly by tracing the
history of Article X of the GATT and its jurisprudence. With respect to other forms of
transparency and especially external and internal transparency, positivists turn to a
rationalist approach, which posits that information disclosure is a strategic tool for states
and only occurs when it is to their interest. Realist approaches in international law, which
argue that international law is not really law because of the lack of enforcement are very
similar to “hard” Hartian positivism 88 which cites the lack of secondary rules in
international law as evidence for its nature as not “true” law.
The general disposition of positivist approaches towards WTO legitimacy concerns is
summarized well in Joel Trachtman’s analysis on civil society participation in WTO
adjudication, which we will see in more detail at the end of this chapter. Trachtman
notes:
“It is best to avoid conclusory assertions of the rightness, fairness,
democracy, or legitimacy of private participation in WTO dispute
settlement. Private participation in dispute settlement should not be
determined by natural law assertions, for the market is constructed, and
the property contract, and trading rights allocated to individuals are
determined, not by natural law but by politics, hopefully informed by
comparative institutional analysis. The right to litigate should be
understood as a component of individual rights in the same way.”89
The underlying rationale here is the separation between law and behavior, which prompts
a centralist approach in international law, whereby only treaties bind states and focusing
on specific rules will clarify how and when compliance occurs.90 Legitimacy, fairness
and democracy are displaced to the periphery of the academic discussion

and not

explicitly linked to specific rules in the WTO. At best, they appear in non-binding
chapeaux of treaties. As such, any link between transparency and legitimacy is not
plausible. Positivism discusses rules, and their enforcement in a “pragmatic” fashion,
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instead of looking at the “quality of the legal regime.”91 This implies more than the
possibility of analytical separation between law and legitimacy: it argues that such a
separation is not only possible but a better framework for analysis. The result is that
legitimacy and state-interest are eventually collapsed into each other.
Trachtman’s version of positivism is described in his book “The Economic Structure of
International Law” as a “social scientific approach to international law”92 and more
specifically “methodological and normative individualism”93 According to Trachtman,
his positivist analysis focuses only on secondary rules, namely rules that induce and
ensure enforcement of international obligations.94 His approach however to rules’ and
institutional design as a means for states to induce the type of compliance they desire
approximates rationalism more than positivism.95 Similarly, for the WTO Trachtman
posits that depending on each member’s interests, the WTO system authorizes members
to breach obligations and pay compensations as a result. 96 He specifically says that the
implementation of the GATT as a treaty is based on power politics and reputation.97 As
such, any type of “constitutional changes” for the WTO occur when there are shifts in
state preferences, induced by public pressure, technological advancement, or health
concerns. 98 Any discussion on concessions in key sectors to developing countries or the
Green Room problems is absent for the most part.
A different positivist perspective is adopted by Palmeter who discusses all treaty regimes,
including the GATT as regimes of primary rules. 99 However, without secondary norms
the primary rules are not “serious” enough. 100 This reflects a realist understanding of
international law, namely that without enforcement mechanisms international law is not
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law. Thus, Palmeter observes that the negotiators of the Uruguay Round, which resulted
in the creation of the WTO wanted an independent adjudicatory system. Furthermore this
dispute settlement system has evolved from a more formalist application of rules to
introducing value considerations. 101 This observation can be seen as Palmeter’s internal
critique to his originally positivist thesis.102
As a result from the aforementioned approaches on WTO rules, transparency is analyzed
in two different ways by scholars who identify their theories as positivist. As mentioned
before there is a significant portion of Article X of the GATT formalistic analysis. This
approach is also adopted by Palmeter, who categorizes Article X as a primary rule.103
Even with the realist and rationalist elements, this scholarship is closer to a narrow, or
hard positivism. The other two positivist approaches do not look at article X but more
towards internal, external and administrative transparency. At first it seems odd (perhaps
even encouraging) that the non-legal forms of transparency are of interest to positivists.
However, as mentioned before, when discussing the WTO, positivists appear to be closer
to realism and rationalism than a Kelsenian approach to international law. Thus, the
following theorists can be classified as soft positivists or even pseudo-positivists.
Trachtman explicitly discusses private rights of action in the WTO. This form of private
participation is also called “external transparency” and involves NGOs, corporations and
members of civil society at large who wish to formally participate in WTO’s judicial
proceedings. The absence of an explicit legal right of such parties to participate in the
DSU, except in some specific cases in TRIPS (approximating NAFTA’s Chapter 11) lead
Trachtman to conclude that such private rights are absent from the WTO.104 However,
this is a very narrow understanding of the WTO’s normative framework. As we will see
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further, especially in the Asbestos case105 the Panels and the Appellate Body have the
opportunity, through formal rules of procedure to introduce an ad hoc platform for civil
society participation in dispute settlement. Overall, Trachtman’s analysis does not explain
the few but consistent filed amicus curiae briefs.106
An extension of the same rationalist rationale behind Trachtman’s account on the WTO is
adopted by Steinberg where all “information gathering” (which includes mostly internal
transparency but also elements of external transparency). Transparency is seen under the
lens of “maximizing efficiency in policy making.”107 More specifically, Steinberg points
that: “[t]he agenda setters from powerful states must have good information about each
country's preferences, the domestic politics behind those preferences, and risk tolerancesacross all of the topics that might be covered- to understand potential zones of agreement
on a package acceptable to all. To be most useful, the available information must be
sincere and not provided for strategic purposes (that is, not for purposes of yielding an
outcome that would make the information provider better off than if he or she had
provided sincere information).” 108 Thus, not only is information used against less
powerful states, but the sincerity of their disclosure is manipulated. External transparency
and administrative transparency are weaved together in Steinberg’s analysis, and in terms
of external transparency, information signals preferences and is utilized in agenda-setting
processes without any regard for legitimacy altogether. 109Steinberg to some extent down
acknowledges this as a problem and even characterizes this as “organized hypocrisy.”110
However, he misplaces attention and blames the consensus rule for all the extant WTO
problems, while the real issue at stake is the underlying disregard for development needs
and the economic theory that lacks legitimacy. It is the lack of meaningful consensusand this would be the same even if the voting rules were diametrically different, and
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involved weighted decision making, or even simple voting. 111 It is not the decisionmaking process that induces legitimacy.112
3.

Formalist and fragmented analysis of Transparency in the

WTO
Traditional WTO scholarship on transparency is either focused on a formalist analysis of
Article X, its history, case law and other implications, and the trade review and
monitoring mechanisms that exist in the WTO. Moreover, some of the analyses focus on
either internal or external transparency problems. This second stream of transparency
scholarship breaks away from a formalist perspective and introduces non- Article X
transparency forms, however it does so in an isolated and fragmented manner. After
bringing forward the current state and problems related to internal or external
transparency no links are drawn between the two or the rest of transparency forms and as
a result the engagement with transparency remains unfinished.113 Publication of WTO
documents is often mentioned and the WTO’s track record on openness is seen
positively. Any proposals for improvements on transparency focus on the utilization of
existing rules, advocating for the protection of the inter-state nature of WTO agreements,
which create rights and obligations only for their member states and only after their
consent to limit their sovereignty.
This fragmented approach to transparency isolates and de-contextualizes each of the
transparency forms. More specifically, governmental attitudes towards these different
forms vary significantly, to the point that some governments may support one form of
transparency and celebrate it as pivotal, while trying to stop efforts to promote another. If
an open and transparent attitude towards world trade regulation is beneficial to traders,
consumers and citizens, then it becomes less and less obvious why one form is desirable
while others are polemically engaged with.
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Most traditional analyses on transparency recognize the legitimacy conundrums in the
WTO and identify rather loose links between transparency and legitimacy. Padideh Ala’I,
114

a prolific Article X scholar, mainly focuses on the history of GATT and WTO

jurisprudence. Although she links the emphasis of the WTO on legal transparency to
good governance, she does not elaborate more on the implications of this emphasis, other
than to say that transparency is moving to the forefront of international trade law. In
particular, she traces the emergence of the rule from obscurity to prominence in
jurisprudence and extends her analysis on the affect the expansion of the trade mandate
that the WTO brought about to transparency. Her more recent work on transparency is as
editor of a book and author, co-edited with Robert Vaughn, which focuses mainly on
general theory of transparency and transparency in domestic law. In the last part, entitled
Transparency in Global Governance, the last of three contributions by Padideh Ala’i and
Matthew D’Orsi discusses transparency in the WTO. The analyses does not depart from
Ala’i’s previous work, discussing transparency under classic international law and
focusing on Article X of the GATT and implementation of related reports. Biukovic also
explores legal transparency and the national trade and administrative practices of China
and Japan.115
In addition to providing the only, very brief account of the four types of transparency in
the WTO in his book,116 Van Den Bossche also discusses external transparency in a
separate article, where he looks at other international organizations in addition to the
WTO.117 Charnovitz elaborately discusses the pre-GATT history of transparency and the
GATT and WTO case law in a manner similar to Ala’i. Additionally, he introduces
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private participatory rights118 that appear in the Safeguards Agreement, the GATS and the
TBT Agreement. In his article, he also mentions administrative transparency119, external
transparency,120 as well as the relationship between other governmental organizations and
the WTO, drawing some links to the organization’s accountability. He also includes some
suggestions for the future of the WTO. This work perhaps is the only to-date article that
incorporates almost all forms of transparency, but in a score-card fashion, albeit with
very limited analysis on the implications of each form.
Drawing a comparison with the EU, Weiss discusses legal transparency and briefly
mentions amicus curiae briefs.121 Asif Qureshi focuses on the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, its history and work, without further elaborating on the institutional
framework and the overall effect of the mechanism in international trade culture. Etsy
and Bonzon draw links with good governance that place them much closer to Global
Administrative Law. Etsy discusses transparency in the context of links between the
WTO’s governance and administrative law while Bonzon’s analysis focuses more on
public participation avenues within the WTO. De Brabandere in a similar note discusses
public participation, but in the context of adjudication and the submission of amicus
curiae briefs by NGOs. He links such participation to what he sees as “public interest” of
a dispute, which begs the question of which WTO decisions lack such interest. 122
Mavroidis and Hoekman discuss external transparency peripherally in the national legal
orders’ framework and civil society voices are seen as best filtered within domestic
administrations.123
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Wolfe and Mavroidis in a recent article124 salute transparency as “the real jewel in the
WTO crown” 125 and part of the “WTO’s DNA.” 126 They focus entirely on legal
transparency, although some of their comments on developing countries and Preferential
Trade Agreements allude to internal transparency issues. Looking at the history of Article
X transparency they identify three generations of transparency norms127, where the first
generation is Article X of the GATT, the second generation includes monitoring and
surveillance mechanisms in the WTO (such as the various notification and policy review
mechanisms), and the third generation is related to the WTO’s enlargement and access of
the public to information. In their analysis, unclear at parts, they mention that information
can be of assistance to traders and consumers, or citizens.
They cite the establishment of inquiry points but mention that “the ‘intensity’ of
information” given to traders should be different as “traders do not possess sophisticated
bureaucracies that will ‘process’ supplied information for them.” This is one of the more
obscure parts of their analysis, as it is not entirely evident what type of information would
require a sophisticated bureaucracy in order to be understood. Usually, traders are
interested in a single product or a class of products, and given their familiarity with their
specific trade area, they may be very capable to understand, assess and utilize
information given to them with respect to the commodities of interest. A similar rationale
applies to labor and trade unions. Moreover, instead of keeping information from
reaching the public unless filtered and processed, especially considering the internet’s
low publication cost, it is better to publish more and provide filters of assistance when
those are available.
Their analysis turns towards treating information like a scarce commodity.128 Three major
points are not at all addressed, or are not addressed sufficiently. First, the notion of
internal transparency asymmetries, or the systematic exclusion of developing countries.
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They note that small countries need more from the WTO without any mention of the
collusive practices endorsed by developed countries, such as the Green Room.129 Second,
they mention citizens and the general public but do not elaborate on how to make the
organization and its functions more accessible, both at an informational level but also
during litigation, when interested citizens try to submit amicus briefs. Finally, they allude
towards administrative capacities of the WTO, but do not discuss at all any aspects of the
WTO’s administrative transparency. In particular, they do not propose any concrete
measures to improve institutional capacity that will promote more reporting of
information meaningful to traders and consumers.
Any proposals for improvements on transparency focus on the utilization of existing
rules, advocating for the protection of the inter-state nature of WTO agreements, which
create rights and obligations only for their member states and only after their consent to
limit their sovereignty. The vast majority of the aforementioned analyses do not differ
much from the WTO official day-to-day discussions on transparency, obscuring the large
internal and external problems, and instead focusing on trade monitoring alone.130 Most
importantly, the different forms of transparency are always discussed in isolation from
each other. These contributions adopt many of the classic international law scholarship
characteristics lacking a coherent framework for transnational phenomena and are
distinguishable from global governance discussions in the sense that they filter out
transnational governance.
4.

International Public Law

International public law scholarship has been very prolific in discussions on the Rule of
Law, transparency, accountability and participation in global governance. In particular, a
large number of scholars have discussed the aforementioned themes in the context of
international organizations, transnational actors and regimes, such as the UN, the WTO,
the Basle Committee, WADA, the International Red Cross and others. Early works pre!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dating the proliferation of this scholarship focused mainly on arms control, disarmament
(nuclear and otherwise) and nuclear energy. In the nineties and throughout the last
decade, many public international law scholars identified the proliferation of international
institutions and tribunals and the ensuing institutional crises, and set out to create an
analytical framework that would provide investigations and potential solutions to
problems. All of the scholarship in the group of international public law gravitated
strongly towards public law analyses. They engage in discussions of global governance,
which they trace in the emergence and consolidation of principles such as transparency,
accountability and participation, as well as global rights and legal orders above the nation
state. Four sub-groups emerged within International Public Law, all of them using parts
of the domestic public law conceptual metaphor: first, the Global Administrative Law
(GAL) theorists, second those who discussed the exercise of public authority in
international organizations, the constitutionalists and finally, societal constitutionalism.131
Based on three different factors, the following table summarizes the position of each
group. The first column summarizes the type of domestic public law that each theory uses
as its main analogy for its approach on WTO law and on principles such as transparency.
The second column discusses the types of actors each group places emphasis on: state
and non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, for profit and non-profit non-state
actors, formal and informal governance networks and individuals. Finally, the third
column summarizes the relationship between the international public law theory and the
notion of hierarchy, which in domestic public law exists in a more pronounced manner.
The approaches to hierarchy range from non-existent, fluid or heterarchical to more
structurally defined and approximating the Kelsenian order.132

GAL
IPA/IPL

Domestic Law
Analogy
Administrative Law
Public Law

Constitutionalism/
Democratization
Societal

Constitutional Law/
Democratic theory
Autonomy of

Actors

Hierarchy

All
All (states and international
organizations more pronounced)
All

Fluid/Amorphous
Two orders: domestic public and international
public
Pyramid (on top combination of democratic
values and constitutionalism)
Two orders: Constitutional law (with the

All
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Constitutionalism

societal
constitutions (loose
link with
constitutional law)

pouvoir constituant), ordinary law

Table 4 International Public Law Theories

a)

Global Administrative Law

The field of Global Administrative Law (GAL), as a coordinated scholarly effort to
examine how global governance works, emerged at the end of the last century at New
York University School of Law and carried itself into the first decade of the new century.
The GAL project had a transnational approach to the evaluation and interpretation of
principles of administrative law that emerge in the global space. Its focus was less
directed to the nation-state. It is based on two conceptual notions. First, most of what is
described as “global governance” is in fact regulatory administration, namely
administrative action that occurs at various levels. Second, this administrative action is
governed by principles of administrative law. Global administrative law is not restricted
to formal and traditional international law, nor does it exclude national law. In addition to
these, it extends to hybrid regulatory networks, informal institutional arrangements,
transnational initiatives and private governance and regulatory schemes. The principles it
focuses on are mainly participation, transparency, accountability, reasoned decision
making and review. In the words of its architects:
“We […] regard global administrative law as encompassing the legal
mechanisms, principles, and practices, along with supporting social
understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of
global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet
adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality,
and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions
these bodies make.133”
Thus, GAL looks at processes, structures, norms and actors that are involved in global
regulatory decision-making and implementation. The analysis that the GAL project did
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not only revolve around the legal nature and the effects of these normative phenomena, or
the validity of their sources but it extended to examining how they affect the
accountability of global administrative bodies. 134 The GAL project adopts a transnational
approach to the evaluation and interpretation of principles of administrative law that
emerge in the global space. It is based on two conceptual notions. This approach
essentially traces global governance in any form of administrative action that occurs in a
“global space.” As such, it does not assign a higher quality to the exercise of
administrative action when it originates in international organizations or national
institutions, versus that of informal networks, NGOs, private initiatives and multinational
corporations. This approach departs from the narrow Westphalian-centric view, suggests
that the origins of global governance lie in any form of administrative action with a crossborder element, and it moves away from statist concepts of exercise of public authority.
GAL is not restricted to formal and traditional international law, nor does it exclude
national law. In addition to these, it extends to hybrid regulatory networks, informal
institutional arrangements, transnational initiatives and private governance and regulatory
schemes.
Transparency and information disclosure are prominent regulatory principles in national
administrative law, and GAL scholarship traces these principles at the transnational and
international level, discussing their function and proposing ways to improve them.
Transparency takes many forms, such as openness

135

, participation, right to

information136 and access to documents.137 Transparency is also explored in the context
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of promoting stability.138Etsy discusses administrative principles and transparency, and
good governance.139 Bonzon traces the different levels through which civil society (or
global citizens/consumers) engage with the WTO administration, comparing them with
other organizations, and discussing ways to improve these participatory platforms.140
Stewart explores the push for transparency from national governments (with a focus on
the US).141 The GAL project focuses on soft law transparency, although the project
extends into the other forms as well. It refers mainly to the process of selection, everyday works and working procedures for international administrators, employees of the
organization. When examining transparency, scholars of the Global Administrative Law
project focus equally on intergovernmental organizations, formal and informal regulatory
bodies, mutual recognition arrangements, indirect regulatory powers of international
organizations and hybrid public-private or private transnational bodies. Some trace the
development of transparency in traditional administrative law, but identify a paradox in
the asymmetry of focus in transparency in the domestic level compared to the
international level.142
The GAL project thus sees transparency as structurally linked to participation 143 and
accountability. 144 It is not confined in the realms of structures and processes that
resemble those of national administrative law. Instead, transparency in GAL extends to
private initiatives and hybrid regulatory networks. Its coupling with participatory
elements is a clear attempt to locate some form of democratic legitimacy at the global
level, and to further argue for ways to increase these quasi-democratic elements. There is
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an aspirational inclination, faintly captured in this debate, to eventually introduce
electoral democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state. Scholars even go as far as to
deposit on transparency and participation their hopes for electoral democracy in the
transnational level.145
Extending the domestic law analogy, the most important aspect of WTO transparency
under GAL is external transparency. Transparency in the WTO according to GAL is
linked to public access to documentation. Until the Uruguay Round there seemed to be
lack of adequate minutes of meetings and thus, the reports of the meetings did not
provide the public with sufficient information. This has been addressed in part by the
publication of a greater amount of documents that shed light into the negotiations
between member states. Moreover, the WTO website is an important gateway for
efficient access to information and documents relating to the works of the organization.
The second theme that appears in the transparency of the WTO discussion in GAL is
participation of interested parties, like NGOs in WTO processes.146 The third theme
involves the review of transparency requirements by the Appellate Body. Authors such as
Shaffer and Nicolaides 147 , Benvenisti 148, Chimni 149 and Cassese 150 have very briefly
looked at instances where the Panels or the Appellate Body have tackled issues of
substantive transparency. However they have tied this analysis with a more general
discussion on accountability in international organizations and systemic issues facing the
WTO. Finally, GAL discusses internal transparency in the WTO briefly, mostly under the
lens of fairness and the Rule of Law.
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Two problems with GAL theorists are the lack of linkage between transparency and the
organization’s unique history as well as the underemphasized legal transparency. GAL
literature insists on soft law transparency. GAL does move away from the treaty-centric
analysis of rationalism and realism, and closer to knowledge-based or cognitive theories
in international law, since it explores the normative potential emerging out of civil
society initiatives, scientific communities, and consumer-citizens. However, GAL
remains complimentary to the analysis of treaty-based transparency, and thus, appears to
introduce a weak cognitivist perspective. Weak cognitivism adopts a critical perspective
towards rationalist approaches by introducing the perspective of normative elements of
transnational actor participation in global governance. Strong cognitivism would, instead
provide a single framework of analysis for both the internal WTO discourse (legal,
internal and administrative transparency) as well as the external discourse (external
transparency). In seeking such a common thread, theories responding to GAL introduced
notions such as “constitutionalism” or “global norm” in order to show that transparency
has a meta-normative value. In reality, GAL in its definition also alluded to the metanormative value of administrative principles. The entire theoretical account aims to show
that the collective analysis of the administrative law principles that appear in international
law produces a result larger than the aggregate of the principles, a new group of rules,
Global Administrative Law. The next groups counter this meta-normative perspective
with Global Constitutionalism.

b)

The exercise of Public Authority at the International

Sphere
The response to the Global Administrative Law project came from the second sub-group,
the Max Planck Institute for International Law, where scholars captured this debate
focusing mostly on public law elements of the exercise of international authority by
extending domestic notions of public authority to the international level (International
Public Authority- International Public Law, or IPA/IPL) under the understanding that the

91

nation-state still had a significant role to play in the discussion of global governance. 151
The Max Planck School extends domestic notions of public authority to the international
level.152 Such extension is the focus on the “publicness” of public international law,
including administrative law, constitutionalism and any other examples of domestic
public law. 153 Global governance exists insofar the adoption of such principles by
international institutions (or other networks) occurs as exercise public authority, similarly
to the domestic legal order. The IPA/IPL theorists discuss the regulatory authority from
non-state actors and hybrid networks but show emphasis on state-created institutions,
especially international organizations, their tribunals and their committees.
According to Armin Von Bogdandy:
“a public law approach to the law of international institutions is a way to
further legal understanding of the phenomena of global governance […]
The development of general principles of international public authority,
such as the principle of attributed competence, or of human rights
protection, aims at the strengthening of the publicness of public
international law. So far the general principles of international law
correspond mainly to private law principles or principles of litigation
between equal subjects, i.e. private law litigation. The emergence of the
public law component together with principles of international public
authority is not just a sectoral phenomenon since international institutions
are of considerable importance in many fields of international law.
Therefore this development heralds an overall strengthening of the
publicness of public international law and evolves the general principles of
international law. We propose as the disciplinary point of departure for
studying global governance phenomena the discipline of international
institutions. […] One should not only study principles of such
international institutions which are subjects of international law but also of
other institutions such as treaty organs or informal institutions which
exercise public authority.”154
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This approach suggests that the origins of global governance lie in national administrative
law. In particular, the principles of participation, transparency, accountability and review
of reasoned decision-making were substantiated in the national level after the French
Revolution and have been elaborated on extensively both in administrative practice but
also through judicial review. Thus, they are now considered part and parcel of rule of law
requirements for governments.
The Heidelberg response to the Global Administrative Law project begins under the
understanding that transparency is a fundamental value of public institutions in liberal
democracies155. Under a Weberian analysis, governments were seen as seeking exclusive
access to knowledge as a method of increasing their power.156 Instead of focusing on
informal participatory elements, which, if identified are seen as underdeveloped at
best157, the Max Planck School directs the focus of the transparency debate to free access
to documents.158 It is generally seen as a “fuzzy” concept, which can be understood when
seen under the lens of a particular institution. 159
Transparency in IPA/IPL is discussed under the administrative law paradigm. Bogdandy,
Goldmann, Ioannides and Venzke observe transparency as the legitimizing element of
international public authority in the WTO, the international public law substitute to the
lack of a parliamentary authority and majoritarian democracy at the global level and a
method to limit unjustified discrimination. De Wet and Feichtner argue that transparency
will improve the efficacy of monitoring and oversight mechanisms themselves. Thus, the
Max Planck School focuses on formalized processes that promote transparency and are
coupled with specific “global bureaucracies”, that is, formal administrative processes that
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exist in the context of intergovernmental organizations. Any potential democratic
elements of transparency beyond that of “legitimacy substitution” are altogether eluded,
but without any formal explanation other than the general mandate of focus on
“publicness.”
With respect to the WTO, the transnational idea of involvement of non-state actors and
networks is obscured.160 Rather, the focus shifts on circulation of documentation to all
members by the secretariat and the move toward multilateral review of documentation.161
The main distinction examined here is between informal and formal meetings, and the
conceptual dichotomy that results is between formality and informality.162

c)

Constitutionalism

A very prominent and illuminating set of analyses that discuss transparency in the WTO
come from two groups of scholars who engage in discussions of constitutionalism in
Global Governance and in WTO Governance. We will divide these into two groups,
namely “endogenous” and “exogenous” constitutionalists, depending on whether they
treat the WTO as their main case study, emphasizing the uniqueness of the organization
and thereby, their conclusions, or they see the WTO as one of few examples of the
manifestation of transparency as a norm. The origins and aspirations of each
constitutionalist perspective differ to a certain extent. Both scholarly streams appear to
exhibit a form of angst with respect to the political space in global governance.163
Constitutionalist theories in International Law seek a framework with elements that
resemble the domestic public legal order. They recognize common features between
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national parliaments and plenary organs of international organizations, the judiciary and
international tribunals, and the executive (government) and international administrations.
First, exogenous constitutionalists, namely Global Governance constitutionalists, form
the outer limit of theorists in International Public Law/International Public Authority.
Amongst IPA and IPL analyses the constitutionalist perspectives demonstrate the
strongest public law features. They are concerned with legitimacy deficits in international
organizations and identify patterns of normative distillation into norms that resemble
those of the national constitutions, which, they argue, have consolidated into “global
norms.” Transparency in Constitutionalism as an extension of IPA/IPL legitimizes
international rules and enables, through the dissemination of information, to the
possibility of deliberative democracy at a global level. Just like IPA/IPL, IPA/IPL
constitutionalism focuses on external transparency in the WTO and openness and prompt
publication of dispute settlement proceedings. As such, transparency is an enabling
condition or a pre-condition of constitutionalization of global governance.
Within the IPA/IPL discourse, and in opposition with the constitutionalist voices who are
his peers, Delimatsis explicitly refuses the constitutional qualities of transparency in the
WTO, together with constitutionalization generally, claiming that a “constitution without
distributional effects cannot be conceived.” This demonstrates that his theoretical
approach is pegged to national constitutionalist structures. He discusses a few aspects of
three transparencies, namely internal, external and administrative transparency, leaving
legal transparency entirely outside this debate. He adopts an institutionalist approach with
some critical elements, resembling the IPA/IPL scholarship but falls short of adopting the
constitutional dialect of Peters.164
Most analyses tracing constitutional qualities in international transparency are either
bound by the constraints of Article 38, gravitating towards the formal pronouncement of
transparency as a general principle of law, tied to due process and the rule of law, and
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simultaneously are tied to the domestic administrative law and constitutional paradigms.
They either emphasize a link to the nation state, or to Article 38 of the ICJ Charter, which
is reflective more of the Westphalian world-order. Possibly a saving grace of the latter
tendency is the linkage to general principles of law, the source less connected to pacta
sunt servanta.
Such a framework of analysis is highly reminiscent of early 20th century scholarship on
general principles of law, identified as general principles of the common law and civil
law.165 In this vein, Andrea Bianchi traces transparency to national democracies166 which
further explains the “operational” quality assigned to transparency as a principle of
national administrative law.167 The definitions of transparency adopted also retreat from
the idea of “meaningful” information, which would embrace a more contextual approach
to transparency in the internet era, as we will see in the next chapter. Thus, transparency
is coupled with the “adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of information”168
or to the “degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them to have
informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders.”169
Megan Donaldson and Benedict Kingsbury, who offer the following twelve hypotheses
on the effects of transparency in global governance, adopt a clearer outlook towards
transnational elements of transparency:
1. “Transparency measures […] may affect choices about what information to
produce and how it is presented.”170
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2. “The impact of transparency depends on the existence of intermediaries
wiling and able to make use of the information provided.”171
3. “Transparency measures may alter existing inequalities between states in
access to information held or collected by global governance
institutions.”172
4. “Impacts of transparency measures on particular States depend on
resources and capacity to make use of information.”173
5. “Transparency measures may increase the influence of some States over
the programmes of global governance institutions, relative to the influence
of other states.”174
6. “Transparency measures may play a role in shifting relations of power
within states.”175
7. “Transparency measures may reduce cooperation of some States with an
institution and/or decrease willingness to seriously address particular issues
within that institution.”176
8. “Transparency measures can enable greater scrutiny and contestation of, or
conversely support for, policies being pursued at the instigation of a global
institution.”177
9. “Transparency measures may foster productive contributions to an
institution’s work by other actors, facilitating reform and development
within the institution and/or strengthening its epistemic authority.”178
10. “Transparency measures can break down an institution’s epistemic
authority.”179
11. “Transparency measures may multiply and diversify relationships between
global institutions and non-State actors.”180
12. “Transparency measures may empower actors who are in a position to
process information and render it comprehensible to others, altering the
influence of non –State actors on the work of global institutions.”181
These twelve points offer a comprehensive approach to transparency in global
governance. They offer a typology of different possible relationships that transparency
creates within and outside international organizations and an insight in the different
dynamics that transparency produces. According to Kingsbury and Donaldson, six types
of relationships become possible with transparency. The first two are unidirectional,
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referring to the global institution as the source of information (1) and the possibility of
intermediaries to distribute information (2). The other four involve two or more actors:
relations among states (3, 4), relations between the state and the institution (3, 4, 5, 7, 8),
relations within a state (4,6 for example, among political powers, the governing and the
governed, or various constituencies) and relations between the institution and the global
community at large (9, 10, 11, 12).
All four forms of transparency fall within this typology. For example, administrative
transparency relates to the first point, external transparency to the last four, three and four
relate to internal transparency, and points three to eight can apply to legal transparency.
Three more things are noteworthy at this point with respect to this list and the WTO.
First, legal transparency, the obligation of states to disclose information appears in more
robust form in the WTO (as it is a specific treaty obligation) and it is litigated on. Second,
the WTO has developed peer-to-peer monitoring mechanisms, and thus point 8, on
scrutiny is built into the WTO agreements, thus it is not an outcome of transparency but
one of its constitutive elements. Third, transparency in this analysis appears to be induced
by institutional preference. In other words, it exists as a result of a choice made by the
global administration itself. That may be accurate for many international organizations,
however it only describes part of the WTO’s transparency landscape. External
transparency for example has been at times initiated by civil society alone, as it happened
with the amicus briefs.
This is possibly the most extensive analytical framework on transparency in Global
Administrative Law and global constitutionalism. It indicates that transparency can take
multiple forms, but stops short of exiting weak cognitivism and the proximity to the
national paradigm of administrative law.182 The four transparency forms explored in this
thesis aspire to follow a similar typology and identify relations among different actors
and the effect transparency has on their dealings. However, it combines this analysis with
the points Howse, Nicolaides and Cass have made on democratization in an attempt to
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depart from weak cognitivism and the nation-state prototype that lies beneath the
transparency analysis.
The most constitutionally conscious approach on transparency comes from Anne Peters.
She sees the transition of transparency towards the status of a global norm183, a global
public good, non-rival and non-excludable.184 and insists on its public law elements, as it
is a component of publicness, necessary for deliberative democracy.185 She notes that
“In yet another sense, transparency is both the driver and the manifestation
of a paradigm shift to ‘public’ international law. Transparency seems
indispensable to international practices and rules, because the element of
transparency supports the qualification of these rules and practices as law
in the modern sense.”186
A very illuminating observation is her argument on the compensatory nature of
transparency. The forces of globalization resulted in a proliferation of norms as well as
the lack of transparency within many regimes. The GATT for example was barely
newsworthy before 1995. Only in 2002 did the organization start publishing its
documents online. Yet, the tens of thousands of pages of documents regulate trade to an
impressive extent. The force that produced this need for transparency has come from
globalization itself. 187 She also acknowledges the lack of a right to transparency, when
she observes that “international organizations generally do not acknowledge the
individual rights of persons to access their documents”188 Rather, transparency exhibits
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both strong emancipatory elements, as a power shifter.189 Transparency’s enabling role is
a recurrent theme in Peters’ work on democracy in global governance.190
Peters draws a link between transparency and democracy referencing Madisonian
democracy.191 She further briefly notes that “the international legal system may have a
proto-democratic quality in which transparency plays a role”192 Her analysis is replete
with a domestic understanding of constitutionalism, publicness and democracy, although
there are many important observations on the role of NGOs, experts and international
administrations with respect to global governance and democratization. 193 She mentions
for example that
“the transparency of global governance should be improved in order to
assume those very constitutional and in particular democratic functions
transparency performs in domestic law.”194
Her insistence on the national legal system characteristics of transparency appear
throughout her analysis. Moreover, transparency and its costs may be not compatible with
Peters’ constitutionalism.195 She hails the EU transparency, although in her analysis196 the
multifaceted role of EU transparency norms is not evident. Finally, she declares that
“Most importantly, transparency in itself does not bring about democracy. It is only, but
importantly, a pre-condition for democratic procedures.”
Second, endogenous constitutionalists, or WTO constitutionalists, primarily examine
WTO legitimacy issues. They mostly identify as WTO scholars and are exploring
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patterns of constitutionalization within the WTO and insist on the possibility of WTO
reform.
First, John Jackson puts forward an institutionalist form of constitutional theory, which
locates the constitutional elements in the WTO in the dense institutional forms that have
consolidated over the GATT years and became a lot more pronounced and formally
institutionalized in the WTO, especially in view of the establishment of the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism in the transition to the WTO. Second, Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann
proposes a trade-rights-based constitutionalism. He emphasizes the constitutional
dimensions of a fundamental right to trade, which limits the power and reach of
governments. According to this approach, a set of normative values have concentrated in
the organization to the extent that they effectively give rights to citizens and limit the
power and reach of governments.197 As the right to trade resembles the rights in domestic
constitutions it contributes constitutional qualities to the WTO. External transparency is
both an aspect and a manifestation of this right. Petersmann places economics above
politics in the constitutional structure that he designs. The flaw in Petersmann’s construct
stems mainly from the circularity of legitimizing an economic regime through the use of
economic rights. It becomes self-referential to expect the economic system that was built
based on a neoliberal economic paradigm and produced certain rights as a result of its
underlying economic thinking and principles to be in its turn legitimized by the very
same rights.198 Neither Jackson nor Petersmann appear to have a concrete agenda for the
role of transparency in their constitutional constructs, although one could imagine that for
Petersmann it forms part of the economic rights he proposes as the basis of his rights’
constitutionalism.
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The third approach by Deborah Cass argues that we can trace constitutional elements in
the WTO generally, and more specifically in the organization’s adjudicating processes
(judicial constitutionalization). Cass however suggests we should move beyond the
efforts to create a single constitutionalist theory in the WTO. She posits that
inconsistencies in the interpretation of WTO rules will be avoided if we replace trade
constitutionalization with trading democracy. The shift towards the democratic rule
mitigates the circularity that is apparent in Petersmann’s account. With respect to
transparency, her focus is mostly on external transparency and existing inconsistencies
with respect to individual and NGO participation and access to information. Allowing
more transparency and participation of more actors according to Cass will strengthen
deliberative processes, and contribute to trading democracy. A similar approach, linking
transparency directly to democracy is adopted by Howse and Nicolaides who identify
transparency as a ‘key value’ in the WTO demonstrating “the embrace of the political
ethics of democracy.” We will follow up on their very useful critique of constitutionalism
in favor of democratization in the beginning of the next chapter. When Howse and
Nicolaides discuss the connection between constitutionalism and legitimacy, they note
that:
“In the short run, at least, the application of the language of
constitutionalism to WTO is likely to exaggerate the hopes of
globalization’s friends that economic liberalism can acquire the legitimacy
of higher law- irreversible, irresistible, and comprehensive. At the same
time, it is likely to exacerbate the fears of the “discontents” of
globalization that the international institutions of economic governance
have become a supranational Behemoth, not democratically accountable to
anyone.”199
d)

Societal Constitutionalism

Teubner proposes a form of constitutionalism that actively steps outside the bounds of the
nation-state and adopts a different lens of analysis for transnational constitutional forms.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199

Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and global governance: Why Constitutionalizing the
WTO is a Step too far: Efficiency, equity, Legitimacy—The multilateral trading system at the millennium
227-252 at 228 (2001), Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy:
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16.1 GOVERNANCE 73-94 (2003).

102

Following Koselleck’s analysis200, he observes that transnational regime constitutions do
not reach the density of national ones.201
Teubner addresses global governance and its legitimization in the context of societal
constitutionalism. He refutes the ‘unitary bias’ of the term “constitution” and instead he
traces constitutionalism in several different regimes, intergovernmental and private,
applying constitutionalism to “fragments” of global society, such as the economy, law,
art, science and others.202 He identifies the constitutional emancipation of the WTO in the
existence of the Dispute Settlement Body, the Most Favored Nation principle, the
prioritization of trade rules and the direct effect of WTO law. 203 However, any “onesided ‘neo-liberal’ reduction of global constitutionalism” cannot be sustained.204 The
WTO’s constitutive elements are heavily biased pro-trade and pro-MFN, with few
exceptions (and even then, the exceptions are strategically allowed only when they follow
the pro-trade ethos).205
The push from the periphery of the WTO has grown stronger and as a result,
‘deliberative-participatory polyarchy’ can show the way to democratic avenues for
stakeholder participation. Such theories of ‘deliberative-participatory polyarchy’ draw
emphasis on “the political relevance of civil society but also [attempt] to discover their
democratic potential and to design procedures of civic participation.”206 Such a process of
societal constitutionalization allows for the establishment of norms that draw their
legitimation from their public interest character.207
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This socio-legal analysis actively moves away from the domestic analogies that almost all
constitutionalist theories use and adds two crucial elements that will help us dissect
transparency in a much better light: polyarchical democratization, namely democratic
forms that do not necessarily stem from voting processes, and legitimization through the
public interest. Coupled with Cass’, Howse and Nicolaides’ recommendations to move
towards democratization and away from constitutionalism in the WTO we will in Chapter
II propose a theoretical frame to utilize transparency in order to understand how such
analysis may be practically possible in the WTO today. However, before that, two more
theoretical strands deserve our attention: a critical perspective on global governance in
international law from the global south and its global north counterparts, and the
contributions of regime theory.

5.

TWAIL and Critical International Law

Transparency was discussed in the works of others who critically engaged with the works
of the Global Administrative Law and the Max Planck groups. Scholars from the Global
South, as well as their counterparts in the North, which I will group here as “Critical
International Law”, criticized the scholars in these previous two groups (IPL) for their
lack of adequate consideration for development needs and the celebratory analysis of
administrative principles as “good governance principles.” All agree on the existence of
inconsistencies in global governance discussions and the need for a more critical
approach towards principles that are borrowed from domestic legal systems and may
carry particular histories not applicable in all contexts or in international law, cautioning
against legal transplants.
In its discussion of transparency generally and transparency in the WTO more
specifically, Critical International Law scholarship is divided into two distinct groups:
those who see the current status of transparency in international financial institutions as
inadequate and urge for more and more meaningful transparency as one terrain for the
resolution of legitimacy conundrums and those who view transparency skeptically
altogether, citing either the origins of the rules in national administrative law that was in
104

and of itself a product of troublesome national histories, or its links to the Mandate
system or finally because of overall skepticism on the political process that labeled some
administrative principles from the domestic legal order into “good governance” principles
at the international level.
The transparency supporters urge for a need for more transparency and openness of
governance at the global level. 208 Chimni addresses skeptically the relocation of
sovereign powers to the benefit of international organizations, and discusses the potential
compensatory effects of more transparency, which may induce better accountability
mechanisms:
“The relocation of sovereign space in international organizations has
undermined resistance in third world countries. Accountability is not even
theoretically envisaged today. Those affected in the third world are
prevented from expressing their doubts directly to the concerned
international organization. Thus, for example, the WTO has no address in
India. It is impossible for Indian farmers to protest, like their French and
Belgian counterparts, in front of the WTO office in Geneva.”209
The lack of formal judicial avenues for civil society at the international level render
transparency the next best thing according to Chimni.210
Dongsheng Zang offers the only to date monograph on transparency in the WTO. He
focuses extensively on the negotiations of Article X as well as the political and legal
origins of transparency, which he mainly traces in the US administrative law. He then
looks at the case law in the GATT and the WTO and argues that liberalism as the core
ideology in the WTO is related to the transparency requirements. His approach focuses
on legal transparency mostly, and transparency-related institutional discourse, as well as
national administrative law. Similarly, Zumbansen cautions against the conceptualization
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of international norms outside their “historical-intellectual contexts.” Similarly to Zang,
he argues that the publication of transparency laws coincided with state systems or
judicial eras that had devastating results for the world history and economy.211 Elsewhere,
he questions the attitudinal differences towards different administrative law principles
when he says that:
Whereas administrative law for a long time has been described as the law
governing “the processes and mechanisms of the welfare and regulatory
states,” the changes in conceptualization and delivery of “public” services,
the role of private actors in public governance and the resulting
ambiguities of political representation, transparency and accountability
have contributed to a new context of administrative governance.212
Also a skeptic, Anghie discusses the links of administrative law principles and the
concept of “good governance” to the Mandate system.213 Rajagopal elaborates on the
colonialist origins of administrative law and good governance:
“Once defined this way development comes to include everything that is
seen by the ruling classes as desirable or necessary for the catching up of
the Third World with the West: economic growth, poverty alleviation,
anticorruption and transparency, environmental sustainability, and even
democracy and freedom/rights. The ideology of 'catching up' is itself a
complex notion: an aspiration as well as a programme.”214
Harlow, seeking the principles and values behind the “fashionable” good governance
principles echoes the reservations expressed by Anghie and Rajagopal. 215 She also
identifies the distinct history that transparency had in the EU context and its emergence
as a general principle of administrate law, having received judicial recognition after the
Maastricht treaty. A similar reluctance to expand the notion of transparency in the context
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of the WTO has been put forward by Steger, 216 although she belongs to more
conventional WTO scholarship. In conclusion, the treatment of transparency by TWAIL
is different in each of the two scholarly streams. Both groups however are preoccupied
with the meaningful participation of developing countries in international organizations
and also the genuine consideration of their interests without the constraints of the
neoliberal paradigm.
6.

Theory of International Regimes

Examining transparency in the WTO under the lens of Global Governance also relates to
International Regimes’ Theory to the extent that the latter involves institutional
evaluations and normative proposals combining International Law, International
Relations and Global Governance in the context of international organizations. We have
already briefly discussed realism, rationalism, weak and strong cognitivism. This part
will elaborate on these categories and others that appear in Regimes’ theory.
The three larger categories of International Regimes’ theories depending on their
explanatory variables217 are first, power-based or realist assessments that consider power
dynamics as the most plausible lens of analysis in international relations: powerful
nations dominate normative production based only on self-empowering motivations;
second, interest-based or neoliberal perspectives mostly based on economic analyses and
game theory, treating states as rationalist interest-maximizers; and finally, knowledgebased or cognitivist perspectives (weak and strong), examining the origins of state
interests and adopting sociological analyses to explain state behavior and interests. The
three different theoretical strands assign a different degree of value to international
institutions, from weak (realism) to medium (neoliberalism) to strong (cognitivism).218
Stephen Krasner in the introductory chapter of the 1982 spring issue of International
organization introduces the first four elements of international regimes: normativity (at
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various degrees of potency), decision-making, enforcement, and specificity, namely focus
on an issue-area. He defines international regimes as:

“principles, norms, rules and

decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issuearea.”219

He further defines principles as “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude”,

norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”, rules as
“specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” and decision-making procedures as
“prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”220 In the same
volume, Ernst Haas, similarly to Krasner221, adds issue-specificity to the definition of
regimes, when he notes that regimes are: “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations”222 He further distinguishes the notion of a regime from
that of an order in that:
“regimes are artificial creations designed to bring about particular
orderings of values among actors; there is no general international "order."
The qualities we have in mind when we use the term order in general are
those associated with the concept of system. We can only speak of
particular orders devoted to equity, efficiency, justice, survival or
whatever we value. Order, then refers to the benefits a regime is to
provide; system refers to the whole in which collaboration toward an order
takes place.”223
Certain elements from regime theory are useful in discussing global governance issues.
First the turn from a state-only analysis of international relations to the
transnationalization of legal relationships is embracing the critique that cognitive
approaches express against the Westphalian-oriented international law. A cognitive
approach criticizes realism for assuming that states are rational actors.224 It remains a
fact, however, that the WTO is a member-driven organization, however multilateralism
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combined with globalization is not of the same nature as it was before the proliferation of
international organizations.225 It is important at the same time to internalize levels of
governance that extend beyond the nation state. NGOs and the amorphous maze of the
global civil society, either in the form of consumers or in the form of protestors, are
relevant to the WTO. 226A cognitive approach takes these actors into account and a
measures their relevance to law.
An intergovernmental organization, or a transnational network needs to develop its own
institutional history

227

, during which normative expectations are created and

distinguished. Time allows for negotiation, agreement, conflict, resolution and thus
consolidation of norms. It also allows for dynamics to develop between members, thus
revealing asymmetries that can further produce bargaining and stabilization. If bargaining
results in instability and further conflict without resolution, organizational structures
break down, and thus the possibility of a regime becomes remote. A regime also
demonstrates properties of self-governance and flexibility in the legal obligations its
members assume, which over time will favor change of normative forms228 to a more
optimal location.229 Moreover, a regime works as a stabilizer of relationships amongst
actors, which necessarily implies some conflict resolution properties, and the shared
understanding of principles.230 Conflict resolution corrects ambiguity in legal, economic
and political relationships and that process can be described as evolution in the
organization. The GATT and the WTO, through the negotiation rounds, the GATT
jurisprudence and the numerous decisions the organization has adopted over the years has
clearly evolved. By the time of creation of the WTO a prolific legal system consisting of
Agreements, jurisprudence and binding decisions was in place. Then the Uruguay round
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resulted in the further enlargement of the legal Agreements. 231 Issue specificity is also
important, as international regimes form a “web of meaning” and linkages in specific
issue areas.232
Finally, regime theory considers the WTO compliance record as relevant. Louis Henkin
observed that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all the time.”233 However, when this occurs in a
consistent manner, rather than sporadically, it is relevant to the formation of a global
governance regime. It is important to consider here also that many legitimacy concerns
often raised in international law are related to implementation and the lack of
enforcement mechanisms in international law. The existence of the Dispute Settlement
Body in the WTO is unique in international relations.234 The WTO has established a
mechanism for the resolution of disputes that in the last 17 years has been prolific, with
425 cases having been brought before it, and with an impressive compliance record. Even
though retaliation is authorized at the end of Panel and Appellate Body Reports quasiautomatically, only four cases have ended with actual retaliation (i.e. suspension of
concessions) in the WTO.235All others were complied with, settled, terminated or are still
in consultations. No other international tribunal has had such a large number of cases
being brought before it and a similarly notable compliance record. As we mentioned
before, there exist some serious problems when cases involve larger and smaller
economies and compliance.
Complementing a socio-legal analysis of transparency in the WTO with a cognitive
approach of international relations complements global governance and international law
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theory with many useful components that can help measure the degree to which
transparency as a principle has the potential to establish and maintain a normative
framework that lies outside the WTO agreements and include WTO stakeholders, NGOs,
and the civil society at large. Complementing the analysis on transparency with links of
each form of transparency to democratization and further to legitimacy aspires to move
towards a strong cognitivist perspective with respect to the WTO legal system.
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II.

Transparency through the lens of democratization in the

WTO
A.

Constitutionalism and its discontents

The presence of elaborate constitutionalist analyses in global governance and the
incorporation of transparency as an enabling principle for global constitutionalism
indicates the omnipresent fascination with the rule of law in the nation state and the
difficulties of formulating an analytic framework that can address challenges posed by
globalization and transnational aspects in Westphalian terrains and particularly
international organizations. More specifically we could identify five shortcomings from
constitutionalism in global governance theory.
The first problem is the intimate and intricate relationship between the constitution and
the nation state. National constitutions became the communication point, a document that
was used to govern the relations between the political system and the legal system during
revolutionary periods. Constitutions did not emerge necessarily from bloody revolutions
and it can be argued that they are the social contract that legal systems draw legitimacy
from. Constitutions emerge out of a social contract momentum in order to organize
national polity when a demos or a government distinctly understands itself as dissimilar
or even opposite that its predecessor. Many similar moments, of seeming constitutional
nature exist in international law: the treaty of Westphalia, introducing the nation state as
it was understood for the past three centuries; the first and second World War and the
Holocaust, which established the United Nations and unconditional respect for human
rights; the pronouncement of Martens clause, to which the respect for humanity is traced
back to; the Brian Kellogg Pact, outlawing war and establishing peaceful coexistence as
the only acceptable modus operandi among nation states; decolonization and the
formation of the G-77, breaking with the colonizing past and the distinction between
“civilized and the rest”; the fall of the Berlin Wall, the September 11 events and the end
of history euphoria. However, reflecting the difference between government and
112

governance, these constitutional moments did not result into constitutions,1 as they lacked
several other elements beyond the absence of a written text.2
The second problem in global constitutionalist perspectives is that the emphasis on the
notion of a constitution may imply a reluctance to genuinely move to a post-Westphalian
analysis where international organizations and non-governmental actors can and do create
a new public space, which can in turn become normative space through the emergence of
meta-principles. Howse and Teitel allude to the potential of treaty regimes to expand their
normative space when they discuss the notion of ultra- compliance. International law can
produce:
“ultra-compliance […] which mean[s] it can have normative effects that
are greater or more powerful or different than what may be desired or
consistent with the values or intentionally that might be plausibly be
attributed to the “creators” of the norms.3
Such normative effects can be the result of a treaty regime. Linking meta-principles with
the creation of public space has other benefits. Global constitutionalism requires some
consolidation process for the rules it entails, and possibly in the future agreement among
state actors or state and non-state actors on its scope. Public space can emerge
spontaneously, at any time, without an explicit agreement (online, in forums, or during
protests, or on twitter).4 Transparency and the dissemination of information as well as
transparency linked to participation possibilities enable the formation of this public space
instantaneously. The meta-principles that emerge can in some cases be of a quasinormative nature, that is, they exhibit many law-like elements but do not stem from
international agreements or national laws. This is the case for example for the traditional
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and classic source of lex mercatoria and a more modern one is the legal elements of
Second Life.
Third, the celebratory side of seeking hierarchies to understand transnational regimes and
analyzing transnationalism through the constitution may be paired with such theoretical
approaches seeking a form of Kelsenian stability in order to deal with the omnipresent in
international law “anxiety of fragmentation”.5 However, it is optimal to contextualize
fragmentation rather than obscuring the debate by adopting quasi-hierarchical forms of
analysis in an attempt to avoid its risks altogether.
Fourth, constitutionalization oftentimes relies on overemphasis on adjudicatory processes
while it obscures other elements that may contribute to the legitimacy debate.6 This is
particularly true for the WTO. This form of institutionalist analysis does not stress the
importance of domestic mechanisms in some (albeit few) countries that allow industries,
corporations and those involved in cross border commercial activities to file direct
complaints which their governments will take before the WTO.7 Peters notes that the
emphasis on judicialization is harmful to constitutionalism itself:
“Promotion of judicial protection reinforces the lopsidedness of the
constitutionalization of international law. This process has so far been
adjudicative rather than deliberative. This is most visible in the WTO and
the related sector-constitutionalization debate. What has been identified by
some scholars as a constitutionalization of the WTO boils down to the
legalization of the dispute settlement mechanism, judge-made principles,
and constitutional techniques applied by the panels and Appellate Body,
such as balancing […][T]his reading foists an impoverished, legalist
(judicially made), a-political conception of a constitution. So exclusive
focus on the improvement of judicial protection in international law is not
only a foul trick to define away the democratic deficit, but might moreover
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undermine the persuasiveness of the constitutionalist reconstruction of
international law.”8
However, this does not mean that adjudication is not crucial for the analysis that will
follow, it just has to be complemented with other normative equivalents within the
organization that can produce more discourse space to address the democratic deficit.
Peters’ remarks also allude to another problem stemming from constitutionalism in
international law, namely the attempt to de-politicize the debate by insisting on
consolidated normative forms, instead of ones that are constantly being negotiated and
expanded.9 Andrew Lang among many cautions strongly against such de-politicization in
the WTO.10
The question asked in this thesis is: can there be a theory that allows for the repoliticization of the WTO debates, without using constitutionalism as a framework? The
answer stems from the observations of Howse, Nicolaides and Cass11 who hint on the
value of democracy in the WTO. Democratic occurrences can occur outside the
constitutional framework, at any public or even private space. For example, a corporation
can adopt democratic practices, or a university, or the denizens of a small neighborhood.
Such events do not need to be systematic. In the WTO, transparency as a notion offers
glimpses of such space for democratic moments. In some instances the participatory
effects of transparency are more mature than others (where we identify deficits in the
WTO).
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The analysis followed here on the democratization potential of transparency cannot solely
rely on previous theoretical accounts on WTO transparency, since none of them has
evaluated the aggregate democratizing potential of the norm, and instead have insisted on
its constitutional qualities or its role as an aid to, or a prop for global constitutionalism. In
the words of Peters transparency is a condition for constitutionalism and “serves more of
a reformative quality for democracy, a preventor of ills, instead of something that in and
of itself expands the democratic space.” Rather, this dissertation adopts this
polynormative perspective whereby transparency is analyzed as a norm within the legal,
political and economic frameworks in the WTO. My analysis extends beyond the
traditional sources of international law and I argue that normative impetus can potentially
be traced in transparency forms that have not distilled to any form of law (not even soft
law).
B.

Democratization as an alternative framework

Finding normative space that enables more legitimacy in global governance can be done
through a focus on democratization. Peters, Cass, Howse and Nicolaides and Teubner
have all noted, others briefly and others extensively, that this discussion on
democratization is not only possible but also necessary. Howse and Nicolaides in
particular emphasize the re-politicization properties of democratic fragments in the WTO.
Cass also sees it as a better alternative to constitutionalism in the discussion of the history
and development of legal principles in the WTO.
Democracy stricto sensu is currently not possible at the international level.12 Robert Dahl
however argues that a more expansive definition of democracies can occur in
polyarchical structures. Polyarchies may be thought as relatively democratized regimes,
popularized, liberalized and “highly inclusive and extensively open to public
contestation.”13 Thus, all institutions and processes, formal and informal can be involved
in the exercise of governance and are affected or affect transnational actors, individuals,
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corporations, unions, NGO’s governments and parts of governments, other regimes and
international organizations. My argument is premised on the understanding that
transnational regimes, or regimes of transnational governance such as the WTO include
multiple levels of exercise of authority and affect a very large number of stakeholders
either directly or indirectly with trade rules and policies. They do so with both contractual
rules and soft law principles or guidelines. As such, the WTO as a transnational regime
exhibits two fundamental characteristics: it is a polyarchy, a relative but incomplete
regime with few democratic elements and its normative reach can be described as
polynormative, ranging from guidelines to contractual obligations.
To revisit the mapping of the various approaches in global governance, this
democratization perspective is critical of existing structures in the WTO but recognizes
the global governance aspects in the organization with many transnational elements and
argues that legitimacy problems should be discussed on the understanding that an
expansion of discourse and normative space in the WTO is possible. A strong link exists
between transparency, legitimacy and democracy and all four transparency forms in the
WTO are discussed under the single narrative of composite democracy.
Note: The shaded areas are parts of my approach that correspond to others. Darker shade implies stronger
overlap.

International Public law
∗ GAL
∗ IPA/IPL
∗ Constitutionalism
See also Table 5

WTO and
Global
Governance
NO (or
tautology
between global
governance
and
international
community)
YES
(resembling a
domestic
public law
order)

Critical Public
International Law/
Opposition to
GAL/Sutherland Report
reactions

YES (critical
of existing
structures,
transnationalist
elements)

Classic International
Law/ Positivists/
Trade Law

WTO and
Legitimacy
problems
Not as
pronounced
and crucial

Relation of
Transparency
to Legitimacy
Loose link

Transparency

Sovereignty
of States

Civil Society in
the WTO

Sutherland
Report

Emphasis on
legal and
internal

YES- only
states can
bind
themselves

Filter through
the nation state

Agreement in
spirit, some
criticisms on
trade law
related issues

Crucial but
“public-law
like” Global
Governance
can help
solve them
Crucial,
unclear how
(if) global
governance
will (can)

Strong link

Emphasis
mostly on
external, and
then internal

YES with a
global
polity

Element of
deliberative or
representative
democracy

Disagreement
in parts,
opportunity
to extrapolate
publicness.

Medium/
Strong link

Emphasis on
internal and
external

YES-eroded

Important as part
of transnational
actors, at times
amorphous, at
times more

Stronger
reaction and
criticism

117

Societal
Constitutionalism

YES
(transnational
constitutionali
zation)

Theory of Composite
Democracy

YES (critical
of existing
structures,
many
transnational
elements

handle the
erosion of
the nationstate and
power
asymmetries
Crucial
(socio-legal
analysis
necessary)

Crucial but
global
governance
can help
with
legitimacy
problems
through the
expansion
of
discourse
and
normative
space

organized

Medium link

Strong link

Discussion on
deliberative
polyarchy and
knowledge,
capacity for
action and
power of
implementatio
n
Analysis of all
four
transparency
forms under
one single
narrative of
composite
democracy
without
elections

YES (but
national
constitution
s are
structurally
inadequate
to deal with
global
problems)
YESeroded with
the
possibility
of global
democracy
substitutes

YES (massive
externalincluding civil
societyintervention will
trigger the
internal process
of change

N/A

Element of
composite
democracy
(closer to Cass’
democratization
of trade and
Howse’s
democracy in the
WTO)

Disagreement
in parts,
opportunity
to emphasize
the
prevalence of
transparency.

Table 5 Links to other constitutionalization theories

Domestic Law Analogy
Administrative Law
Public Law

GAL
IPA/IPL
Constitutionalism/
Democratization
Societal Constitutionalism
Democratization without
Constitutional elements

C.

Constitutional Law/ Democratic
theory (representative, deliberative
democracy)
Autonomy of societal constitutions
(loose link with constitutional law)

Actors
All
All (states and
international organizations
more pronounced)
All

Democratic theory
(composite/compound democracy)

All
All

Hierarchy
Fluid/Amorphous
Two orders: domestic public and
international public
Pyramid (on top combination of
democratic values and
constitutionalism)
Two orders: Constitutional law
(with the pouvoir constituant),
ordinary law
Fluid/Amorphous until it
becomes constitutional- then two
orders (not domestic/
international, but
constitutional/ordinary)

Theory of composite democracy
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In the Spirit of Laws Montesquieu was the first to discuss checks and balances extending
beyond democratic legitimation and put in place in order to ensure the liberties that
democracy enabled in the first place. In particular, Montesquieu notes:
“It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but
political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments,
that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power
of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what
we ought not to will. […][C]onstant experience shows us that every man
invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it
will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of
limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of
things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so
constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law
does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law
permits. […][T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an
end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting
laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of
individuals.” 14
Similar ideas are echoed by Madison in the Federalist Papers:
“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.”15
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It is in the writings of the two statesmen that scholars trace the origins of composite
democracy, or the idea that elections alone do not guarantee good government, nor secure
individual rights and freedoms. In his work, Robert Dahl extended the Madisonian and
Montesquieuian paradigms and established a pluralist theory of democracy, or as he calls
it, polyarchy. Dahl, like Montesquieu and Madison posited that elections alone do not
guarantee democratic governance. There should be in place a sophisticated and flexible
set of institutions, norms and processes that ensure constant access to bargaining and
checks and balances. As a result, many of the so-called democratic states did not
withstand the test of being a polyarchy, while other institutions or even processes
exhibited elements of democratization outside electoral processes and possibly outside
the nation state. Knowledge, access to information and participation are cornerstones of
his pluralist democratic construct. More specifically Dahl observes:
“Because of its inherent requirements, an advanced economy and its
supporting social structures automatically distribute political resources and
political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups and organizations.
Among these skills are resources and knowledge, […] skill in organization
and communicating; and access to organizations, experts and elites. These
skills and resources ban be used to negotiate for advantages – for oneself,
for a group, for an organization. When conflicts arise […], access to
political resources helps individuals and groups to prevent the settlement
of the conflict by compulsion and coercion and to insist, instead, upon
some degree of negotiation and bargaining – explicit, implicit, legal, alegal. Thus, systems of bargaining and negotiation grow up within,
parallel to, or in opposition to hierarchical arrangements; and these
systems help to foster a political subculture with norms that legitimate
negotiating, bargaining, logrolling, give and take, the gaining of consent as
against unilateral power of coercion.”16
Further he notes that:
“The condition that no subculture be indefinitely denied the opportunity to
participate in the government can be met in two ways: - by a system
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oriented toward unanimity or by a system of shifting coalitions, that, over
time allow each group to shift out of opposition into the government.” 17
If such conditions are not met, then we can anticipate decisional immobility and other
major problems. 18 Dahl places discourse pluralism at the heart of polyarchies. At the
international level, a great example of such multilayered governance with incomplete
democratic forms has been analyzed in the context of the European Union. Heritier
discusses composite democracy this setting.
The first and very strong element of democratic legitimation is the periodic, free and fair
elections. The representativeness of European elections for EU issues is not as strong
however, as oftentimes national political divides and issues carry themselves over at the
EU level. In addition to the limited representativeness, the European Parliament has
incomplete decision-making powers. 19 Secondly, legitimacy stems from executive
representation, at the level of the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The
executive branch of the EU at the level of the Council of Ministers has received indirect
legitimation through national elections. 20 The third legitimation aspect is mutual
horizontal control, stemming from Montesquie’s and Madison’s separation of powers,
close also to Dahl’s pluralist democracy, so that no single group dominates decisionmaking and minority voices are represented in government. 21 The fourth legitimazing
element in the EU composite democracy is associative and expert representation
“reflected in the fact that policymaking often takes place in policy networks in which
sectoral interests are represented and negotiated among associative and independent
experts often nominated by the member states.”22 Finally, the EU democracy provides for
certain rights for EU citizens (rights’ based legitimacy), among which transparency plays
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a prominent role, as a right to access to information as well as a pre-requisite for
decision-making.23 The next table summarizes the above legitimacy elements.
Form of legitimation
Vertical legitimation
Executive representation

Expression
Voting/Majority
Negotiation

Horizontal mutual control

Diversity of actors and
bodies
Deliberation/ consultation

Associative and expert
representation
Individual- Rights’ based
legitimacy

Individual demand/
complaint mechanisms

EU form
European Parliament
European Council and
policy networks
CJEU, Council, Parliament
Policy networks
Access to information,
transparency, CJEU

Table 6 Elements of Composite Democracy in the European Union

Heritier emphasizes the subsidiary role of access to information as a component of
democratic legitimation in the European Union.24 In fact, the increased emphasis on
transparency may imply the deficiency of EU institutions and other legitimizing
processes to genuinely address legitimacy concerns that arise within EU governance. The
recent financial crisis is also demonstrative of this fact: more laws and new organizations
and facilities does not imply consideration of social concerns that are assume radical
forms and produce political impasse at national levels.25
There are many fundamental differences between the EU and the WTO. Most visibly, the
WTO does not hold any kind of elections, and the EU is a regional organization while the
WTO is global. The EU integration is nearing federalism, while the WTO maintains its
intergovernmental organization structure. The disparities among the WTO member states
in terms of economic and political histories are more divisive than within the EU.26 With
respect to transparency, the meanings it has assumed within the WTO as we will see in
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the next chapter are distinct to the notion of transparency within the EU. As such, the
subsidiary nature of the principle in the EU does not transpire in the WTO. The left
column of Heritier’s composite democracy matrix as summarized here can thus be
utilized to discuss how the different forms of transparency in the WTO formulate a
composite democracy space.
Dahl perhaps more clearly links the notion of “competition of ideas” and public
contestation as direct result of transparency to a pluralistic social order.

27

In such

polyarchies even when they assume the elementary shape if transnational regime, Dahl’s
“competition of ideas” is coupled with demands to participate in decision-making (in
opposition to hegemonic systems).28 Issue specificity of the regime can also allow for
more genuine competition of ideas. Originally the WTO was seen as the face of
globalization (during the protests in Seattle, Geneva and Montreal), but progressively this
response was replaced by the sophistication of arguments against the trade liberalization
paradigm which corresponded to a sophistication of participatory forms and more
importantly the insistence of civil society to be heard in the adjudicatory processes
through amicus briefs.
Finally, discussing the relationship between transparency and democracy, Hollyer et al.
answered the question whether democracies are more transparency than other political
regimes affirmatively, utilizing Dahl’s concepts of polyarchy. Other works on
transparency as complementary to democratic polity come from Mitchell29, Vishwanath
and Kaufmann30Stasavage31, Florini32, Bellver and Kauffman33, all linking transparency
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and accountability in democratic governance. Kono34 however cautions that transparency
in democratic regimes may induce the adoption of even more complex and opaque trade
policies by governments. Kono examines if democracies trade more than autocracies and
where transparency and liberalization are more robust.35 He concludes that the adoption
of transparent policies in terms of tariffs carries a backlash, as it encourages less
transparency non-tariff barriers to trade.36 The next part will outline the four transparency
forms in the WTO before linking them to each of Heritier’s legitimation aspects in the
last section of this chapter.

D.

Transparency forms in the WTO

Transparency in the WTO context has been seen as an unclear notion.37 It appears in
multiple forms and many instances. The following matters are discussed under the term
“transparency” in the WTO: power asymmetries among WTO member states (“internal
transparency”), openness, publications and participation of non-state actors, civil society
and individuals in the WTO (“external transparency”), transparency as an administrative
principle invoked in the selection and operations of various WTO bodies, such as the
Secretariat, the Dispute Settlement Body and the General Council (“administrative” or
“institutional transparency”), and transparency as an obligation to publish national laws
and maintain judicial remedy mechanisms for traders, assumed by WTO member states
in Article X of the GATT and its equivalent in other WTO Agreements (“legal
transparency”). Moreover, transparency in the WTO normatively takes the form of: soft
law, as part of the organization’s operational dogma and as an administrative principle;
general principle of international law in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 c) of the ICJ
Statute; and, treaty obligation, in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 a).All four forms of
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transparency are relevant to the main argument of this thesis as they all correspond to a
form of democratic legitimation under the theory of composite democracy.
1.

External Transparency

External transparency appears as a global governance principle in relation to civil society
at large (citizens, consumers, for profit and non-profit non-governmental organizations).
The first element of external transparency is information, namely the declassification and
publication or online availability of a very significant number of WTO documents. Also,
information includes the opening of WTO meetings at various levels of the organization’s
day-to-day work to the public. This opening occurs via either online streaming or in a
televised presentation in the WTO building in Geneva. Even though for the latter limited
seating is available, it appears that all interested parties so far have been admitted to
watch the meetings. In exceptional cases where the parties agree to do so, the WTO
dispute settlement process can be open to the public through a real time closed-circuit
television broadcast, as it recently occurred in the EC-Canada case on seal products.38
The second element of external transparency is participation of everyone other than WTO
member states. To this day, such participation is not of a decisive nature. In particular,
NGOs can participate in Ministerial Councils as observers and can also submit amicus
curiae briefs during the Dispute Settlement process. Moreover, the international
community is invited every year to participate in a usually three-day event, the WTO
Public Forum (previously known as the public symposium)39, where members of the civil
society, media, academics, business representatives and government officials meet to
discuss the most recent developments in international trade. Even though the Public
Forum has minimal normative value, it promotes transparency in the form of outreach
and openness towards the general public. 40 Another formal category of non-state
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participants in the WTO dispute process is experts, whose opinions can requested by the
Panels or the Appellate Body when needed. 41 Finally, representatives of large industries
involved in a particular dispute have participated in the Dispute Settlement Process,
either informally, or as ad hoc members of national missions.42
2.

Internal Transparency

Internal transparency as it has become known in the WTO context is the problem of
effective participation of developing countries in WTO decision-making. Indicative of
the internal transparency problem is the famous “Green Room” where only a small part
of member states participate in discussions, as well as incidents during the Seattle
Ministerial Council and others, where informal consultations took place only in the
presence of certain WTO member states while others were excluded.43
This issue extends to the underutilization of adjudicatory processes. This problem appears
first, in limited usage of the dispute settlement system by developing countries. Second,
countries with smaller economies are reluctant to seek enforcement of decisions once
they have won against a bigger trading WTO country in fear of retaliatory consequences
(such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-Bananas III
case). Finally, even when developing countries attempt retaliation, WTO rules limiting
retaliatory measures in the domestic markets limits the ability of developing countries to
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get effective compensation at the end of adjudication. Moreover, developing countries
lack the armies of lawyers that large nations can afford.
Similar problems of exclusion and powerlessness of weaker economies have been caused
by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements that result essentially in collusion
amongst their members, as their rules are never inspected for their compatibility with
WTO rules. Finally, take-it-or-leave it agreements are imposed to candidate member
states during their accession process. In this thesis these two areas of exclusionary tactics
and take-it-or-leave-it deals are discussed as problems of internal transparency lato sensu.
The WTO differs from other organizations with respect to the length and complexity of
negotiations and accession instruments. Accession to the WTO occurs through several
stages. Negotiations for accession have been very different from case to case. Indicative
of the spectrum of proceedings is that the shortest accession to this day, Kyrgyzstan,
lasted for almost three years, while the longest, China, lasted for more than fifteen years.
The WTO puts forward an elaborate process with many thresholds to be met. These are
not uniform for all candidate members and the WTO does not operate under a “checklist”
type of criteria. Rather, for each country that wants to accede, all current members can
put forward their interests and through negotiations at different levels, reach an
agreement on rules, tariffs and other issues covered by agreements under the WTO
umbrella. Thus, the accession requirements vary, to a lesser or a larger extent, from
country to country, thus questions for lack of transparency.
In recent years, especially with the accessions of China and Russia, negotiations have
extended to a number of commitments that exceed the WTO baseline of obligations, as
these are outlined in the WTO Agreements. More specifically, partly due to the fact that
both countries are considered Non Market Economies (NMEs) but also due to the trade
volume that the two countries engage in44, existing member states feared that admission
to the WTO would send shock waves through their domestic markets and their external
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trade. They also feared that both countries would not be prepared to participate on equal
terms with existing WTO member states. Thus, an additional set of obligations was
imposed to them, the so-called WTO-Plus. 45

3.

Administrative or Institutional Transparency

The next type of transparency is administrative or institutional transparency. This form of
transparency relates to the main participants in managing the WTO as an organization,
the less than 700 people46 who are employed by the WTO Secretariat with short or longterm employment contracts. Together with them, another six hundred or so liaison
officers and representatives to WTO47 located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva,
manage international trade. 48 The limited information published on the Secretariat
furthered the idea that the organization suffered from a significant compositional flaw: a
very small number of diplomats and international technocrats, working within the legacy
of the original architects of the WTO, namely a handful major WWII-era neoclassical
economists, are now the key actors of the international financial system. This “elite
administration” has not been elected and remains unaccountable for advancing normative
changes in the area of international trade that affect the lives of the vast majority of the
world population.
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Transparency concerns can be raised specifically with respect to the hiring process of
WTO employees. The original GATT was administered by a very small number of
international officials, mostly lawyers and economists. 49 Their duties were not only
administrative, but they were required to help the committees working on tariffs, provide
expert assistance to national delegations, support negotiations among different groups
and provide statistical assistance. 50 As the organization expanded, the size of the
secretariat remained proportionally small with respect to the size of the GATT
membership. After the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the secretariat doubled in
size, and the WTO delegations have increased proportionately. Ordinarily, the hiring
process begins with the public announcement of a position. Only citizens of WTO
member states can apply and interested candidates can submit an application online. Up
until this point the process is quite transparent. No other information exists publicly with
respect to the interview process and the types of questions asked, or average candidate
profiles.51 For those who have not participated in this process, very little information is
publicly available, unlike, for example, the hiring processes of the European Union or the
United Nations.
4.

Legal Transparency

Last, but not least, the final form of transparency in the WTO is legal transparency,
namely transparency as a legal obligation for member states substantiated in several rules
in the WTO Agreements and other related documents, such as Accession Protocols and
Trade Policy Reviews. 52 Member States are required to publish information related to
legislation that can have an effect on trade that are regulated by the WTO Agreements
that they are parties to and notify other members with respect to any changes in such
legislation (publication and notification requirement). Additionally, WTO Members are
required to establish enquiry points to provide information. Finally, several committees
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and mechanisms are put forward, including the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in
order to produce reports with respect to trade policies of Member States (trade policy
review process). 53
Transparency as a legal obligation is embodied principally in Article X of the GATT,
entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.” The transparency
obligation also appears in Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). Article III of the GATS imposes obligations for publication of legislation and
notification of changes in laws that affect trade in services and prompt response to
requests by other members on any of the regulations affecting trade in services.54 The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Part V,
under the title “Dispute Prevention and Settlement”, contains Article 63 on Transparency,
effectively extending the obligations of publication, notification and establishment of
review mechanisms to the subject matter of this Agreement. Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13 of
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) contain provisions that address transparency
related issues relevant to anti-dumping investigations. Transparency related are also
Articles 11, 12, 22 and 23 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 1 of the Import Licensing Agreement, Articles 3 and 12
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article 2(g) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin
and Article 12 of the Valuation Agreement which make reference to Article X. Finally,
the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement also contains provisions to
ensure transparency in Article V, Article VII paragraph 2, Article VIII, Articles IX to
XVII and finally Article XVII, which explicitly addresses transparency. 55
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Dispute settlement with respect to Article X has an interesting history in the GATT and
the WTO. Until 1980, transparency was never mentioned in any Panel reports. Even if
claims were raised by member states, they were not examined by the members of the
Panels. The transparency case law began in the eighties, and expanded within the overall
framework of the US-Japan disputes, which dominated the first period of Article X. With
the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the proliferation of disputes examined in the
dispute settlement process coincided with a proliferation of Article X claims. An
impressive number of disputes filed since 1995 cite Article X and its equivalents in other
WTO Agreements. Out of those, many have resulted in panel and Appellate Body reports
discussing the notion of transparency.
Another very important mechanism fostering the culture of transparency in the WTO is
monitoring of countries’ trade policies and practices. Trade monitoring first occurs on an
ad hoc daily basis at various WTO committees Second, the member states have
established two permanent monitoring bodies, one general and one specific, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 56 and the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). The
various councils and the committees in the WTO act as ad hoc monitoring mechanisms,
since, among other things, they are responsible for observing members’ activities related
to the GATT and other agreements.57 Each specialized committee issues reports and
updates on countries’ notifications and compliance with WTO obligations. Some of the
notification, information-sharing and monitoring procedures at the committees’ level are
directly linked to transparency, 58 especially when the documents produced are de-
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classified and published. But even prior to publication, the internal information
monitoring and sharing promotes a culture of transparency within the organization.59

E.

Composite democracy and transparency in the WTO

All the phenomena labeled as transparency in the WTO carry a number of characteristics
prevalent in democratic regimes, such as participation and meaningful information.
Whether these amount to constitutional principle is a derivative point: first we have to
understand the democratizing potential of transparency and how it can expand the WTO’s
normative space.
In other words, if there exist principles that have emerged above the WTO Agreements,
first we must understand how these principles add to the existing normative framework,
and then assess their constitutional quality. The appropriate framework has to steer clear
from nationally embedded public law and national notions of the constitution, and instead
first explore the democratizing potential of transnational principles, before moving to
transnational constitutionalism. In the absence of elections at the global level, composite
or compounded democracy offers a full list of other potential democratic functions in
governance. It extends beyond voting, for example into the executive representation,
horizontal mutual control, associative and expert representation, and legitimacy based on
individual rights.
To each of the four forms of transparency corresponds to a different aspect of composite
democracy. There exist very few and incomplete elements of vertical legitimation
through external transparency as well as intermediate democratic legitimation (or
secondary vertical legitimation) to the extent that governments of democratic member
states represent the interests of their citizens periodically legitimized through national
elections. Internal transparency parallels horizontal control (mutual at a political level and
structural at the permanent review bodies). The participation of NGOs and experts in the
WTO relates to both secondary vertical legitimation and associative or expert
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representation present in composite democracy. Finally, Article X, directly assigning
informational and adjudicatory resources for traders exhibits elements of individualrights based legitimacy.
Form of legitimation
Vertical legitimation

Expression
Incomplete secondary
vertical legitimation

Executive representation

General Council,
Ministerial Conferences

Horizontal mutual control

Permanent in trade review
bodies and mechanisms,
exceptional during the DSU
process
Amicus curiae briefs, expert
testimonies, NGO
participation in Ministerials
etc.
Publication of WTO
documents, national inquiry
points, Article X and
equivalents national
administrative and
adjudicatory recourse
mechanisms

Associative and expert
representation
Individual- Rights’ based
legitimacy

WTO form
National legitimacy
processes of WTO member
states’ governments
Internal transparency,
consensus and meaningful
decision-making
Legal and administrative
transparency
External and administrative
transparency
External and legal
transparency

Table 7 Transparency and Composite Democracy forms in the WTO

The numerous forms of transparency in the WTO also display these two characteristics:
polyarchy in the sense that transparency appears at various levels of governance and
involving numerous actors, and polynormativity because of the varying legal nature of
transparency forms.
However, the dominant neoliberal pro-trade ethos, prevalent in the WTO, on one hand
refutes the value of internal and external transparencies, stubbornly ignoring the former
for decades, until having reached a veritable deadlock today, and reducing the latter to a
non-issue during decision-making. Administrative and legal transparencies on the other
hand are perceived as conducive to the acceleration of trade liberalization and are
promoted with the proliferation of relevant case law and trade monitoring bodies. I will
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address this contradictory treatment of transparency. Legal and administrative
transparencies are useful to trade access and to eliminate unnecessary transaction costs,
while external and internal transparencies have more deeply embedded potential to
remedy imbalances in the world trading system.
All forms of transparency as they appear in the WTO can favor the proliferation of
discourse space in international trade regulation, by allowing for the dissemination of
trade information, the meaningful participation of developing countries and the inclusion
of civil society. However, their significance for the WTO varies. Publishing laws and
trade monitoring means more trade for WTO member states. Systematically sidestepping
the interests of developing countries and civil society has the potential of causing the
demise of the WTO.
I propose that for this reason that there can be a common red thread that cuts through all
the transparency forms. Adopting a sociological perspective to examine the four forms of
transparency is crucial for four reasons: first, the current inconsistencies with respect to
each of the transparency forms do not become obvious in the debate that discusses each
one separately, but when examined alongside. Second, a direct comparison of how
different forms of transparencies has evolved shows common histories that coincide with
the emancipation of global civil society, the refinement of their arguments and the
systematic push for accountability of national governments and international
organizations and the expansion of democratic discourse space at a global level to match
that which may exist at the national level in many countries. Third, demonstrating the
interconnectedness of different transparency forms and their relationship to
democratization gives developing countries more terrains to pursue fair and meaningful
integration of their economic needs at the WTO level. Finally, a sociological approach in
law that refocuses the transparency analysis in the WTO from constitutionalism to
democratization seeks to not limit participatory platforms to those allowed by the GATT
and other normative forms. Instead, an analysis that includes both legal and other
transparencies in the context of democratization will allow multiple and innovative
participatory forms to emerge and be proposed by developing country members outside
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the “rigidness” of an analysis based on constitutional consolidation. Rather, democratic
fluidity is proposed as the main analysis framework.
The two most contestable elements of this matrix are both related to the WTO demos.
The first is the possibility of indirect vertical legitimation, otherwise known as transitive
legitimacy. Second is the question of whom the WTO peoples consists of.
Transitive legitimacy is based on the link between periodic elections for national
governments and the representation of national interests at international fora and in the
bodies of international organizations. Anne Peters extensively discusses transitive
legitimacy as a factor for global democracy that will additionally result in the promotion
of global goods.60 She further adds that:
“[D]omestic democracy is warranted as a basis for the transitive
democratization of global governance, and […] promotes global
constitutional values, notably peace. [I]nternational law as it stands
already demands fulfillment of the international constitutional ideal of a
community of democratic nation states, while strictly limiting the means
of enforcing the spread of domestic democracy. Although the application
of the democratic prescription remains selective, the quest for domestic
democracy in the international lex lata is an indicator of the
constitutionalization of international law.”61
The data that Freedom House publishes every year on the quality of national democracies
are not as encouraging as Peters’ conclusions. There may be a rhetorical push towards
democracy, and it is an interesting and sometimes puzzling fact that the overwhelming
majority of countries in the world, all but one or two, describe themselves as free, or as
democracies. An overview of where democracy functions properly and where not is
much different. Using the WTO membership list as our sample group, and Freedom
House three-fold ratings we can see that 40 out of 160, or 25 percent of WTO member
states are authoritarian in practice, 76 out of 160 or 47 percent are free and everyone else
falls somewhere in between. This could be considered as a majoritarian victory for
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democracy in the WTO. However, considering the always-observed consensus rule, we
never witness in the auspices of the WTO Ministerials or General Council meetings a
show of hands that demonstrates a divide in values based on mode of governance. It is
also hard to imagine a democratic value-based divide in voting considering the tradespecific mandate of the WTO.
Finally, the demographics of the WTO may be only in theory weighing towards
democracy. The balance of 47 percent democratic states versus 25 percent authoritative
does not adequately describe the quest for democratic values in international law. In fact,
a comparison of population data for the very same countries paints a different picture.
The 40 authoritarian member states account for approximately 2 billion 348 million
people, while the 76 democratic ones have a population of 2 billion 831 million. This
changes the dynamics significantly, especially when one considers the end-consumer of
trade policies, the consumer-citizen herself.
These statistics render any efforts on behalf of the WTO as an organization to give an
outlet to civil society voices directly at the international level all the more important, as
such discourse and opportunities for influence and dissent may be entirely lacking at the
national level. Thus, the argument that some62 have put forward that the nation state is the
appropriate terrain and filter for civil society voices may work well in the EU, US,
Canadian, Japanese and other national contexts but it does not necessarily apply to the
rest of the world in quite the same way. Moreover, even if national constituencies are
heard at the national level, the Green Room practice may not allow for the representatives
of many countries to ever bring the considerations that were nationally discussed
forward. Picciotto more strongly than Peters argues for complementing the
transformation

of

global

democratic

space

with

domestic

pro-democratic

63

transformations.
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Another problem with transitive democracy is that the WTO Agreements are only
legitimized through treaty signing by a single government at a single time. Their
successors are to a large extent “locked in.” The process of treaty conclusions
significantly adds to this problem. Peters observes this when she notes that:
“…even within democratic states, the democratic foundation of foreign
policy is traditionally weak. International treaties are negotiated, signed,
and ratified by members of national executives, who enjoy less direct
democratic legitimacy than national parliaments. In democratic states,
parliaments are involved in the conclusion of treaties, but often in a late
stage when the text is already fixed. They can for the most part only take
or leave the treaty and have no creative power to introduce amendments or
carve out single articles.”64
A second issue that has been discussed with respect to the WTO, as it has in the EU
context is who exactly belongs to the WTO demos. I argue that this question is not as
relevant and has been sufficiently answered by Kjaer, who notes that a functional
equivalent of the EU peoples at the global level is “the concept of stakeholders, defined
as affected parties operating within a formalized institutional framework.”65 Instead of
arguing who may be the recipient of WTO policies (as the answer to that today may very
well be “everyone”), it is more pertinent to insist on the expansion of the WTO’s public
space and similarly the expansion of other international organizations’ public space.
Delineating a specific demos may even become a hurdle if it is eventually identified as a
procedural requirement for participation in any processes in the WTO. In theory, the
WTO Public Forum which invites everyone and anyone to participate in its three-day
discussions on trade should serve as a prototype at least to the extent of not excluding
anyone from the trade debate. Encouraging the expansion of public space in the WTO,
that is, improving external transparency, is a conditio sine qua non for addressing the
organization’s legitimacy issues. Drache links this public space with transparency and a
“strengthen civic order”:
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“[W]ithin a globalized world, public domain activities are becoming more
significant in the core economic jurisdictions, as well as many developing
and advanced states that are having to confront globalization and a range
of intractable distributional issues. International organizations like the
WTO, stress the need for transparency and the rule of law, both of which
require a strengthened civic order.” 66
Similarly Picciotto identifies the expansion of public forums as crucial to democratic
deliberation,67 and the assessment of expertise.68 He sees the establishment of WTO
contact points as a step in the right direction, and summarizes the need for a global
deliberative space and its establishment through democratic legitimacy:
“[D]emocratization of global governance is not a matter of creating a
global version of an already outdated national model of representative
democracy, but part of a more general process of the development of new
democratic principles responding to changes in the character of the public
sphere. The meaning and content of globalization are as much political as
economic questions: the construction of global governance has been under
way for some time, but it has been dominated by international elites. The
issue now is whether it is possible to provide democratic legitimacy
through appropriate constitutional principles, in the broad sense of
ensuring the allocation and exercise of public power in ways that can be
responsive to the values and preferences of those affected by relevant
decisions.”69
The next four chapters will elaborate on each of the four transparency forms and discuss
whether they can provide for such “public spaces”, in the sense of “normative discourse
spaces” and create opportunities for democratization in the WTO.
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III. Internal Transparency
Internal transparency in the WTO is defined as “the issue of effective participation of
developing countries in WTO decision-making.”1 In 2001, internal transparency was
included as an issue in Paragraph 10 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as follows:
“Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO membership,
we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency
and the effective participation of all Members. While emphasizing the
intergovernmental character of the organization, we are committed to
making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including through more
effective prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue
with the public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels
continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO and to
communicate the benefits of a liberal rules-based multilateral trading
system.”2
Paragraph 10 of the Doha Declaration addresses both internal and external transparency,
although it only mentions the former by name. In this chapter we will focus on the
internal transparency aspects of paragraph 10, and later we will also explore external
transparency in the relevant chapter.
Arguably, Paragraph 10 could be divided in two parts, discussing internal transparency
until the first period, and external for the rest of the paragraph. However, certain elements
in the part after the first period can be seen as qualifiers for internal transparency: the
WTO’s intergovernmental character refers not only to the membership to the WTO and
the conference of rights and duties reserved exclusively for states and not for other nonstate entities, but also, can be a reference to sovereign equality as the foundation of
international treaty making competence. Sovereign equality is alluded to as it is possibly
seen as a counterbalance, a cardinal notion in the foundation of international law that
aspires to offset the problematic notion that some countries are not participating as
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effectively as others, which the first sentence just spoke of. Even if internal transparency
was formally recognized in the Doha Declaration, immediately after the recognition was
tampered by an indirect reference to sovereign equality.
The last sentence of paragraph 10 makes the notion of internal transparency even
murkier. Issues of transparency are directly linked to lack of public understanding,
without it being further clarified if developing countries and their constituents are also
victims to such a “misunderstanding” or this is a reference only to external transparency
and non-state stakeholders, citizens, consumers and for profit and non-profit entities.
Finally, the last sentence, perhaps the most problematic of the entire paragraph is the one
directional notion that only benefits are to be reaped from the liberal rules-based system
that is the WTO. Even more here lie the notions that first, the problem with the WTO is
not the lack of benefits, or that such benefits come from its liberal rules-based nature, but
that all the above have somehow been lost in translation and not been communicated
properly to those who are interested or care, or are affected by these rules; and second,
that the very nature of the WTO as a legal system is decided and set, and what needs and
can be negotiated is the communication of the benefits. This reduces Paragraph 10 to a
debate on the WTO’s public relations’ agenda, and obscures the real issues that exist
within the organization and that have resulted to a negotiations’ standstill.
Since the Doha negotiation’s deadlock, it is evident that internal transparency problems
entail a lot more than an anomaly in the WTO’s communications’ strategies. This
conclusion is also evident through literature that discusses law and development in the
WTO: the lack of effective participation of developing countries is due to more
embedded issues that date before the creation of the WTO, and even before the
conclusion of the GATT, and are not unique to the international trading context.
Moreover, when one explores exclusionary practices from some WTO member states
against others in general, problems appear outside the development framework as well.
Thus, I argue that the definition of internal transparency should not be pegged to
developing countries. Instead, it should be extended for three reasons: the first is in order
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to remain more faithful to the letter of the Doha Declaration: Paragraph 10 stipulates that
internal transparency problems are linked to the expanding WTO membership, without an
explicit mention of developing countries. Therefore, other participation hurdles caused by
the increasing size of the organization should be considered under paragraph 10. Second,
there are some similarities in the legal framework that addresses development in the
WTO and two others, namely regionalism and accession. A set of exceptions are set forth
to address a different issue each time, putting in question the validity of cardinal rules in
the WTO and whether they function as intended. In other words, it is paradoxical why
such sets of exceptions are necessary to rules that represent the liberal rules-based trading
system, which provides its members with benefits only. Third, contextual parameters of
the three sets of two-tiered processes exhibit similarities. There exist most importantly
obvious stronger-versus-weaker state (or groups of states) dynamics, which further
influence the processes followed to conclude these rules, their content and their
monitoring mechanisms (when those are in place).
For these reasons I argue that internal transparency should extend to countries who are
left out of Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements as well as countries who are in
the process of acceding to the WTO. Or, one could argue that developing countries’
participation problems are issues of internal transparency stricto sensu while the other
two, accession and PTAs/RTAs belong to internal transparency lato sensu. Extending the
definition of internal transparency to non-development related exclusionary problems can
help us better understand the issue of non-effective participation to the world trading
system, and can also help address fairness questions that do not exclusively appear in the
development context.
A WTO member state can be facing exactly the same issues of complete disregard for its
economic needs and inability to do much about it in the WTO context during its
accession process or because of being left out from Preferential Trade Agreements. The
former scenario happened for example in the case of Vanuatu, which, in order for its
accession to be approved, was essentially being coerced into signing the plurilateral
Agreement on Aviation even though the country has no civil aviation system. The
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possibility of such anecdotes in accessions negotiations exists due to the structure of
accession in the WTO. With respect to PTAs, the mega-agreements signed between the
EU and Canada (CETA) and negotiated between the EU and the US (TTIP) can easily
exacerbate the problems from extant subsidization practices from all three parties for
their products at the expense of small economies. The three WTO members are already
dominating the world trading system. New agreements between them without the
obligation to extend the privileges agreed through MFN to anyone else can block entire
sectors of global markets from any chances for prosperity. Additionally, a significant
amount of intransparency exists with respect to PTAs in the WTO.
The first part of this chapter will discuss internal transparency stricto sensu, namely as it
relates to developing countries. The second and third parts will extend to transparency
lato sensu, in PTAs, RTAs and the accession process. The chapter will aim to highlight
the significance of trust in the WTO institutional processes, such as negotiations,
decision-making, dispute settlement and trade monitoring that the representatives of
member states should have in order for the WTO system to function productively,
observe similarities and differences amongst the three areas where internal transparency
is relevant and link internal transparency to democratization in the WTO. This chapter
acts as a form of “internal” critique to the WTO discourse, namely it adopts the Doha
Declaration definition and examines how it can be better understood.

A.

Internal Transparency stricto sensu: Developing Countries in the

WTO
The problems with respect to internal transparency stricto sensu became more widely
known during the Green Room incidents in the first few years of the GATT operations.
The Green Room refers to a room adjacent to the office of the GATT and then the WTO
Director-General where smaller group meetings traditionally took place.3 Such meetings
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include countries with higher financial stakes in certain products or the outcomes of
certain negotiations and result in faster negotiations of rules, excluding the bulk of WTO
member states. Thus, the familiar tactic of alliance formation during treaty negotiations
was quasi-institutionalized. The exclusionary incidents proliferated to the point that
countries with large delegations would meet in several small working groups who were
convening in parallel and at the same time during Ministerial Meetings. Countries with
smaller delegations, mostly smaller economies, developing and least developed countries
would not have similar diplomatic armies and would thus be excluded from efficient
representation of their interests in such meetings. Efforts of these countries to unite and
conquer the meetings partially remedied the problems but cannot fully work, as the
interests of developing countries and smaller economies are not uniform with respect to
tariffs, products and agreements. To this day, internal transparency problems remain as
one of the cardinal legitimacy deficits in the WTO.
This chapter will discuss the context and the rules related to internal transparency. The
origins of the internal transparency deficits can be traced beyond the GATT and the WTO
and the problems with developing country participation at international fora is not unique
to the WTO. Instead of disembedding the treatment of developing countries with respect
to WTO rules from the internal transparency problem, I argue that only through
examination of the GATT development decisions can we fully understand how internal
transparency became to be seen as an issue in the WTO in the first place and how deeply
rooted internal transparency is to the tension between the “rules-based liberal trading
system” and the economic needs of developing countries. The growing frustration of
developing countries did not emerge after the creation of the WTO, and is not limited to
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being left out of the Green Room, or not having large enough delegations to fully engage
in tariff negotiations. Instead, developing countries have voiced concerns of their
interests being side-stepped throughout the history of the GATT and as a result,
periodically the GATT member states and later the WTO member states have taken steps
to rectify the problem. However, such steps are first, too few and too late, and second,
they are introduced on an exceptional basis and not through a proper developmentoriented dialogue.
In this chapter I argue that the marginalization of developing states during WTO
meetings and the marginalization of development needs in international trade are linked.
Developing countries have traditionally been excluded from discussing the needs of their
economies in the WTO: many of their industries cannot sustain the pressure of extensive
liberalization and competition in global markets. Instead of benefiting from comparative
advantage, domestic markets have plummeted to extinction. This decline was greatly
exacerbated by globalization. Not being heard, and not being taken seriously resulted
instead in the adoption of “Band-Aid” frameworks such as the GSP and the Enabling
Clause, and agreements with insignificant stature or restricted to single products like the
ones adopted for Least Developed Countries during the Bali Ministerial. Therefore, the
incomplete nature of development rules is coupled to a more systemic reluctance in the
WTO to question the ideological foundations of the world trading system. This is
evidenced inter alia by the wording of Paragraph 10 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
as we saw earlier, which is replete with disclaimers and qualifiers that negate the severity
of the development issue. The “Green Room” saga and the failure to create a
development-friendly normative agenda are having mutual spillovers onto one another.
Thus they will be discussed together in this chapter.
The first part will begin the conversation of development outside the world trading
system and provide an overview of the history of development in order to show that this
lack of consideration for development needs is a more systemic issue in international
affairs. In the second part, I will discuss the history of development and the legal
parameters of development in the GATT and the WTO. This part will focus on the
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Generalized System of Preferences, the Enabling Clause, the most important DSB report
discussing the issue of development, EC-Tariff Preferences, and the status of
development after the Doha Ministerial Conference. This analysis will help demonstrate
the extent of the deficit on a proper consideration of development needs. The third part
will link the conclusions from the first two parts to the notion of internal transparency.
More specifically, I will first examine how development is, as shown, a complicated
concept that encompasses a series of considerations and a plethora of diverse national
interests. International administrations and global governance more generally has been
struggling to form a proper development agenda. However, returning to internal
transparency, I will argue that it will never be possible to include developing needs in
multilateral trade negotiations without including developing countries in the dialogue as
well.

a)

A very brief overview of Development

The concept of development mainly arose during the period of decolonisation following
World War II. In that sense, the dynamics between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’
countries can be said to be a direct result of the convoluted and complex history of
colonialism.4 Development is hard to define, and contains elements such as infrastructure
and poverty, which are also difficult to define, and can incorporate a number of biases
that may be difficult to identify.5 It has been a central matter of contestation and attention
in the work of development economists, economic geographers, international political
economists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, managers, production engineers and
others.6 In an attempt to define development, we could consider notions such as the
standard of living (and how to improve it), economic and labour factors, and the desire to
eradicate poverty. Tied to the notion of development are the history of colonialism, the
economics of scarcity in goods, food and other commodities, labour economics, legal
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pluralism and comparative law, and, finally, human rights discourse. These analytical
categories include a large number of further distinctions that fall outside the scope of this
thesis.
Development has been the meeting point for historical, economic and legal concepts and
analyses.7 It has also been the preoccupation of political and civil society actors and
international organisations.8 The notion of development differs from one country to the
next, reflecting the varied development needs of each country. It also differs based on
who defines it: lawyers, historians, economists, NGOs, the people living in developing
countries, their politicians, other governmental structures such as international
organisations (the WTO, World Bank, IMF), or the G20. Each discipline and stakeholder
has developed multiple narratives, which are often not compatible with other descriptions
of the same phenomenon. Accordingly, navigating development from the point of view of
law is particularly challenging for lawyers and legal scholars. Globalisation amplified the
difficulty of this task by accentuating more transnational dimensions in existing legal
relationships.
Development economics is perhaps the most prolific discipline occupied with
development. It is the discipline that had the greatest role in informing all other
development-oriented disciplines. The focus of development economists can be
summarised in two questions: Why are the poor countries still poor? What can be done to
remove their persistent poverty?9
Notwithstanding classical economists and Marx, the history of development economics
began in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It includes many schools of thought ranging
across the political spectrum, from neoliberal laissez-faire economists to neo-Marxists. It
includes institutionalist theories, theories of endogenous and exogenous growth,
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heterodox theories, theories of path dependency, varieties of capitalism, developmentalist
economics, external trade optimists and skeptics, theories exploring the world population,
agriculture, technology and their effects on development, comparative political economy
and many others.10 A lawyer approaching this field is provided with an extensive menu of
economic theory choices examining a variety of socioeconomic factors. At the same time,
many of these theories are in stark opposition to others and offer opposite accounts for
the same economic phenomena or the same case studies.11
Law and Development emerged in legal discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s it
took the form of an aggregate of loosely connected theoretical accounts from comparative
law scholars, legal anthropologists, Third World specialists and social theorists.12 This
original stream of work focused on establishing a model for the relationship between law
and society and an explanation for the relationship between law and development.13 In
their seminal article ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development Studies in the United States’, David Trubek and Mark Galanter
deconstructed the ‘liberal legalism’ paradigm of previous accounts by challenging its
underlying assumptions of law as an instrument for change towards the ‘ideal’ form of
Western rule of law models.14
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Legal reform and legal education were featured as prominent tools for law and
development in the first two decades of the movement.15 In the 1980s, Trubek, among
others, identified that in the 1980s ‘Rule of Law’ theories replaced previous Law and
Development debates.16 The first ‘Rule of Law’ wave emerged during the era following
the end of 1980s Washington Consensus.17 Very soon, the promise of solutions that
would ensue endogenously through domestic market and rule-of-law reforms was
replaced by an understanding that development needs varied significantly not only from
one country to the next, but within geographic districts of the same country. Poverty
alleviation and sustainable growth could not be attained based on prescribed development
strategies.
In the post-Washington Consensus era,18 law and development can no longer afford to
disembbed economic from social considerations. 19 Soft law, informal norms, social
norms, networks and culture must be considered during any attempt to formulate a
development strategy.20 As the vast majority of theories and assumptions of development
economics has been drastically revisited, law and development is following suit.21 The
evolving Rule of Law discourse in the World Bank22 is still far from proposing a positive
roadmap to growth.
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b)

Development in the GATT and the WTO

The complexity of development is well-known in historical, legal and economic analyses
of trade and development.23 Sonia Rolland gives a concise definition of development in
the organisation as the ‘unspoken … non-negotiated understanding … transpir[ing] from
the GATT and WTO practice regarding special and differential treatment’. According to
Rolland, the objectives of the special and differential treatment are in sum ‘the promotion
of North-South trade’, ‘allowances for domestic development policies that may be trade
restrictive’ and ‘increase of South-South trade’, albeit limitedly. The establishment of
special and differential treatment, with its multiple facets,24 occurred throughout the
history of the GATT and the WTO.
The question of how to increase benefits from trade for developing countries arose
shortly after GATT came into existence in 1947. Ten out of the 23 original GATT
members were developing countries and more acceded shortly after the conclusion of the
GATT. 2526 The strain of colonisation inevitably followed the developing countries in
their multilateral trade responsibilities. Originally, the distinction among developed and
developing nations was yet another outfit of the mandates’ and the colonies’ apparatus.27
The dynamics between the two groups were a direct result of the history of colonialism
but also the de facto position of developing countries, which accessed only limited
resources of wealth, comprising mainly of primary products.28 There was substantial
discussion on development during the negotiations of the ITO but no aspects of it
transpired to the GATT to form any kind of concrete legal rules.
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Until 1954, developing countries participated as equal partners in the GATT. Article I of
the GATT, entitled ‘General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment’ (MFN), contained an
obligation to automatically extend the lowest tariff level in any given product that applied
to one member of the GATT to all members. One ultimate goal of the cardinal GATT
provision is an overall reduction in tariffs for its members. This was a cumbersome
obligation for developing countries, whose domestic markets could not sustain the direct
competition of foreign products. With the participation of developing countries in the
GATT and later the WTO, opportunities for national protectionism and subsidies
diminished.29 National manufacturers had to compete with global prices, and domestic
industries were left vulnerable to shocks of exposure to world markets. 30 Any
opportunities of subsidies in order to help national manufacturers were originally
inhibited by the GATT rules. For the developing GATT member states, membership in
the organisation seemed to be an obstacle to, rather than an opportunity for, growth. To a
large extent, formal equality translated to unequal rewards. 31 Developing countries
pushed immediately for changes in the GATT system. As early as 1954, during the first
GATT Review session, Article XVIII providing for infant industry exceptions was
revised. Article XVIII (B) was adopted, giving the opportunity to countries with balance
of payment problems to adopt exceptions. Finally, Article XXVIII (bis) lowered the
reciprocity requirements for developing countries.
Later on, with the formation of the G77 group, and the negotiations of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the New International Economic
Order32, the GATT Contracting Parties gained some negotiating power in the WTO.
Partly responding to almost two decades of pressures from their developing members,
partly due to concerns of progressive replacement by UNCTAD (whose mandate also
was directly related to trade), WTO members chose to adopt Part IV of the GATT, under
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the title “Trade and Development.” Even though Part IV does not contain any concrete
legal obligations vis-à-vis development, it can be seen as a victory of developing
countries. In any case, UNCTAD offers a comparable framework, equally aspirational in
nature.
The creation of UNCTAD, another organisation specialising in Trade and Development,
acted as a warning for the developed members of the GATT: their developing
counterparts could abandon the organisation. Such a move would compromise the
developed bloc’s universal membership ambitions, which gained particular significance
during the Cold War. 33 The Committee on Trade and Development was created in the
GATT and Part IV of the GATT was adopted as a response. Part IV, entitled Trade and
Development, consists of three articles entitled ‘Principles and Objectives’,
‘Commitments’ and ‘Joint Action’. The content of these articles is more aspirational and
declaratory than compulsory. It does not create any obligations for developed countries,
nor rights for developing ones.34
Shortly thereafter, another three waivers to the Article I MFN clause were adopted with
the aim of assisting developing countries. Most importantly, in 1971 the GATT member
states agreed to the Generalized System of Preferences,35 which granted tariff preferences
to developing countries without a reciprocity requirement (as MFN would otherwise
require). This was essentially a waiver, containing an expiration date whose extension
was to be further decided. Its significance was strengthened eight years later, when it was
concretized during the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. In 1979, at the end of the
Tokyo Round, the temporary waivers of the previous decade were made permanent in the
Enabling Clause36.
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Waivers were granted under the GATT framework37, which remains unchanged in the
WTO. One could claim that they are mostly isolated and sporadic. Even though each
waiver was granted for a legitimate reason, the explanation behind each one is on an adhoc basis and the conclusions to be drawn from such waivers are limited. In any case,
waivers as exceptions portray a return to the bilateral structure,38 juxtaposed to the
sweeping MFN and National Treatment. The waiver mechanism for developing countries
creates an elaborate system under the GATT/WTO, which targets a specific group for a
particular reason with large political and economic parameters.
The special and differential treatment of developing countries could be seen as adhering
to the principle of equality and doing so quite faithfully. Indeed, equality in law obliges
one to treat equal cases equally, and unequals unequally39. As was pointed out by the
Rapporteur of the Subcommittee on General Principles, in the Report of the Committee
on Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order:
“From a legal point of view […] the equality principle (or the nondiscrimination-principle) means that equal cases should be treated equally
and unequal cases unequally. […] [U]nequal cases should be treated
unequally in proportion to their inequality. In view of the objectives of the
rules and policies concerned and particularly in view of the objectives of a
NIEO this will mean in particular that developing countries have to be
treated more favourably by developed countries in proportion to their level
of under-development.”40
There are three main parts to the legal framework of development under the WTO/GATT
umbrella. First, the GATT provisions. Article XVIII of the GATT contains a detailed
support structure in case developing countries need to adopt measures regarding infant or
otherwise necessary for development industries. Part IV of the GATT is a lot more vague,
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setting out ambitions and principles with limited legal application. This lack of legal
obligations was even at the time of the adoption of part IV, depicted as an advantage.41
Second, the Generalized System of Preferences, paragraph (a), according to which:
“…without prejudice to any other Article of the General Agreement, the
provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to the extent
necessary to permit developed contracting parties […] to accord
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing countries
and territories with a view to extending to such countries and territories
generally the preferential tariff treatment refereed to in the Preamble to this
Decision, without according such treatment to like products of other
contracting parties…”
Third, the Enabling Clause adopted in 1979, which in the first paragraph provides that:
“Not withstanding the provisions of article I of the General Agreement,
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment
to developing countries, without according such treatment to other
contracting parties.”
Further, it says in Paragraph 2:
The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:
(a)
Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting
parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with
the Generalized System of Preferences.
Of importance is also Footnote 3 (referring to paragraph 2a).
“As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25
June 1971, relating to the establishment of “generalized, non-reciprocal
and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries”
(BISD 18S/24).
Two areas of increased significance for developing countries were left out of the GATT
until the Uruguay Round: trade in textiles and agricultural products. Another important
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issue, especially for sub-Saharan African countries, was that of the prices of drugs for
many diseases that plagued large numbers of their populations. They were asking
essentially to be able to produce generic versions of the drugs, circumventing the lengthy
periods of expensive patents. The deal resulting from the Uruguay Round of negotiations
in the next decade was in the form of a single undertaking and included an Agreement on
Agriculture and one on Textiles and Clothing, as well as TRIPS on Intellectual Property.
GATT Members had to accept all agreements as a package deal.
The inclusion of crucial to developing countries sectors, especially textiles and
agriculture was only a Pyrrhic victory. The agreements themselves did not result in any
changes to the benefit of developing country industries. In the meanwhile a number of
regional initiatives attempted to assist developing countries, such as the EU Cotonou
Agreement,42 the United States’ Caribbean Basin Initiative,43 as well as the US African
Growth and Opportunity Act.44
The new tariff schedules and their implementation reserved unpleasant surprises. First,
agricultural concessions were entered into on an average basis. Compared to the less than
4% average tariffs of manufactured goods, agricultural products’ tariffs were cut on
average by 36% according to the Uruguay Round results. An average cut of 36%
however does not entail significant liberalization, as countries can pick and choose
products that are of lesser interest (or more difficult to grow, producing smaller volumes
of exports) and eliminate tariffs completely, while keeping them intact for products that
are of pivotal interests in domestic economies, as long as on average the cut amounts to
36%.
On top of that generous subsidies of domestic markets, as it happens for example for the
US cotton industry, can help flood world markets with cheap US cotton. As a result,
cotton, a key sector for sub-Saharan Africa’s external trade is rendered much less
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competitive. In 2005, former Mali President Amadou Toumani Toure summarized the
importance that cotton acquired throughout the Doha Round of negotiations.
“Cotton is by no means the only issue at stake in the agricultural sector in
the Doha Round negotiations. But it must be recognized that, between
Cancùn and Hong Kong, cotton has become the symbol of the African
fight for fair and equitable trade, a fight that is supported by various
international non-government organizations. A few years ago, cotton was
a source of wealth for us. Now it has become a burden, and a factor in
increasing poverty. This trend has become worse over the past few years,
which have been marked by a major fall in global prices. Although a
number of factors have led to this situation, agricultural subsidies are the
main cause of market disruption, which has serious consequences for our
economies. In addition to the macroeconomic impact of losses in
government revenue, due to subsidies paid by developed countries to their
producers, 15 million people in West and Central Africa, of whom over
three million are farmers, depend directly on cotton for their livelihoods.
These people are suffering the socio-economic costs. The current situation
generates poverty in the rural areas of Africa, and particularly in the
cotton-growing regions. This poverty in turn is causing an exodus of
people from the rural areas. The paradox of the situation is that, while
African cotton is the most competitive in the world, African farmers can
no longer manage to survive by growing it. […]The crisis in the cotton
industry eloquently demonstrates that it is not enough for our countries to
produce efficiently in order to hope for fair recompense for the efforts of
our farmers.”45
During the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, developing countries found
themselves at the front line of opposition on the so-called Singapore issues, trade and
investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and
trade facilitation. Later, a 1999 World Bank Report addressing the question of whether
trade conducted based on WTO rules would result in assisting developing countries
contributed a comprehensive analysis to what empirically developing countries were
experiencing long before the creation of the WTO. In particular the report said that:
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“the WTO obligations reflect little awareness of development problems
and little appreciation for the capacities of least developed countries to
carry out the functions that SPS, customs valuation, intellectual property,
etc. regulations address. The content of these obligations can be
characterized as the advanced countries saying to the others, Do it my
way!”46
Another very important point that this study put forward was that the continuous lack of
participation for least developed countries resulted in a lack of “sense of “ownership” of
the reforms to which WTO membership obligates.” Although the report was focusing on
market reforms that the Uruguay Round necessitated, its conclusions were directly
referring to the Green Room problems that we have described to some extent already.
The report notes that problems include the lack of resources for least developed country
delegations, the fragmented communication of the WTO delegations and the
governments back home as well as the non-existent involvement of domestic
stakeholders.47
In addition, the Uruguay Round was a single undertaking process, developing and
developed countries could not opt in the Agreements and concessions that their domestic
economies could endure. The conclusions of the World Bank paper are damning for the
WTO. The Agreements provide, mostly to a significant extent, both “inappropriate
diagnoses” for development issues and “inappropriate remedies.”48 The paper concludes
that:
“Though the agreements allow for the possibility that alternative
approaches might be developed and recognized, they provide no such
alternative. As to developing alternatives, the WTO negotiations are a selfinterest propelled process. Narrowly interpreted, that places the burden of
developing alternatives that are appropriate to least developed countries’
needs and their resources on the least developed countries themselves.”49
The report finally mentions that some projects are in place to assist least developed
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countries. Dani Rodrik has discussed the trade and development relationship in a similar
line focusing not only on least developed countries but developing as well. He notes that
the “success stories” of world trade, such as China or Korea adopted a large amount of
protectionist measures in order to assist domestic industries before exposing them to
world market shocks. He challenges the idea that benefiting from international trade
through the GATT and WTO rules alone. 50 Essentially, he proposes a shift from
evaluating the trade regime from the perspective of whether it maximizes the flow of
trade in goods and services and to asking whether “the trading arrangements –current and
proposed—maximize the possibilities of development at the national level” instead. 51 In
a sense, it is a little like learning how to swim for the first time in the middle of the ocean.
Those who survive and thrive in the current trading system had the opportunity to “learn”
in a controlled environment. Furthermore, intra-country inequalities persist in those
countries. Their GDP may be rising but a large segment of the population in some cases
is still living under the poverty line. Even their benefit from global trade is relative.
The dissatisfaction of developing countries was carried over to the next two Ministerial
Conferences in Geneva and Seattle. The failure to launch the next round in Seattle
demonstrated that the problem of development couldn’t be fixed with fragmented
concessions and ad hoc solutions. The mainstream logic in trade that granting periodic
privileges would push poorer countries’ participation in world markets and market
dynamics would take care of the rest and improve national economics was fundamentally
challenged.
The eventual launch of the 2001 Round of negotiations, the Doha Round was linked to a
strong commitment of member states to place the interests of developing countries in the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50

See Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness work Vol. 24.
Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council (1999), THE SAME, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE:
AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED (2001), Dani Rodrik, Trading in illusions, FOREIGN POLICY 55-62
(2001). Also, see various entries at his blog http://rodrik.typepad.com/.
51
DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED, PAPER
PREPARED FOR THE UNDP (Revised July 2001).

157

forefront. The round was subsequently named the “Doha Development Round.”52 The
Doha agenda comprised of a number of issues: liberalization of trade in agricultural
products, market access for non agricultural products, continuing liberalization in trade in
services, improvement in rules on dumping, intellectual property rights and regional trade
agreements, clarification of the relationship of trade and the environment and further
integration of developing countries in the WTO.
Two important developments occurred two years later, in 2003. The first was during the
Cancun Ministerial, the formation of a new and strong coalition of developing and least
developed countries, the so-called G20 (whose variations were the G30 and the G40).
Led by India and Brazil, who decided to set their trade dissimilarities aside, the group
strongly opposed being coerced to more cumbersome concessions and agreements. Other
developing country groups tried to push new agendas forward during the preparations of
the Ministerial.53
The second event in 2003 was the delivery of the EC-Tariff Preferences report. 54 The
Generalized System of Preferences and the Enabling Clause were given a more specific
meaning during the EC Tariff Preferences dispute. The Panel and the Appellate Body in
the EC-Tariff Preferences decision were called upon to answer some significant questions
with respect to the legal treatment of developing country products in the WTO.55 First
the Panel and Appellate Body discussed whether the Enabling Clause consists an
exception to Article I:1 of the GATT, and thus the two are mutually exclusive, or Article
I:1 applies to measures falling under the Enabling Clause. Article I:1, embodying one of
the cardinal rules of the GATT provides for non-discrimination of like products
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originating from different member states when these products reach the market of a third
member state. If the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 then, any measures
adopted within the Enabling Clause context do not need to be automatically extended to
all developing countries in the WTO. However, if the Enabling Clause were found not to
be an exception to Article I:1 but a self-standing commitment, then, Article I:1 would
apply to it, as it does to all WTO commitments. Thus, any privileges granted to one
developing country would automatically need to be extended to all developing countries.
The Panel decided, and the Appellate Body affirmed that the Enabling Clause is an
exception to Article I:1. Specifically, the Appellate Body said:
The ordinary meaning of the term “notwithstanding” is, as the Panel
noted, “[i]n spite of, without regard to or prevention by”. By using the
word “notwithstanding” , paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause permits
Members to provide “differential and more favourable treatment” to
developing countries “in spite of” the MFN obligation of Article I:1. Such
treatment would otherwise be inconsistent with Article I:1 because that
treatment is not extended to all Members of the WTO “immediately and
unconditionally”. Paragraph 1 thus excepts Members from complying with
the obligation contained in Article I:1 for the purpose of providing
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries,
provided that such treatment is in accordance with the conditions set out in
the Enabling Clause. As such, the Enabling Clause operates as an
“exception” to Article I:1.56
Furthermore the Panel and Appellate Body were asked whether there exists for developed
countries an obligation to extend the same privileges, once granted, to all developing
countries. In other words, does the exception need to be as such applied in a non
discriminatory manner. the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings. It said that
extending tariff preferences to all developing countries in a non-discriminatory manner
does not mean that identical treatment is ensured for all. Any privilege-granting member
can choose what form and level of privileges it will give to different countries.
In particular the Appellate Body said:
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It does not necessarily follow […] that “non-discriminatory” should be
interpreted to require that preference-granting countries provide
“identical” tariff preferences under GSP schemes to “all” developing
countries. 57
For all these reasons, we reverse the Panel’s finding […] that ‘the term
‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling
Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be
provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the
implementation of a priori limitations. 58
Further down, the Appellate Body restates the thesis that ‘developing countries’ may
mean “less than all developing countries.” 59 In a sense, this differentiation among
developing countries can support the claim that the Appellate Body may be keen on
recognizing the rationale that lies behind the so-called ‘graduation’ principle. This
principle, which has been often been seen as mercantilist and monolithic60 very briefly
says that developing countries, once they reach a certain level of development that puts
them in a position noticeably better and comparable to developed countries, they should
“graduate” from their “developing-country” status and receive no further privileges. The
principle was accused as mercantilist61 because it implies that, once it graduates the
country will be in a position to grant preferential treatment to those still in a developing
status.
The Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences offered a systemic interpretation of the
obligations contained in the Enabling Clause and the GSP:
Furthermore, as we understand it, the participants in this case agree that
developing countries may have “development, financial and trade needs”
that are subject to change and that certain development needs may be
common to only a certain number of developing countries. We see no
reason to disagree. Indeed, paragraph 3 (c) contemplates that “differential
and more favourable treatment” accorded by developed to developing
counties may need to be “modified” in order to “respond positively” to the
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needs of developing countries. Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause
supports this view by recording the expectation of “less-developed
contracting parties” that their capacity to make contributions or concession
under the GATT will “improve with the progressive development of their
economies and improvement in their trade situation”. Moreover, the very
purpose of the special and differential treatment permitted under the
Enabling Clause is to foster economic development for developing
countries. It is simply unrealistic to assume that such development will be
in lockstep for all developing countries at once, now and for the future.62
Since the launch of the Doha Round, not a single agreement was reached in twelve years
until the Ministerial Council in Bali in 2013. The Doha Round indicated that developing
country issues had no easy solution, and ignoring the problem was not an option any
more. Negotiations reached a stand-still, and until today, there is still a rift in at least
three important areas. 63 The most pressing present interests of developing countries, as
the current Doha agenda indicates, are primary agricultural products, which are generally
exported for further processing, access to medicines covered by patent agreements,64 and
implementation specifics with respect to special and differential treatment.65
Recently, during the Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013, the Doha
Development Agenda was revisited. Agriculture and Development were at the centre of
the agenda.66 Many developing countries expressed a desire to avoid small Green Room
group negotiations.67 The conclusion of the Bali package was the first positive outcome
of the Doha Development Round. It includes three pillars: trade facilitation (reducing red
tape and speeding up port clearances); agriculture, focusing on food security and finally
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including an agreement on cotton products from least developed countries; and
provisions aiming at assisting the group of least developed countries.68 The emphasis on
developing and least-developed countries in the Agreements is prevalent.69 Additionally,
the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism is extended to the implementation of special
and differential treatment provisions.70 It is still very soon to determine whether the reach
of these agreements will result in a noticeable improvement in the position of developing
countries.
Overall, Developing Countries have come a long way, from not being heard at all during
the ITO negotiations, to causing an impasse at the last negotiation rounds. Still, there is a
long way to go. The limited use of dispute mechanisms and the oftentimes observed
reluctance to enforce adopted reports of the DSB and give tit-for-tat to developed
countries (such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the ECBananas III case, 71 or the Antigua and Barbuda case on gambling services against the
US) shows that developing countries have not found themselves yet in a peer-to-peer
position. This imbalance is still explained both by the actual economic position of
developing countries in the world trading system, but also, historically by their
continuing behavioral stance vis-à-vis the “Developed Country” paradigm, which, seen as
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a “success”, comes forward and imposes itself authoritatively with economic and legal
recipes and a paternalistic attitude. The message that comes across towards developing
countries is “you either follow or fall behind.” The two factors, the pragmatic and the
attitudinal perpetuate the existing imbalances. 72

c)

Development and Internal Transparency

The system in place for developing countries has been very much criticized, especially
during the last twenty years.73 The provisions, instead of assisting developing countries,
are seen as in fact reproducing power and bargaining asymmetries. The WTO, just like
GATT, stressed market-access as a sacrosanct target. The world trading system operates
under the assumption that inclusion will produce larger volume of trade and this would
semi-automatically bring developing countries out of any fiscal dead-ends. It reflected the
belief that once in the marketplace, price mechanisms for commodities will allocate
resources in an optimal manner.
There is no such thing as a recipe for development. There are only long histories of trial
and error. In particular, within legal discourse, no framework can ever be taken for
granted to produce positive results. 74 The successes and failures, among many, of China,
Vietnam, the East-Asian Tigers, Russia, Chile, Argentina allow us to draw one
conclusion only: no universally accepted set of rules (not even a minimal one) can lead to
development, nor can it prevent financial collapse when it is bound to happen. Each case
is vastly different from the next one. Labor, history, education, property law and contract
law choices, political histories, relationship to neighbors and geographic location, current
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or historical relationship to systems of economic organization (capitalism/communism
before 1989), lack or existence of natural resources, weather, prioritization of
commodities in the global market, religion, cultural habits, and everything under the sun
are affecting the development of a country.75 Even earthquakes and tsunamis can reverse
in a matter of minutes any possible progress. If we loosely, and for the purposes of this
paper, call this “the economic environment”, it affects trade in a great number of ways,
but there are only two legal instruments (Enabling Clause and GSP) that are on some
level legally binding and are addressing the issue, and, just to make matters worse, the
adherence to them by developed countries is done on a voluntary basis. So far, cursory
attempts to formalise concessions granted to developing countries without careful
consideration of context have only led to an aggravation of already existing problems.
The questions we ask in this last part are two: first, can it be argued that there is a
correlation between internal transparency problems and a development-friendly
development agenda? Will improving the first increase the chances of finding more
solutions for the second? I answer this in the affirmative. Second, are there any practical
proposals to help with the internal transparency problems? We will look at some
suggestions below.
The WTO is a member-driven organization where decisions are made through an
informal type of consensus. This means that unless anyone present at a meeting 76
formally objects, a decision is deemed to have been made. Voting occurs secretly, in the
form of polling. A study conducted using records from 2003 showed that small
economies and least developed countries are under-represented in Geneva.77 Moreover,
written submission figures show a dominance from the US and the EU in formal
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participation.78 Not only do smaller countries make fewer submissions, they also make
fewer individual submissions, indicating that they often have to reach compromises with
other developing and least developed countries whose interests may vary.
Developing countries lack the diplomatic resources to participate in lengthy and costly
negotiations. At the same time they do not have the global political stature of large
trading nations. This puts them at an inferior negotiating position. A larger national
mission has the advantage of rotating its diplomats during the on-going negotiations, and
also participates in simultaneous negotiating groups. Developing countries have small
missions who cannot be present at all times in the time and energy consuming negotiation
processes. This problem has been mitigated to some extent by the formation of groups of
developing countries with common interests. Thus, they can benefit from joining forces
and dispersing their missions in order to manage a continuous presence in areas where
their interests converge. Even though this tactic has obvious practical advantages, as well
as the opportunity of power-pooling that gives developing countries a negotiating edge,
still, it can obscure variations in the positions of these countries. However close their
interests might be, they are not identical. The three working languages of the WTO English, French and Spanish- also play a role in participation by developing countries.
Working in one’s own language is seen as carrying an advantage.79
Overall, despite the open doors policies of the WTO, “countries that can afford to be
active are the most active ones.”80 However, in the Doha Round, developing countries are
more active than usual81 and mostly in areas of interest to them.82 The Cancun alliance
formation seems to have been paying off to some extent. The WTO administration should
try and assist on finding ways to ensure that developing countries continue to participate
similarly in the day-to-day works of the organization in view of the scarcity of their
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resources and strong power dynamics present.83 The organized world trading system has
been around for quite some time, and only for the last decade have we observed such a
level of engagement from developing countries. The deadlock of the Doha shows that
developing countries can demand that their needs are taken seriously in the WTO.
The replacement of the Quad with the group of Five Interested Parties is an important
step forward. Middle income countries, developing countries with higher GDPs as well as
the four very strong actors in international trade transactions, Brazil, China, Russia and
India, have rightfully demanded and gained a central position in WTO negotiations.
However, not all developing countries are equal. Those closer to LDCs in terms of GDP
and per capita income are not in a similarly strong negotiating position. Such groups are
less powerful in negotiations and cannot induce similar changes in rules. Also in the
group of the Five Interested Parties are Brazil and India, two of the largest developing
countries in the world.
Additionally any negotiating inferiority of least developed countries and developing
countries outside BRICS also extends to their reluctance to utilize the Dispute Settlement
mechanism and enforce adopted reports of the Dispute Settlement Body (such as the case
of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-Bananas III case).
Developing countries lack the armies of lawyers that large nations can afford. The
Advisory Center on WTO law (ACWL), which was created with a mandate to provide
“advice, support and training to developing and least- developed countries” has only
assisted few developing countries in only 38 cases in Dispute Settlement.84 The limited
use of dispute mechanisms has been and continues to be a symptom of the lack of trust in
the WTO processes. WTO case law keeps growing at a remarkable pace for international
standards, thus making entry costs for first-time developing and least-developed litigants
much higher. One idea is to allow for smaller economies that win dispute settlements in
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the WTO to either get compensation that dates to the initiation of proceedings or be
allowed to retaliate outside the national market. This may reduce the number of violations
on behalf of stronger economies simply because they can currently afford to do so.85
As a step towards improving developing country positions and clarifying the status of
preferences, we can discuss the possibility of a development definition in the WTO. This
is not a proposal that suggests immediate and practical solutions in the WTO. The
reluctance on behalf of developed countries to grant preferences, inter alia is due to freerider fears86. This is further enhanced by the lack of any definition or clarity on the notion
of a “developing country” under the WTO. Originally it was left to each industrial
country to decide who qualified but later their status was based on self-identification. The
situation varies for Least-Developed Developing Countries where the WTO uses the
United Nations’ lists.87
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, two international organizations
with, inter alia a development mandate, have analogous working definitions of what
constitutes a developing country. Perhaps the voting allocation of members based on
quotas and the direct dependence of developing countries on external funds renders such
definitions super-imposed. Adopting their definitions as a transplant would hardly ever be
a success. Such recipe-like clauses could be avoided in the polarized negotiations of the
WTO, where developing countries sit at one side and have the power to sustain the
existing deadlock. They could set terms, to a certain extent. Moreover, the regime of
international trade needs a differentiated definition for development due to many
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differences, and oftentimes contradictory positions among the developing countries.88
Overall, even though development is very difficult to define, the World Bank and the
IMF have managed to adopt working definitions, for the purposes of fulfilling their
functions. Some attempt to introduce a set of rules that moves beyond the current nonbinding legal framework would assist the WTO to tackle the issue of defining
development and moving forward with development solutions.
The WTO political organs and the Director General must focus on ensuring that small
group meetings do not become debilitating for any of the WTO members (developed
versus developing, high-GDP developing versus low-GDP developing). Instead of
encouraging the Green Room practices they should at least try to promote the opposite,
open meetings for all. Finally, in the WTO there should be a serious discussion on the
merits and the disadvantages of the consensus rule. Returning to voting rules, at least for
some meetings can mitigate Green Room exclusionary practices. There has been a lot of
pressure towards members that were not part of the Green Room discussions to accept
what was decided in order for meetings to move forward and still adhere to the WTO’s
consensus practice. It may be a good idea that this precedent, which as we saw almost
results in bullying tactics among various sides can be questioned and potentially
abandoned when that is possible. Also, a majority rule is a lot more democratic than
questionable consensus.

B.

Internal Transparency lato sensu

1.

Preferential Trade Agreements

The multilateral trading system established by the GATT and the WTO does not prevent
its members from concluding bilateral or multilateral trade agreements of a more limited
scope (namely among only few WTO member states). Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs) used to be traditionally signed among countries in terrestrial proximity but
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currently the term in the WTO refers to reciprocal trade agreements between two or more
partners. They include free trade agreements and customs unions. Preferential trade
arrangements (PTAs) involve unilateral trade preferences. They include Generalized
System of Preferences schemes as well as other non-reciprocal preferential schemes
granted a waiver by the General Council.

Figure 1 Map of RTA participants89

PTAs and RTAs are an exception to the Most Favored Nation rule of Article I:1 of the
GATT. In essence, both the GATT/WTO and PTAs/RTAs aim towards trade
liberalization, albeit at a different scale, and while the WTO is based on the principle of
non-discrimination, not the same applies to PTAs/RTAs, who have a discriminatory logic
in their rationale.90 The two schemes pursue the same goal using contradictory rules,
creating some reasonable frustration with respect to their compatibility.91 The rationale
behind the door existing in the GATT for such agreements is that more liberalization,
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even if it occurs at a bilateral level, is better than no liberalization at all. Moreover, the
GATT Founding Members at the time most likely did not want to annul their regional
trade relations agreements, so instead of dealing directly with a possibility of conflict
between multilateralism and preferential access to certain markets, they included an
exception. Thus, it is very likely that the same subject matter is covered by PTAs/RTAs
and the WTO rules, creating the potential for conflict.92
This asymmetry is intensified due the large volume and the importance of regional
agreements [See Figure 1 for data on numbers of Regional Trade Agreements concluded
between 1948-2014]. We need to go no further than point to the European Union,
NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. These agreements have strong impact for the trade
amongst their members and are only four of the hundreds of bilateral and multilateral
agreements that essentially provide an exception to the cardinal GATT rule of nondiscrimination. As such, concerns have been raised that such agreements undermine “the
transparency and predictability of trade relations.”93
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Figure 2 Regional Trade Agreements Concluded between 1948 and 201494
Concerns with respect to the exclusionary nature of PTAs and RTAs are not unwarranted.
It is very interesting to see the reaction of the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick,
following the Cancun Ministerial. As developing countries finally demanded that their
needs be part of the agenda, or else they would not allow for the negotiations and the new
Round to move any further, instead of embracing these requests, even in the slightest, the
US Trade Representative retaliated with turning to a form of “coalitions of the willing.” It
is interesting to see how Paul Blustein reported Zoellick’s reactions after the G-20’s
Cancun stand-off.
“Reflecting his frustration over the events in Cancún was an op-ed he
wrote in the Financial Times on September 22, 2003, a few days after the
meeting. He blasted his adversaries—Brazil was mentioned five times—
for having fostered a “culture of protest that defined victory in terms of
political acts rather than economic results.” He made it clear that he was
going to reward cooperative countries and punish uncooperative ones by
intensifying his “competitive liberalization” strategy of pursuing trade
deals on multiple levels:
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[Zoellick wrote]: “The key division at Cancún was between the can-do
and the won’t-do. For over two years, the U.S. has pushed to open markets
globally, in our hemisphere, and with sub-regions or individual countries.
As WTO members ponder the future, the U.S. will not wait. We will move
towards free trade with can-do countries.”
America’s market of 300 million free-spending consumers, in other words,
would be used as both a carrot and a stick. Countries that shared
Washington’s enthusiasm for freer trade would obtain preferential access
to that market by signing bilateral and regional agreements eliminating
most trade barriers between them and the United States. Meanwhile, the
ranks of the reluctant would be left at a disadvantage; their products
would be subject to the tariffs that Washington maintained on MFN terms
for members of the WTO. Eventually, they would recognize that their selfinterest lay in joining the U.S.-led bandwagon, the result being that small
deals would prove to be “building blocks” toward bigger ones and,
ultimately, a worldwide one.”95
This chapter will first outline the legal framework and the types of PTAs/RTAs that are
regulated in the GATT and other WTO Agreements, including the limited case law in this
area. Second, I will describe the two different recently established Transparency
Mechanisms for PTAs and RTAs and the WTO General Council Decisions of December
14 2006 and 2010 establishing them respectively. In the last part I will discuss the two
different transparency aspects of PTAs/RTAs. The first relates to the contribution of the
Transparency Mechanisms in the overall transparency record of the WTO and the
significant deficiencies, mostly stemming from the lack of an enforcement mechanism
obliging member states to report PTAs/RTAs that they have entered in.
The second form of transparency stems from the underlying exclusionary tactics of large
trading countries such as the US in their decision to move forward with PTAs and RTAs
and relates to the internal transparency problems we discussed in the previous chapter. As
with developing countries whose economic needs have been systematically sidestepped
for decades, and this is mirrored in their exclusion from closed meetings, PTAS/RTAs
extend this small circle process of the Green Room. The difference here is that those
“Green Rooms” are no longer located in Geneva and conducted under the auspices of the
WTO Director General and his Secretariat, but in Washington, Ottawa, Brussels and
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Beijing. The reason why this is the WTO’s internal transparency problem and not just a
parallel phenomenon is that on one hand the GATT allows for these bilateral and
plurilateral agreements to be signed without any control on how many are concluded and
on the other hand all the notification and monitoring mechanisms for PTAs and RTAs are
underutilized to the extent they are rendered meaningless. Thus, beyond the obvious
proposal to strengthen the existing Transparency mechanisms, I will adopt one of Paul
Blustein’s proposals, to somehow put a cap on PTAs and RTAs.
a)

The Legal Framework for PTAs/RTAs

The exception of PTAs/RTAs is considered the most important exception to Most
Favored Nation.96 The basic PTA rules are XXIV of the GATT under the title “Territorial
Application – Frontier Traffic – Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas”, together with
the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, Article V of
the GATS and the Enabling Clause. These provisions introduce five types of Preferential
or Regional Trade Agreements, included in the WTO Agreements and deemed to
generally be WTO- compatible.
During the initial negotiation of the GATT, there was discussion to preserve only those
preferential schemes that were long-standing, however this suggestion did not prevail.97
The so-called London Draft discussed the inclusion of existing and future Custom Unions
within the GATT. 98 The notion of Free Trade Agreements was added later on. 99
Mavroidis et al, reject the claim that this inclusion was put forward in order to
accommodate the subsequent creation of the European Communities.100 Preferential trade
exceptions were negotiated to some extent, and resulted to a relaxed scheme, which is
based on three obligations: to notify, to liberalize among members to the Regional Trade
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Agreement or the Customs Union (internal requirement) and not to raise protectionism
towards non-members (external requirement).101
An interpretation consistent with the principle of pacta sunt servanta evidently favors any
agreement the Contracting Parties made. Even if RTAs are not encouraged in the WTO,
at least they are tolerated. Article XXIV paragraph 4 discusses the overall framework for
such RTAs:
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom
of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of
a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties
with such territories.”
Paragraph 5 explicitly proclaims that:
“…the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area.”
Customs Unions are described in Paragraph 8 (a) of Article XXIV as follows:
“For the purposes of this Agreement: A customs union shall be understood
to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more
customs territories so that
(i)
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (…) are
eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade
in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii)
[…] substantially the same duties and other regulations of
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade
territories not included in the union.
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Paragraph 5 (a) of Article XXIV limits customs unions by explaining that:
“with respect to a customs union […] the duties and other regulations of
commerce imposed at the institution of any such union […]in respect of
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union […] shall not on
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories
prior to the formation of such union […].”102
Similarly, second category of RTAs, Free Trade Areas, are regulated in the same
Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV, under (b):
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (…) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
Article XXIV 5 (b) also restricts the scope of Free Trade Areas:
“with respect to a free trade area […] the duties and other regulations of
commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable
at the formation of such free-trade area […] to the trade of contracting
parties not included in such area […]shall not be higher or more restrictive
than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing
in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade
area […]”
Free Trade areas and Customs Unions essentially overlap since their members have to
liberalize trade among them. The difference between the two is that a Customs Union
additionally establishes a common external commercial policy. Also with respect to
Customs Unions the effect in trade restriction is examined overall, unlike Free Trade
Areas where individual instruments are investigated.
The third- hybrid- category, discussed in Article 5 under both (a) and (b) are the interim
agreements necessary for the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area. Such
interim agreements must be concluded within a “reasonable length of time” according to
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Paragraph 5 (c) of Article XXIV. According to the Understanding on Article XXIV, a
reasonable length of time does not exceed the duration of ten years.103
Very important in terms of setting the foundations for transparency in this context is
paragraph 7 of Article XXIV which reads as follows:
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or freetrade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a
union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed
union or area as will enable them to make such reports and
recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that
agreement and taking due account of the information made available in
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the CONTRACTING
PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation
of a customs union or a free-trade area within the period contemplated by
the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to
the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case
may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify in accordance
with these recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph
5 (c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which
may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with them if the
change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the
customs union or of the free-trade area.
The fourth type of such agreements appears in Paragraph 2 (c) of the Enabling Clause
that is now part of the GATT. The Enabling Clause establishes a PTA. According to
paragraph 2 (c) the differential and more favourable treatment of Paragraph 1 applies also
to:
“Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribe by the
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CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of
non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another.”
The fifth type of agreements is Economic integration Agreements under Article V of the
GATS (entitled “Economic Integration”), according to which:
“This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party
to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or
among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement:
(a)
has substantial sectoral coverage, and
(b)
provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among the
parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a), through,
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures,
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a
reasonable time-frame […].
Article V paragraph 5 of the GATS further requires an at least 90-day advanced notice
period. Article Vbis of the GATS discusses labor market integration agreements, also
notified, just like Agreements of Article V GATS to the Council for Trade in Services.
Arguably, Article V is stricter than Article XXIV, since the former discusses “substantial
sectoral coverage”, including trade volume and modes of supply 104 while the latter
“substantially all trade.”
To date, 258 regional trade agreements and 26 Preferential Trade Agreements have been
notified under the GATT/WTO system and are in force either between countries (the
majority105), or between countries and existing PTAs and CUs (see Annexes 1 and 2).
Very few cases have been brought before the Dispute Settlement Body with respect to
PTAs and RTAs. The limited amount of jurisprudence is considered not surprising,106
especially in view of the complex landscape these agreements create and the content of
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Article XXIV and others. The original burden of proof for a complaint relating to article
XXIV and its equivalents is easy to meet: all RTAs and PTAs are deviations from the
Most Favored Nation rule by definition. As the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, it
is up to them to demonstrate that the PTA or RTA is compatible with their GATT
obligations. Conducive to this confusion and reluctance to litigate is also the lack of
adequate monitoring mechanisms.
The cases that brought the issue of RTAs and PTAs to be examined before the Dispute
Settlement Body are Turkey-Textiles107 and Argentina-Footwear (EC)108 mainly, but also,
Canada Autos109, Brazil-Tyres110 and US- Steel Safeguards111. Turkey-Textiles focused on
Customs Unions and the Appellate Body ruled that a Customs Union may be inconsistent
with the GATT, and in Argentina-Footwear, the Panel discussed some GATTconsistency aspects of MERCOSUR. 112 A test for RTAs and PTAs under the GATT has
three components: first, a procedural requirement (the notification), second, a substantive
internal requirement, the obligation to liberalize all trade amongst PTA/RTA members,
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and third, a substantive external requirement, the obligation not to raise the overall level
of protection.113
b)

The Doha Transparency Mechanisms

The Doha Round has been known, among other things, for not having produced any
agreements in almost over a decade since its launch. However, the General Council
adopted two decisions, one in 2006 and one in 2010, establishing two transparency
mechanisms, one for Preferential Trade Agreements and one for Regional Trade
Agreements. Arguably, both mechanisms address issues covered in the Doha agenda.
More specifically, the preamble of the Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasizes the
compatibility of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO:
“We stress our commitment to the WTO as the unique forum for global
trade rule-making and liberalization, while also recognizing that regional
trade agreements can play an important role in promoting the liberalization
and expansion of trade and in fostering development.”114
Within this framework, paragraph 29 of the Doha Declaration further provides that:
“We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to
regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the
developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.”
As such, with the increasing number of Regional Trade Agreements being signed by
WTO member states, the regulatory turn on “procedures applying to existing WTO
provisions” focused on the lack of a functioning multilateral surveillance mechanism for
RTAs. 115 Thus, the Negotiating Group on Rules focused on transparency since October
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2002116 and in 2006 the General Council adopted the first decision on transparency
entitled “Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements” (hereinafter: the
RTA/2006 Decision). 117 In 2010, the General Council adopted the second decision,
entitled “Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Agreements” (hereinafter: the
PTA/2010 Decision).118 Both decisions can be immediately implemented on a provisional
basis, as is explained in paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration, even though the Doha
Round is treating all negotiations as a single undertaking. The scope of the two
instruments differs in that the first discusses any sub-multilateral trade agreements among
WTO member states, while the second discusses any non-reciprocal preferential
treatment measures adopted on behalf of more developed countries in order to assist less
and least developed WTO member states.
The most important contributions of the new RTA mechanism to the existing system
provided in Article XXIV of the GATT are the early notification mechanism and the
procedures for consideration and publication of RTAs. The PTA mechanism also
establishes a similar consideration and publication mechanism, although slightly less
stringent with respect to the process and the time-frames involved.
The early notification mechanism introduced in the RTA/2006 Decision in part A
paragraph 1 provides that:
[…](a) Members participating in new negotiations aimed at the conclusion
of an RTA shall endeavour to so inform the WTO.
(b) Members parties to a newly signed RTA shall convey to the WTO, in
so far as and when it is publicly available, information on the RTA,
including its official name, scope and date of signature, any foreseen
timetable for its entry into force or provisional application, relevant
contact points and/or website addresses, and any other relevant
unrestricted information.
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2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 above is to be forwarded to
the WTO Secretariat, which will post it on the WTO website and will
periodically provide Members with a synopsis of the communications
received.
Paragraph 3 of Part B in the RTA/2006 decision clarifies the prompt notification period
discussed in Paragraph 7 of Article XXIV GATT, defining it as “no later than directly
following the parties' ratification of the RTA or any party's decision on application of the
relevant parts of an agreement, and before the application of preferential treatment
between the parties.” Paragraph 4 requires that the full text of the RTAs is notified to the
WTO.
The mechanism described in the RTA/2006 Decision under “Procedures to Enhance
Transparency” applies to both RTAs and PTAs, but with respect to PTAs it is further
elaborated on in the PTA/2010 Decision. In particular, the RTA/2006 Decision provides
that after notification, RTAs are considered by Member states within the year of the date
of notification. The WTO Secretariat also prepares a factual presentation in which it
“shall refrain from any value judgment” and which cannot be used as a basis for dispute
settlement. Already in this provision becomes evident the tension between
multilateralism and regionalism and the reluctance of the WTO as an institution to take a
firm stance for or against such RTAs. Another crucial contribution of this mechanism
appears in paragraph 13, according to which:
“All written material submitted, as well as the minutes of the meeting
devoted to the consideration of a notified agreement will be promptly
circulated in all WTO official languages and made available on the WTO
website.”
Additionally, paragraph 21 further discusses the electronic database to be established and
maintained by the Secretariat, which “should be structured so as to be easily accessible to
the public.” Finally, Part E outlines the two committees entrusted with the
implementation of the transparency mechanism, first the Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements (CRTA) for RTAs and second the Committee on Trade and Development
(CTD) for PTAs. Paragraph 19 authorizes the WTO Secretariat to provide technical
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support to developing and least-developed countries, another new feature introduced
under the RTA/2006 Decision.
Besides the more lenient time-frames, the PTA/2010 Decision clarifies the role of the
Secretariat and the CTD in the process of consideration of PTAs. An elaborate
description of the contents of the factual presentation prepared by the WTO Secretariat is
described in paragraph 9 of the PTA/2010 Decision:
[T]he Secretariat may also include in the factual presentation, as
appropriate, the following elements: background information, scope and
coverage (products and countries), exceptions, S&D provisions, specific
rules concerning the application of the scheme (graduation, eligibility for
additional preferences), rules of origin, provisions affecting trade in goods
(IP, labour, environment, TBT, SPS, trade remedies, if applicable),
specific customs-related procedures, composition of merchandise imports
from beneficiary member, fulfillment of TRQs, relationship with other
PTAs by the same Notifying Member and imports under the PTA in the
last three years, if applicable.
Similarly an electronic database, available to the public, exists for PTAs in the WTO
website. Figure 3 gives a summary of the consideration process flow chart established in
both Decisions.119
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Figure 3 Processes established by the RTA/2006 and PTA/2010 Transparency
Mechanism Decisions120
These Decisions are a serious attempt to address the issues that Working Groups faced
under the GATT when considering Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas. In very few
cases had such Working Groups reached a conclusion on the compatibility of such
agreements and the GATT. 121 Transparency, namely disclosure, consideration and
publication, is a significant first step in that direction. Still, neither decision, similarly to
Articles GATT XXIV and GATS V provide for any consequences, should member states
violate this process. As such, the enforcement record of both decisions is fragmented at
best.122 The WTO website indeed has two portals, one for PTAs and one for RTAs.123 It
appears however that not all RTAs and PTAs are notified there124 and overall, even the
ones notified are not properly evaluated by the WTO.125 Another view is that the existing
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system has been overwhelmed by the legal definitions included in Articles XXIV GATT
and V GATS, another issue impeding the RTA and PTA review process.126
Notably, an agreement was recently signed between Canada and the European Union,
CETA, or the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement.127 Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper and EU President Jose Manuel Barroso discussed the significance of the
Agreement in a news conference, where Mr. Harper acknowledged that “This is a big
deal. Indeed it is the biggest deal our country has ever made. This is a historic win for
Canada.”128 The translation and approval processes, in the EU member states’ languages,
and by provincial parliaments in Canada and as provided in the EU has been cited as the
reason why the agreement has not been published yet.129 The Canadian government
published a summary of the agreement, 130 which Trade Minister Ed Fast argued it
provides “everything Canadians need to know.” 131 Even though the translation and
notification procedures are reasonable in international relations, under the RTA/2006
Decision, the parties should already notify the WTO under the early announcement
process or the bilateral trade agreement. Nothing of the sort has occurred to date. Even
though both Canada and the European Union are two of the strongest transparency
proponents in the WTO, the two parties have failed to maintain a consistent attitude
towards transparency and publish their agreement. Essentially, the CETA example is
indicative of the low enforcement capabilities of both General Council Decisions.
c)

Transparency and Trade Preferences

The debate on regional integration as an optimum versus the multilateral path as the only
way to faster trade liberalization has yet to produce concrete and conclusive results. On
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one hand it can be argued that regional trade integration leads to faster trade
liberalization, even if it occurs outside the WTO. Economic ties amongst smaller groups
may be stronger, the costs of negotiations are lower since fewer parties are involved and
elimination of tariffs inside the PTA or the RTA can occur much faster than in the
multilateral framework. Coupled with this idea is that political reasons (not only
economic) may lie behind deeper integration, as is the case for the (arguably unique in
this respect) EU. This argument favors PTAs and RTAs as they appear to be creating
more trade.132 Another interesting phenomenon in the RTA proliferation has been the rise
of “new players” in international trade, such as the trading bloc of South American
countries133, the Asian Tigers,134 BRICS and Middle Income countries, fundamentally
changing the landscape of international trade.
On the other hand, several studies on customs unions and free trade areas suggest that the
trade-diversion effects may be greater than the trade-creation, especially since PTAs and
RTAs favor trade amongst participants, resulting to less trade with members of the PTAs
and non-members. 135 Trade economists have in fact argued that regionalism leads to
factionalisation, and PTAs may be optimal to protectionism, but they will always fall to
the second-best spot 136 compared to a functioning global free trade system, since
multilateralism in the WTO context entails a global vision lacking in regionalist
integration models.137
Moreover, regional trading agreements cannot be fully open to accession from third
parties. If they remained opened to membership, the original parties would have little
incentive to commit to lowering trade tariffs in fear of considerable changes in value of
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their preferences with the accession of a new party. Such problems are not as prevalent in
a multilateral context. For example, the accession of China, a huge country and a great
trading partner, may have taken years to conclude but the commitment to trade
liberalization always supports accession of new members instead of exclusion. The
exclusionary potential is however prevalent in regionalism.
The intensified attention on PTAs and RTAs in the Doha Declaration reflects the current
“regionalization” of international trade (or “new regionalism”138) and is portrayed as a
group systems which are “not attempting to shield themselves from the global economy
and are rather trying to maximise their participation in it.”139 However the inefficiency of
existing transparency mechanisms as well as the utilization of Preferential trade
Agreements as a way out of negotiation difficulties at the multilateral level have rendered
PTAs “stumbling blocks” for world trade for smaller economies who cannot negotiate
such agreements as equals and rely on the GATT MFN for access to other countries’
trade markets.140
With respect to transparency and monitoring, despite the existence of substantial
mechanisms, in addition to Article XXIV and the Understanding on Article XXIV,
Article V of the GATS and the Generalized System of Preferences, their enforcement
momentum is low, at best. The web of RTAs and PTAs is growing very fast in the last
decade. In contrast to the Doha Development Round, where all agreements must be
considered under a single undertaking and also need to be agreed upon by consensus,
regionalism has significantly expanded, to cover for the regulatory space of trade
liberalization that multilateralism does not seem to achieve, albeit only for small groups.
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The WTO has committed institutionally to monitor, consider and publish the RTAs and
PTAs. As it remains unclear whether in fact such regional initiatives undermine the
multilateral agenda of the WTO, consideration beyond a superficial examination is
rendered difficult. Similarly, not all agreements have been published as we saw in the
previous section, illustrated by CETA. A possible solution for this problem is to
introduce some form of a penalty system for failure to properly notify and publish such
agreements in the WTO. Another more obvious solution is to raise the budget for the
monitoring mechanisms, partially remove their member-driven elements and assign a
new part of the WTO Secretariat just in monitoring duties. Instead of relying on member
state committees, Working Groups, for the vast amount of monitoring, rely on the
administration instead. Working Groups can be introduced at a second stage, after the
collection of sufficient economic data and the drafting of initial but extensive reports.
As RTAs and PTAs have multiplied over the years, they have been described as a
“spaghetti bowl”, or a “noodle bowl” or even a “lasagna dish.” 141 Pasta-metaphors aside,
RTAs and PTAs create a very large web of agreements that can have negative effects on
all those left outside of these cooperative structures and compromises general trust in the
multilateral structure of trade negotiations. Keeping track on them alone consumes a part
of the WTO resources. One proposal in order to remedy these detriments is to place a cap
on the number of the Agreements.142 Introducing a straightforward cap on PTAs and
RTAs may cause a sort of revolution in the WTO and never reach consensus. Thus one
form of moratorium could be based either on trade volume covered, or a set of products
that can be agreed on by all WTO members to remain outside the scope of PTAs and
RTAs. If the US and the EU are serious about their commitment to multilateralism then
such an agreement can given them an opportunity to show it. Additionally WTO
members could discuss the possibility for compensatory mechanisms in case of
Agreements, which are found to violate WTO rules.
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Finally, we should note here that there is one set of PTAs that should not be touched.
Agreements giving preferential treatment to least developed countries should be
sustained, as they are key to their economies and trade143 or at least be converted to
import subsidies that would benefit them equally. 144 Moreover there is an additional
positive spillover of PTAs for least developed countries. During smaller scale
negotiations smaller countries can refine their negotiating tactics. An interesting example
is the case of Zambia and Mauritius as participants in the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). The participation of the two countries in both Regional Trade Agreements has
assisted them in preparations for negotiations in the WTO context by providing training,
raising awareness, and overall giving a more familiar forum with countries facing similar
issues for the exchange of trade information and ideas.145
2.

Accession Protocols

This chapter discusses transparency issues with respect to a narrow group of countries. In
particular, it explores two main transparency dimensions that emerge during the
accession process of new member states. The process became much more elaborate and
gained significance since the creation of the WTO. The new organization has a specific
division handling accessions, the accession division. Since 1995, 32 countries have
acceded to the organization, among which are China and Russia, bringing up the total
membership to the organization to 160 countries. Moreover, another 23 countries have
applied and are currently negotiating their membership. Once current negotiations are
concluded, the organization will be representing more than 99.9% of world population,
GDP and trade volume.
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In theory, soon the accession division will become obsolete, when all candidate members
accede and no more countries apply for membership. However, a discussion on accession
will remain pertinent even then, because of the so-called WTO Plus/Minus commitments.
These are commitments that acceding members states are bound by that are either below
or beyond the WTO package of Agreements. On one hand, WTO minus do not pose as
much of a problem, due to their nature, as they fall under the rules in place to assist
developing and least developed countries. These include longer time frames, less
stringent rules and like regulations. On the other hand, the WTO Plus commitments,
imposing rules applicable only to certain acceding countries become problematic because
they introduce asymmetries between WTO member states similarly to the issues facing
developing countries in the WTO.
A second transparency-related issue in the accession process appears in the Working
Party Reports and the Accession Protocols. The majority of these binding accession
documents contain sections entitled “Transparency”, introducing mainly two types of
obligations, Notification and Publication obligations. These obligations refer to national
legislation of WTO member states and measures that need to be notified with the WTO
or published. Such chapters in accession instruments demonstrate the importance of
transparency obligations during the accession process. Even though these transparency
provisions technically fall under the rubric of Legal Transparency, examined in Chapter
Five, they will be discussed here, since they organically belong to the accession process.
This chapter will first elaborate on the accession process in the WTO. Then I will discuss
the example of the Chinese Accession Protocol and its WTO Plus transparency
requirements. Finally, I will examine the legal position of WTO Plus commitments under
traditional public international law and WTO law, and the relationship of such
commitments to internal transparency.
a)

The idiosyncrasies of the accession process

The WTO Agreement provides for two procedures of acquiring membership to the
organization. First, Article XI, under the title “Original Membership” says that GATT
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contracting parties that were members of the GATT at the time of the entry into force of
the WTO Agreement which accepted this and relevant agreements “shall become original
Members of the WTO.” 146 Second, Article XII, under the title “Accession” provides as
follows:
“1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements
may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the
WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements thereto. 2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the
Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the
agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the
Members of the WTO. 3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement
shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.”147
Obtaining membership through accession to the WTO is fundamentally different than the
process followed by other international organizations, even though the basic elements of
admission are similar. In the majority of governmental organizations, as in the WTO,
their constituent treaties establish the criteria and the procedure of admission. The
process usually begins with an application or an equivalent show of interest by the
candidate country and it ends when the organizations competent organ concludes its
decision making on the application. The WTO differs from other organizations with
respect to the length and the complexity of negotiations that intervene between the
opening and the concluding point, as well as in the sometimes complicated accession
instruments.
In most international organizations acquiring membership seems rather straightforward
and is based on criteria such as statehood 148 and commitment to the organization’s
mandate. International economic organizations in their constitutions reserve sometimes
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the option to adapt the procedures and the conditions for membership in special
circumstances. For example, the IMF in its Article II, section 2 of its Articles of
Agreement provides that: “Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and
in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors.”
However, the provision limits this flexibility with the next sentence: “These terms,
including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles consistent with those
applied to other countries that are already members.” The European Union process for
acquiring membership is also multilayered like that of the WTO. Candidate countries
must comply with the “Copenhagen Criteria” 149 and according to Article 49 of the Treaty
on the EU, the decision for the accession is made by the Council, which consists of all
current EU member states, after consulting the European Commission, and a majority
vote of the European Parliament.
Accession to the WTO occurs through several stages. Mainly, the distinguishing elements
of the WTO accession process are the number of products, rules, services and other areas
of interest in international trade where agreement must be reached, as well as the option
for all current members to conduct bilateral negotiations with the acceding country. As a
result, negotiations for accession have been very different from case to case. Indicative of
the spectrum of proceedings is that the shortest accession to this day, Kyrgyzstan, lasted
for almost three years, while the longest, China, lasted for more than fifteen years.
Accession requirements also vary, to some extent, from country to country.
This structure is the product of years of negotiation under the GATT. According to
Article XXXIII of the GATT:
“A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on
behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement on its own
behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between such
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government and the Contracting Parties. Decisions of the Contracting
Parties under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority”
During the second round of negotiations after the signature of the GATT, which took
place in Annecy in 1949, the Parties agreed upon the Procedures Governing Negotiations
for Accession, the Annecy Protocol of Terms of Accession, which provided for the
accession of ten more countries, and a Model Protocol of Accession. The procedure was
based on the establishment of a working party which examined the application and
submitted recommendations to the Council, which could include a draft Protocol of
Accession.
The discussion in the working party was not much different from the discussion under the
WTO. The candidate country first submitted a memorandum on its foreign trade regime,
and then the Contracting Parties posed questions to which the candidate member
answered. Furthermore, negotiations took place on the schedule of concessions between
the acceding country and those Contracting Parties that were interested. Once these were
concluded, a draft Decision, Protocol of Accession and Working Party report were
submitted to the Council for adoption (report) and approval (the other texts). Once a
positive decision on accession was made, the country would become a member thirty
days after singing the Protocol.150
The process in the WTO is regulated by Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement.
According to Article XXII:
“1. Any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may
accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.
Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed thereto.
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The
ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of
accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members to the WTO.
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3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the
provisions of that Agreement.”
Also relevant to Article XII is Article IV:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement which provides
that the General Council can decide on Accessions in the intervals between meetings of
the Ministerial Conference. It is worth noting here that Article XXXIII of the GATT and
Article XII of the WTO Agreement are very similar.
The process of accession begins with the interested government making the initial contact
with the organization either informally first, by approaching the Secretariat for
information, or directly and formally, with a letter of application to the Director-General.
Countries usually have the option of participating in the General Council as observers
before applying for membership. Usually the next General Council that occurs after the
formal application for membership invites the interested country to introduce the main
features of its foreign trade regime and provide reasons for its application. Then the
Council considers the application and the establishment of a Working Party, to examine
the application.
All Working Parties have the same terms of reference, namely “to examine the
application”

and

“to

submit

to

the

General

Council/Ministerial

Conference

recommendations which may include a draft Protocol of Accession.” Membership to the
Working Party is open to all WTO members. Countries with trade interests related to the
upcoming accession usually join the Working Party, thus its size varies from one
accession to another. Four countries, Australia, Canada, Japan and the US, together with
the European Communities, which all together represent 63% of world trade have been
members to all Working Parties so far.
The Working Party process takes place in three stages. The first phase of the Working
Party process focuses on collecting factual information on the applicant’s foreign trade
regime. The applicant country submits a relevant memorandum and members of the
Working Party pose questions both in writing and orally, to which the candidate member
responds. During the second phase, countries negotiate the terms of accession with the
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candidate. Four types of negotiations take place: first, multilateral negotiations on rules,
where all the members of the Working Party and the candidate participate; second,
plurilateral on agriculture and export subsidies, where a group of those members of the
Working Party, who are interested, discuss with the applicant; third, bilateral on goods’
concessions, where each member has the opportunity to discuss concessions in goods
with the candidate member on a one-to-one basis; finally, bilateral negotiations take place
for members to discuss commitments in services with the applicant. Bilateral meetings
are a platform oftentimes for a more efficient discussion on complex matters. The
bilateral process is confidential and so are any bilateral agreements signed at this time. As
bilateral negotiations are concluded, the agreements are signed by both parties and sent to
the Secretariat.
The Secretariat, once all bilateral agreements have been submitted to it, prepares a
consolidated draft Goods Schedule. According to the Most Favored Nation principle, the
lowest percentage that the candidate member has bound its tariffs with one of the current
members will apply to all members to the WTO, regardless of whether higher tariffs were
agreed upon in bilateral meetings with other members. Essentially, the consolidation of
agreements by the Secretariat multilateralizes the products of bilateral agreements. At the
third stage of the Working Party process, the draft report is finalized and so are
commitments and a draft protocol of accession. The three phases often overlap more or
less in practice. This entire process essentially balances the interests and needs of the
acceding country with the interests of WTO members and the credibility of the WTO
system as a rules-based system. 151
The General Council or Ministerial Conference then approves the text of the draft
Protocol and Decision of Accession and adopts the Draft Decision and the Working Party
report. This decision, as all decision making in the WTO is reached by consensus.
According to the Agreement of the General Council 152 only when consensus cannot be
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reached, will WTO members resort to a two-thirds majority vote. A consensus is
considered to be reached in the lack of formal objections.
Protocols usually contain a set of similar provisions but also obligations specific to the
new member. All commitments of the Working Party report that are explicitly referred to
in the Protocol are an integral part of the Protocol and the WTO Agreements as such. In
some cases commitments by acceding members are more strict than those assumed by
current WTO members. The introduction of novel commitments for new members creates
a “ratchet effect” whereby once accepted, these new commitments become apart and
parcel of the negotiations with the next acceding country.
In the next three to six months after the decision by the General Council or the
Ministerial Conference to accept the applicant as a new member, the government of the
acceding country completes all necessary internal procedures. It has been argued that in
most cases, governments are undergoing a national reform process on which “they have
already embarked for their own reasons” 153 After the applicant completes internal
reforms, it accepts the Protocol and thirty days later it enters into effect and the candidate
country becomes a member to the WTO.
In the two decades from 1995 to 2004, thirty-one countries have acceded to the WTO.
The longest accession process lasted for nineteen years and two months, in the case of
Russia. The shortest accession so far has been that of the Kyrgyz Republic, only two
years and ten months. The average time from the day of application by the candidate
member until the adoption of the accession instruments by national authorities is 9.6
years. With the exception of China, Accession Protocols tend to be short, one to three
pages long. However, most of the commitments assumed are included in the Working
Party reports, which are much lengthier and detailed documents. Six of the countries that
have acceded belong to the category of least-developed countries, while another eight
LDCs are candidates for accession (for the accession statistics and data see Annexes 4
and 5).
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b)

WTO-Plus transparency obligations for acceding member

states: the case of China
Under the GATT (pre-Uruguay Round), accession negotiations were presumed to be
restricted only to GATT obligations and related to GATT duties and rights such as
market access, existing trade barriers etc. This principle faded after the Uruguay
Round.154 Accession now is seen as a “difficult and time-consuming process.”155 Reasons
behind the lack of enumeration of terms, put forward could be first that each country
accepts a unique set of terms and different concessions on tariffs156, and second:
“that the drafters of Article XXXIII of GATT 1947, on which WTO
Article XII is based, saw the need to provide flexibility to ensure that the
terms provided for a balance of advantage.”157
Some commentators define WTO plus Agreements as including “areas not covered by
WTO Agreements such as commitments on privatization, investment regime and
bindings of export tariffs” and WTO minus as “commitments far beyond those accepted
by the original WTO members, including (i) non-application of the rights under WTO
Agreements available to WTO members such as transition periods, and tariffication and
special safeguards for agricultural products.” 158 Charnovitz, using as a comparative
baseline that of “rules that exist for countries in that development class that were original
members of the WTO”159 redefines WTO plus/minus as anything above or below this
baseline.160 WTO plus commitments in particular, when they are not directly related to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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trade, as was the case with China, are seen as “dissonant with the egalitarian self image of
the WTO.” 161 The procedure of concluding the accession agreements has been
characterized as non-transparent162. Steve Charnovitz notes in this respect that:
“Unlike most other multilateral organizations, where the membership
process for states is routine, transparent and predictable, the WTO imposes
significant barriers to entry because incumbent members use the lure of
membership to induce economic policy changes in the applying country.
Such linkage appears to be driven by both normative and procedural
reasons. The normative reason is that the conventional wisdom in and
around the WTO is that locking in economic changes in an applicant
country will redound to the benefit of that country and will also help
exporters and investors of incumbent members. The procedural reason is
that a consensus of incumbent members is required in order to admit an
applicant government.”163
A very large number of the accession requirements involves information that the
candidate country must disclose and discuss in order to move forward and become a
WTO member. Moreover, a specific chapter entitled “Transparency” is included in all
accession protocols. Transparency consists of two forms of commitments, namely
Publication and Notification. According to the WTO Handbook on Accession the content
of the Publication obligation entails that:
“[A]ll relevant measures of general application should be published in
such a way as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted
with them; […] measures should be officially published before being
enforced; [ confidential information need not be provided if contrary to the
public interest or prejudicial to legitimate commercial interests of
particular enterprises.”
The relevant provision also determines the method of publication (a website, an official
publication, such as the national gazette or legislation bulletin or both). China and
Chinese Taipei were also required to provide translations of measures into one of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161

Steve Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of WTO Accession, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 237, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER
No. 237 http://ssrn.com/abstract=957651 27 (2007).
162
Id.
163
Id.

197

WTO official languages, English, French, or Spanish, an unprecedented requirement.164
Until 2004 only Bulgaria, Cambodia and Nepal had only publication requirements. The
second form of commitments is that of Notification, which contains a requirement to
notify on measures taken or not taken in one of the official languages of the WTO. This
ensures that acceding members make their initial notifications immediately available.
This was the most common transparency obligation until 2004. Since 2004 and to date,
all members had both notification and publication requirements (see Annex 4).
A striking example of a departure from the “GATT package” was China’s Accession
Protocol. 165 China’s Accession Protocol came as a result of numerous bilateral
agreements. The US and EU China negotiations are particularly noteworthy, as is the
length of China’s overall accession process which lasted 14 years altogether and the
Accession Protocol, which is a striking departure from the WTO Secretariat’s “model
accession protocol.”166 Some examples of the WTO Plus commitments made by China
that can be deemed as “discriminatory” compared to the “GATT Package” are: ironically,
the transparency requirement (2.C); the Judicial Review commitment (2.D); the Right to
Trade provisions (5.1, 5.2, which were also under review by the Panel and the Appellate
Body); and, the regulation of State Trading (transparency 6.1, and information
requirement, 6.2).
The Chinese Accession Protocol is impressive in length and content. 167 It is the longest
protocol of Accession and comes as a result of the intricacies in the Chinese Accession,
as well as the duration of the process itself, so far the longest accession to the WTO. 168
The larger the interests at stake, the longer the process will be as the Chinese case
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indicates169. The Protocol also contains rules that appear for the first time in an Accession
document and significantly add to the obligations of regular members, who became
members to the WTO upon its founding, as well as countries, which became members
after 1995. The Protocol has received a significant amount of criticism.
Part 2 of the General Provisions under the title “Administration of Trade Regime”
addresses four issues: first, the uniform administration of measures in the territory of
China, which includes autonomous areas, border trade regions, Special Economic Zones,
and other territories where special regimes are in place. Local governments are also in
obligation to conform with the WTO Agreements. Second, China assumes under its
Protocol of Accession the obligation to provide information on its special economic areas
and the legislation which is applicable there. The third and fourth sections of Part 2
address issues of transparency and judicial review respectively.
Section A paragraph 2 provides that
“China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner all its laws, regulations and other measures […] pertaining to or
affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights ("TRIPS") or the control of foreign exchange.”
This obligation is accompanied by the establishment of a mechanism where both
individuals and enterprises can report cases of “non-uniform application of the trade
regime” to national authorities. 170 China must also notify to the WTO all the legislation
related to the special economic areas. The obligations for the establishment of a review
mechanism for trade related legislation and the notification of laws is further expanded in
the next two parts, C and D. Part C specifically, entitled “Transparency” provides for the
following obligations:
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1.
China undertakes that only those laws, regulations and other
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the
control of foreign exchange that are published and readily available to
other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises, shall be enforced. In
addition, China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all
laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in
goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such
measures are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations, laws,
regulations and other measures shall be made available at the latest when
they are implemented or enforced.
2.
China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to
the publication of all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to
or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign
exchange and, after publication of its laws, regulations or other measures
in such journal, shall provide a reasonable period for comment to the
appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented, except for
those laws, regulations and other measures involving national security,
specific measures setting foreign exchange rates or monetary policy and
other measures the publication of which would impede law enforcement.
China shall publish this journal on a regular basis and make copies of all
issues of this journal readily available to individuals and enterprises.
3.
China shall establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon
request of any individual, enterprise or WTO Member all information
relating to the measures required to be published under paragraph 2(C)1 of
this Protocol may be obtained. Replies to requests for information shall
generally be provided within 30 days after receipt of a request. In
exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45 days after receipt of
a request. Notice of the delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in
writing to the interested party. Replies to WTO Members shall be
complete and shall represent the authoritative view of the Chinese
government. Accurate and reliable information shall be provided to
individuals and enterprises.171
According to paragraphs 1 and, section C the Chinese government can enforce only the
legislation that has been published in an official journal, whose copies are to be promptly
available to enterprises and individuals. Further, paragraph 3 provides for the
establishment of an enquiry point, which shall respond to requests for information within
45 days at the latest. The next section on judicial review of administrative decisions and
action with respect to trade sets forth the obligation to establish “partial and independent”
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tribunals that “shall not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter” and an
appeal process. Decisions on appeals should be given in writing. This unique set of
clauses extends rights not only to other WTO members, as is the case for most WTO
Agreements and other GATT legal documents, but directly to enterprises and individuals.
Thus, any trade- related legislation that has not been published and is not accessible is
essentially rendered void.
Issues relevant to accession, post GATT, under the WTO umbrella were brought before
the Dispute Settlement Body in the China-Auto Parts case where the Panel found that
Working Party report commitments are enforceable in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. 172 China-Publications is the first report from Panel and Appellate Body to
undergo a complete analysis on the legal nature of the Protocol and the Working Party
report, to proclaim its enforceability in a systematic way, and not exclamatory. Further,
both Panel and Appellate Body organically tied the Accession Protocol and Working
Party report to the GATT but and accepted that the exceptions of Article XX can be
invoked in view of the accession commitments.

c)

WTO Plus, Public International Law and Transparency

Both future members and commentators would opt for a straightforward process of
accession, in favor of predictability. 173 However an important issue is that international
trade relations involve legal, political and economic considerations. Thus, the negotiation
process for the WTO cannot be blanket and involve the same amount and level of
discussions for China, the single most important player remaining outside the WTO until
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2001, and for instance a country with Developing or Least-Developed country status. 174
Such differentiations are due to trade volume as a share of world trade, but also the
amount of bilateral relations each potential member already has with all other
members.175 Harmonizing the nexus of previous bilateral relations and integrating it to
the WTO framework will be far more complex than merely a stabilized variation of the
GATT/WTO legal documents, particularly in view of the existing bilateral agreements
between the acceding member and the WTO members. This alone creates a natural
asymmetry in the negotiation process and the consequent variation from country to
country.
One central issue involves the legal nature and enforceability 176 of the Accession
Protocols and Working Party Reports. Some have gone so far as to say that each
accession protocol plus working party report is an amendment to the GATT/WTO177. The
recent US-China Publications case not only manifestly demonstrates that such documents
are enforceable, but both the Panel and the Appellate Body moved as far as to outline the
organic relationship between the Protocol and Working Party Report and the GATT,
where they examined and answered to the affirmative whether the exceptions of Article
XX can be used as justifications for non-compliance with the accession commitments.
This fortifies the position that WTO plus/minus agreements are not of exceptional nature,
but are in fact structurally tied to the GATT legal instruments.
Article XII talks about “terms” without further limiting existing Members as to the nature
of the terms they can propose. Moreover, it is important to look at the balance between
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“object and purpose” on one hand, and “pacta sunt servanta” on the other in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (or VCLT) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations (or VCLTSIO). Assuming that the terms negotiated will not fall under
article 53 of the VCLT, and thus will not conflict with a “jus cogens” norm, both treaties
seem to create a balance between the agreement of the parties on one hand, and the object
and purpose of the treaty on the other.
A very important factor in “pacta sunt servanta” is the explicit consent to be bound by a
treaty, as well as the full knowledge of the treaty’s terms. As for any reservations and
amendments, there are no prohibited reservations under the GATT, any reservations or
amendments are possible so long as they are negotiated and agreed upon by all parties (or
after the obtaining a certain majority). Thus, the departure from any treaty provisions is
very well possible, when there is consent. This extends to provisions central to the
“object and purpose” as much as it applies to peripheral provisions. The VCLT and the
VCLTSIO does not separate between the two. 178 179Thus, the conclusion we can draw
here is that both the VCLT and the VCLTSIO prioritize the foundational rule of “pacta
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sunt servanta” when examining permissible reservations and amendments instead of
looking at the object and purpose of treaties.
This interpretation should be accepted in the case of the GATT/WTO instruments, in
particular in view of the opt-out provision in Art XIII of the WTO Agreement which can
be seen as prioritizing consent to “object and purpose.” 180Any two members could opt
out of the application of the Agreement between them, as long as this occurs during the
time they become members and there is consent among them. This provision was
included in order to accommodate countries that did not want to have formal trade or
other relationships with another party for political or other reasons. Both a “formalistic”
and a “progressive” interpretation should concur in the case of the WTO Agreement, that
any terms can be possibly negotiated.
The question of extra-treaty accession terms was discussed in the first advisory opinion
given by the International Court of Justice in 1947 on the Conditions of Admission of a
State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter). The Court decided
that the list of Article 4 is exhaustive and no additional criteria can be imposed.
According to an e contrario argument, the UN Charter enumerates the criteria of
admission, while the Agreement Establishing the WTO explicitly refers to negotiated
terms. The individual opinion by Alvarez also emphasizes the following:
“…the fact should be stressed that an institution, once established,
acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have given
birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those
who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international
life.”
Thus, he departs from a formalistic interpretation to a more systemic and oriented
towards viewing the organization as an organic entity and not a static treaty. The
variations in the accession process can be attributed to the differences in the nature of
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each organization. In a nutshell, the WTO Plus/Minus provisions are compatible with
general public international law.
However, it is important for the organization that at least some of the burdensome WTO
Plus provisions can be renegotiated and phased out with time. Adding commitments
beyond the WTO Agreements shows skepticism towards market access, or a mercantilist
logic (for example, like the fears that Chinese products would saturate national markets
of other member states). Possibly in the future negotiation rounds, such commitments can
be phased out, in order to put all WTO members on equal standing, especially vis-à-vis
the rules. The problems with lack of transparency during accession and imposition of
rules as prerequisites appear as compromises to the WTO’s chances to develop a more
democratic profile. However, the issue is rather limited, as by now most countries in the
world have already acceded to the WTO, and those remaining do not have as big
economies and their accession process is not expected to last as long. Generally, the
process of accession can benefit from more openness, but that does not necessarily need
to be achieved for the accession process itself, it can be the result of overall
democratization of the organization.
A final note on the transparency obligations in accession protocols: these conditions,
even though they are additional to Article X of the GATT, they are important for the
international trading system. They have become vehicles linking businesses and
individual exporters and importers with WTO law. They contribute to the openness of
trade in countries where perhaps legislation is not easily obtainable. Transparency in the
Accession Protocols of large member states has promoted the unique and direct link
between consumers and traders on one hand and WTO member states and the WTO
regime on the other. Smaller countries that would be overly burden by such obligations
are given the opposite option, the WTO Minus, giving them additional time-frames and
assistance for implementation.
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IV.

External Transparency

External transparency was the explicit focus of the Sutherland Report in its fifth chapter
on Transparency, discussed earlier. External transparency generally refers to the
relationship of the organization not with its own member states, its shareholders, but with
anyone else affected by the rules and procedures introduced under its auspices, the
stakeholders. Although generally civil society is understood to be represented by NGOs,
this chapter will not only discussed the interactions of the WTO with the organized civil
society, but it will look at all possible communication and information flows between the
WTO and citizens of WTO member states and non-member states, namely the public at
large.
The first part will explore forms of interaction that are non-decisive. Even though the
discussed transparency-related aspects are adding to the organization’s overall outreach
profile and hope to address its legitimacy deficits, it is important to bear in mind that
none of these aspects affect the rules or the outcomes of decisions, at least not to date.
The second part will examine in detail a type of external transparency that has
considerable potential to affect the outcome of dispute settlement in the WTO. Even
though panel and Appellate Body reports are binding inter-partes and not erga omnes the
rare cases where the WTO court has included civil society arguments in its reports are
extremely significant. They are the first and only step to engage with civil society
arguments and allow them to inform (even to a small extent) reports which are binding to
member states.
The first part will discuss first NGO participation in WTO Ministerial Conferences;
second the new trend of (few) open meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body; third, the
WTO symposia where academics, NGOs, business representatives and students often
participate at, and the annual WTO Public Forum. Finally, this chapter will briefly
discuss the publication of WTO documents at the WTO website, a very important and
detailed source of information for the WTO. These non-decisive aspects of the WTO are
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also often discussed in the context of Global Administrative Law. The second part begins
with a brief history of amicus curiae briefs before it discusses the related case law in
detail. Finally, after offering some statistical data on amicus briefs there is a short critique
towards the Panel and Appellate Body’s ambiguous stance towards amicus briefs.
A.

Civil Society in Ministerial Conferences, Symposia, Publication
1.

NGO Observer Participation

Attempts for participation from non-state actors began as early as 1946, during the ITO
negotiations. At the London Preparatory Conference, the International Chamber of
Commerce as well as the World Federation of Trade Unions expressed concerns for the
status and content of the negotiations that eventually led to the GATT. 1 Yet, no provision
in the GATT alluded to non-state actors, even though the GATT had some informal
relationships with NGOs.2 This changed when the WTO was created in 1995. Article V
of the Marrakesh Agreement discusses the outreach of the organization. The first
paragraph in particular briefly mentions the WTO’s relationships with other
intergovernmental organizations. The second paragraph, dealing with NGOs and other
non-state actors provides as follows:
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation
and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with
matters related to those of the WTO.
Shortly after the adoption of this article, in July 1996 the General Council adopted the
“Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.” The
Guidelines unambiguously link transparency with NGO access to the WTO:
“In deciding on these guidelines for arrangements on relations with nongovernmental organizations, Members recognize the role NGOs can play
to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and
agree in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication
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with NGOs. […] The Secretariat should play a more active role in its
direct contacts with NGOs who, as a valuable resource, can contribute to
the accuracy and richness of the public debate. This interaction with
NGOs should be developed through various means such as inter alia the
organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specific WTO-related
issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish
to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the
continuation of past practice of responding to requests for general
information and briefings about the WTO.”
However, the General Council clarified that this participation could not be decisive in
nature. In particular, the disclaimer the members added is related to a strict view of the
WTO as an intergovernmental organization and nothing more, an idea that is strongly
coupled with state sovereignty. As the Sutherland report will reiterate, if governments
wish to allow for more NGO participation, they should do so at a national level:
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO, which is both
a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and obligations among
its Members and a forum for negotiations. As a result of extensive
discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be
possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its
meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met
constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where
lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of
public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making.
The Sutherland report hails the adoption of Article V:2, but moves cautiously and avoids
discussing any decisive role for NGOs. In particular, it compares Article 71 of UN
Charter authorizing the Economic and Social Council to “make suitable arrangements for
consulting with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters within its
competence” as less robust.3
Since the adoption of the Guidelines, the General Council has addressed the issue of
external transparency in its meetings on several occasions.4 In particular, the General
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Sutherland Report Paragraph 188.
GC Meeting WT/GC/M/2930 September 1998, WT/GC/M/35 30 March 1999, WT/GC/M/45 2 August
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Council discussed after the Ministerial Conferences the results of NGO participation.
NGOs participated as observers for the first time at the Singapore Ministerial Conference.
The General Council concluded that the process and the results were successful and nongovernmental organizations could attend as observers at subsequent Ministerial
Conferences (Geneva, Seattle, Doha, Cancún, Hong Kong, Geneva- See also Table 3).5
Table 8 NGO participation in Ministerial Conferences

Ministerial
Singapore 1996
Geneva 1998
Seattle 1999
Doha 2001
Cancún 2003
Hong Kong 2005
Geneva 2009
Geneva 2011
Bali 2013

NGOs who received
accreditation
159
153
776
651
961
1065
435
234
346

NGOs who attended

Participants

108
128
686
370
795
811
N/A
N/A
N/A

235
362
Approx. 1500
370
1578
1596
Approx. 500
N/A
694

The division which manages relationships with NGOs is the Information and External
Relations Division, which communicates information about the WTO. It also organizes
an annual Public Forum, which is discussed in the following section.6 NGOs become
accredited to participate in Ministerial Conferences through a system similar to that in the
United Nations. It is unclear what NGOs contribute during the Ministerial Conferences.
The Sutherland Report discussed the bureaucratic burden of the accreditation process to
the WTO Secretariat. It is clear that more institutional capacity is needed in the WTO.7
The Director-General and members of the Secretariat meet regularly with NGOs.8 There
is also an online forum for discussions in the WTO.9 NGOs may provide position papers,
which the WTO Secretariat distributes to members states. A position paper is a written
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Ministerial Conferences http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm
Information and External Relations Division
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm#ierd
7
Sutherland Report paragraphs 207-208, Peter Van den Bossche, Debating the Future of the World Trade
organization, Divergent Views on the 2005 Sutherland Report 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 759 (2005) and PETER
VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS at 154-155 (2008).
8
Sutherland Report para.184.
9
Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/chat_e/chat_e.htm
6
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statement asserting the position of an organization on a specific WTO issue.10 The
position papers published at the WTO website are no more than a handful per year,
although some years, such as 1999 and 2005 ten or more papers are submitted. As with
the observer status in Ministerial Conferences, the usage of the papers is also vague. The
WTO has been criticized for the selection process as a “supreme cognitive arbitrer”
prohibiting thus any mitigation of the organization’s democratic legitimacy problems
through the participation of NGOs.11
2.

WTO Public Forum and Open Day

The WTO instituted an outreach event, which takes place annually, originally known as
the Public Symposium, which later became the Public Forum.12 It was first held in 2001.
Members of the civil society, media, academics, business representatives and government
officials meet at the WTO during the Public Forum to discuss the most recent
developments in international trade. Each year has a different theme (see Table 4). The
Public Forum has minimal normative value, however it signifies the outreach and
openness of the organization to the general public.13 The event according to the WTO
regularly attracts over 1,500 representatives from civil society, academia, business, the
media, governments, parliamentarians and inter-governmental organizations.14
WTO Public Forum
2014
“Why trade matters to everyone”
2013
“Expanding Trade through Innovation and the Digital Economy”
2012
“Is Multilateralism in Crisis?”
2011
“Seeking answers to global trade challenges”
2010
“The Forces Shaping World Trade”
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NGO position papers received by the WTO Secretariat
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/pospap_e.htm
11
Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315-317 ( J.
Klabbers et al eds. 2009).
12
Public Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm
13
Interesting examples of analogous transparency improvement are the OECD, see James Salzman,
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 191-227 (2005)) and the Basle Committee (Michael Barr &
Geoffrey Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15-46 at17 (2006)),
Lorenzo Casini, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 6 INT'L
ORG. L. REV. 421-446 at 445 (2009).
14
Public Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm
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2009
“Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better Global Governance”
2008
“Trading into the Future”
2007
“How the WTO can help harness globalization?”
2006
“What WTO for the XXIst Century?”
WTO Public Symposium
2005
“WTO After 10 Years: Global Problems and Multilateral Solutions”
2004
“Multilateralism at a crossroads”
2003
“Challenges Ahead on the Road to Cancún”
2002
“The Doha Development Agenda and beyond”
2001
“Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system ”
Table 9 WTO Public Forum and Public Symposium

Another outreach event is the Open Day which takes place at the end of June. According
to the WTO website:
“[t]he WTO opens its doors to the public on the occasion of the
inauguration of its new building and the completion of the renovation of
the Centre William Rappard. The WTO opened its doors to the public for
the first time in 2009, attracting some 5,000 visitors who came to learn
more about the WTO, the work of its staff, and the artistic treasures of the
Centre William Rappard, the WTO's headquarters in Geneva. A second
Open Day was held in 2010, offering a variety of entertainment and
educational activities, including guided tours of the building and special
activities for children. A web-only event was held in 2012 to introduce the
members of the WTO.”
Both events are mostly decorative. The cost to travel to Geneva would be prohibitive for
anyone who is curious about the works of the WTO. If these events represent some form
of engagement with civil society, then presumably it is only the elite civil society,
academics, lawyers and representatives of NGOs with large budgets, or just those who
already reside in Geneva and the surrounding areas who participate. The idea of web
events may be a better way to introduce those interested in the works of the WTO.
3.

The WTO website

Another aspect of external transparency is direct information on the WTO, namely the
declassification and publication or online availability of a very significant number of
WTO documents. The General Council since 2002 has authorized the derestriction of
WTO documents almost at the time of their circulation among WTO member states. In
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particular, in the decision entitled “Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of
WTO Documents” 15 the General Council “[e]mphasizing the importance of greater
transparency in the functioning of the WTO”

decided

that

all

official

WTO

documents shall be unrestricted unless requested otherwise by Member states. In the
latter case, documents can remain unrestricted for up to sixty days.
Minutes of meetings are restricted and are only released to the public forty-five days after
the date of circulation. Documents relating to modification or renegotiation of
concessions or to specific commitments are automatically derestricted after the
certification of such changes in the schedules and

documents relating the accession

process are automatically derestricted after the adoption of the report of the working
party. Moreover all documents are translated in English, French and Spanish, the three
official languages of the WTO, and are made immediately available at the WTO website,
which now contains a very large number of documents in order to “[f]acilitate their
dissemination to the public at large.”
Considering the complex nature of the WTO as an institution, and the WTO rules and
agreements, this derestriction is not as useful to those who are unfamiliar with the WTO
as a system, mostly trade economists and trade lawyers. Even though the WTO website is
an invaluable gateway for professionals, these documents are not as useful to the public
at large. The WTO has attempted to remedy this problem with the introduction of various
researched guides and simplified versions of the structure of the WTO. 16
4.

Public hearings during Dispute Settlement

Finally, the opening of WTO meetings to the public has recently been occurring via
closed-circuit televised presentations in the WTO building in Geneva.17 This form of
transparency is identified as “auxiliary meta transparency measures” put in place to
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WT/L/452 16 May 2002 (02-2719) Decision of 14 May 2002.
See for example: About the WTO http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
17
Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 ( J.
Klabbers et al eds. 2009) reports that those hearings are public.
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safeguard the efficiency of confidentiality of judicial mechanisms. 18Usually, limited
seating is available. In exceptional cases where the parties agree to do so, the WTO
dispute settlement process can be open to the public through a real time closed-circuit
television broadcast, as it recently occurred in the EC-Canada case on seal products19 or
the US-COOL case.20
In this case, interested individuals must file a form with the WTO giving their name,
address, phone, email, profession, organization, date of birth, nationality and passport
number. It appears that any interested person, regardless of whether their country is a
WTO member (for the small number of countries who are still not WTO members) can
attend the meetings. Moreover, according to the disclaimer at the application form:
“In the light of the limited seating capacity, the seats reserved for the
public will be allocated on a first come, first served basis upon receipt of
the completed form. […]A valid official photo identification will need to
be presented on-site to access the viewing room. Please note that any form
of recording or filming is prohibited. Security checks may delay access to
the viewing room. […] Note that the names of those who have registered
will be communicated to the parties and third parties in this dispute.
Finally, it is interesting to note here that these closed circuit hearings are another example
where the organization could be a lot more transparent. It is unclear why such meetings
are not published at the WTO website. The fears of member states for the real-time
transmission could be minimized if such broadcasting occurs only with the consent of all
member state involved, and after the meeting is over and the Panel or Appellate Body
report is issued. Publicizing a video of the DSB meetings would assist with making the
process more transparent. It is unclear why this has not happened to this date.
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Thore Neumann & Bruno Simma, Transparency in international adjudication in TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 472-473 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013).
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products
dispute
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WTO meeting on United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements - Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico to be held on 18 and 19 February 2014
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B.

Participation in dispute settlement through amicus briefs
1.

History and case law of amicus curiae briefs

In the first section we will first look at the history of amicus curiae briefs from 1995 to
this day. The topic has been much discussed, as it is quite popular among WTO scholars.
Many member states have been vocal on their disagreement with the interpretation of the
DSU by the Panels and the Appellate Body who maintain that they have a right to accept
unsolicited briefs. Yet, the Panels and Appellate Body, in most of the cases instead of
opening their doors to briefs they engage in maneuvers of rejection unless the parties to
the dispute incorporate the claims into their own submissions. As such, the membercentric nature of the process is reinforced. The Panels and Appellate Body seem
progressive in their interpretation of the DSU in almost every case. At the same time,
they end up not examining the amicus briefs, again in almost every case. However, as the
last section will demonstrate, an opportunity exists for erosion of this de facto
traditionalist practice. Utilizing the lessons from US-Tuna II (Mexico), the only case
where an amicus brief was explicitly relied upon in the Panel report, I will put forward a
proposal on expanding this case law, based on the relevance of consumer preferences in
WTO litigation.
The history for amicus curiae submissions in the WTO began with US-Shrimp, a case
involving a US prohibition on shrimp imports originating from countries using a certain
type of net. The Panel in US-Shrimp received two amicus curiae briefs. While the United
States, citing article 13 of the DSU, urged the panel to take into consideration any
relevant information, regardless of its source, the applicants, India, Malaysia, Pakistan
and Thailand explicitly requested that the Panel not consider the briefs. The Panel
decided for the applicants in this case, noting that “the initiative to seek information and
to select the source of information rests with the Panel”21 and therefore consideration of
unsolicited information from parties other than the applicant(s), the respondent(s) and any
third parties to the dispute is incompatible with the DSU. Moreover, the Panel noted that:
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Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R,
adopted 6 November 1998 para 7.8

214

“it was usual practice for parties to put forward whatever documents they
considered relevant to support their case and that, if any party in the
present dispute wanted to put forward these documents, or parts of them,
as part of their own submissions to the Panel, they were free to do so. If
this were the case, the other parties would have two weeks to respond to
the additional material.”22
The US-Shrimp Panel approach, as I will further demonstrate after reviewing all case law
to date, has become the de facto response of the Panels and the Appellate Body to the
majority of amicus curiae briefs. During the appeal of US-Shrimp, another four amicus
curiae were submitted, some from the same parties as the ones before the Panel, and
some new. The joint appellees requested again the rejection of the briefs, albeit on a
different legal basis. Inter alia, they stressed that only issues of law and not of fact can be
brought before the Appellate Body as per article 17.6 of the DSU.23 The Appellate Body
responded that the admissibility of amicus curiae is in fact a legal issue.24 Avoiding to
rule on whether the DSU allowed for the Appellate Body to accept unsolicited briefs, it
ruled instead that as long as these materials are attached to the brief of either party, and
insofar it coincides with the main submission of that party, the Appellate Body will
consider it. The Appellate Body then reversed the Panel’s interpretation on its right to
“seek information:
Against this context of broad authority vested in panels by the DSU, and
given the object and purpose of the Panel's mandate as revealed in Article
11, we do not believe that the word "seek" must necessarily be read, as
apparently the Panel read it, in too literal a manner. That the Panel's
reading of the word "seek" is unnecessarily formal and technical in nature
becomes clear should an "individual or body" first ask a panel for
permission to file a statement or a brief.
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Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R,
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Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998
para. 80.
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Id. para 88.
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The issue of amicus curiae was also discussed in the Article 21.5 US-Shrimp Panel and
Appellate Body reports. By then, even though the briefs received were only two, an
increasing number of organizations joined the previous ones in their efforts to be heard in
the WTO dispute settlement context. Once again, Malaysia insisted that the DSU cannot
accept or consider amicus curiae, but the Panel reiterated the previous position of the
Appellate Body and exclaimed that it can consider such briefs, insofar they coincide with
parties’ submissions. 25 Another two briefs were submitted in the appeal during the
compliance proceedings between the US and Malaysia. With respect to the first brief,
which was attached to the US submissions, the Appellate Body repeated the Panel’s
ruling in the compliance proceedings and the Appellate Body’s ruling in US-Shrimp. For
the second brief, submitted by professor Howse, the Appellate Body simply stated that
“we have not found it necessary to take into account the brief.” The rejection did not
decrease professor Howse’s desire to be heard in the dispute settlement process.26 At the
same time the tribunal’s reasonless declaration has been favored in many of the following
disputes when amicus briefs were submitted.
In the Panel proceedings of US-Lead and Bismuth II only one amicus curiae was
received. The Panel stressed they have the authority to accept or reject the brief and
proceeded to say that since the parties did not have adequate opportunity to comment on
the brief, “serious due process concerns” were raised, and although the Panel could have
delayed the proceedings so that parties have adequate time to submit their comments, this
could not be justified.27 On appeal, Brazil, Mexico and the EC argued that the DSU does
not have the authority to accept the briefs from non-parties to the proceedings as per
article 17.4 DSU, also invoking article 17.10 DSU and confidentiality of the
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United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia WT/DS58/AB/RW adopted 21 November 2001 paras 5.15 and 5.16.
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He has since submitted more amicus curiae briefs, which were rejected under the same rubric and he is
one of the few parties with the highest amicus submissions. See infra, section on Evaluation of NGO
Participation.
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Panel Report, United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom WT/DS138/R, adopted 7 June 2000
para 6.3.
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proceedings.28 The US rebutted that the Appellate Body as per article 17.9 DSU and Rule
16.1 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review has the authority to create
additional procedures when necessary.
The Appellate Body in this case ruled on its ability to accept and consider amicus curiae
briefs. It first noted that the DSU neither allows nor prohibits the acceptance of
unsolicited information and effectively agreed with the US position.29 It further declared
that access to the dispute settlement process as a legal right is reserved only for member
states30 and that non-member individuals or organizations have no such legal right and
therefore the Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept the submissions.31 The Appellate
Body concluded that it has the legal authority under the DSU to receive the briefs, but in
this case did not find it necessary to take the briefs into account.
Another amicus curiae brief was submitted during the compliance proceedings of
Australia-Salmon. This is the first case where a letter from a non-state actor, the
Concerned Fishermen and Processors in South Australia, was considered relevant and
was accepted by the Panel without attachment to a national brief or national
endorsement.32 Interestingly enough, the tribunal emphasized that the claim raised by the
Australian fishermen in their letter coincided with Canada’s position on Article 5.5 of the
SPS.33
US- Section 110 (5) Copyright Act is the next case where one amicus brief was submitted
during the Panel proceedings. The United States, although they did not agree with the
content of the letter, submitting that it had little value to the Panel since it provided no
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Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
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additional information, still argued that private parties had a “right…to make their views
known to the WTO dispute settlement panels.”34 The EC further added that the panel can
accept factual information and technical advice by “individuals or bodies alien to the
dispute”, however the panel’s authority excluded legal arguments and interpretations.35
The Panel concluded that they accept the letter, as it is their right to do so36, but agreed
with the parties that the letter contains “duplicate information” and therefore has not
relied on it in its reasoning.37
A new issue with respect to private party participation and confidentiality of the dispute
settlement process surfaced in the next case. During the appellate proceedings of
Thailand H-Beams, one amicus brief was submitted. The thorny matter in this case was a
claim Thailand made on violation of confidentiality of the proceedings.38 In particular,
Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), a US-based private organization,
referred to Section III.C.5 of Thailand appeal submissions. As Thailand claimed, the law
firm hired by Poland in the dispute was also counsel for CITAC.39 Poland responded that
neither their mission, nor the law firm hired had any insight on how CITAC came about
the information cited, and in any case, they dismissed the law firm from the case.40 All
third parties also informed the Appellate Body that they did not disclose the content of
the Thai submissions. Interestingly, the US, a strong proponent of transparency in the
WTO dispute process noted that:
“this issue exemplified the need for enhanced transparency in WTO
dispute settlement. In the view of the United States, the practice of
claiming confidential treatment for submissions that did not contain
confidential business information corroded public support for the WTO
dispute settlement system and inhibited the ability of Members to
represent fully the interests of their stakeholders.”41
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The Appellate Body, in a demonstration of the reluctance of its members to communicate
with the amicus curiae submitting organization, rejected Thailand’s request to even
simply inquire into how CITAC or the law firm obtained information about the brief. The
Appellate Body considered the rejection of the brief provided sufficient remedy in this
case and clarified that, in any event, the reason for the rejection of the brief was its
irrelevance to the case at hand.
Next in the DSB docket was the (in)famous EC-Asbestos case between the EC and
Canada. The Panel received only 5 amicus curiae briefs, two of which the EC decided to
attach in their own submissions. Subsequently, the Panel rejected the rest of the
submissions, two without explanation and one because it was submitted very late in the
process. The Appellate Body received the largest number of amicus curiae briefs
submitted in one case to date: seventeen. 23 organizations, associations and firms and
two individuals submitted the briefs after the establishment of specific procedures42 by
the Appellate Body for amicus curiae submissions. Before filing a brief, interested nonstate parties would have to apply in order to file a brief, explaining their reasons in no
longer than 3 typed pages.43 Initially, the Appellate Body received 13 submissions which
were not submitted in accordance with the established procedures. 44 Subsequently,
another 17 applications were submitted, six of which after the deadline set in the
Additional Procedure.45 The remainder of the applications to file a brief were examined
and the Appellate Body concluded that:
“We carefully reviewed and considered each of these applications in
accordance with the Additional Procedure and, in each case, decided to
deny leave to file a written brief. Each applicant was sent a copy of our
decision denying its application for leave for failure to comply sufficiently
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Called “Additional Procedure” based on Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, copied in Appellate
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with all the requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional
Procedure.”46
One last brief, submitted after the process was concluded, was also rejected.
The Asbestos case is remarkable on the issue of amicus curiae briefs, for a number of
reasons. First, the Appellate Body moves beyond simply recognizing its authority to
accept unsolicited briefs, and establishes, for one and only time, a procedure by which
such briefs will be submitted. The procedure is two-tiered, and interested parties have to
first establish their interest in the case before actually submitting a brief. Second, ECAsbestos is the closest example of the “floodgates” argument put forward by skeptics of
amici. The unremarkably small number of parties interested in weighing in in this case
contradicted the feared outpouring of briefs. Seventeen briefs (even at 20 pages each, if
they had in fact been accepted by the Appellate Body) could hardly be seen as
excessively burdensome to the Canadian and European lawyers’ armies, especially in
view of the large memoranda submitted during WTO disputes. One could also expect
significant overlap in these briefs. Third, one cannot help but express disbelief upon
reading Paragraph 56 of EC-Asbestos: it is unclear how all eleven applicants failed to
comply with Article 3 of the Additional Procedure. This incidence becomes further
troublesome if one assumes that at least one (if not many or all) of the organizations hired
a law firm to assist them with the brief.
Asbestos is particularly noteworthy also because of the emergency General Council
Meeting of November 22nd 2000.47 While the case was pending and as the Appellate
Body was accepting motions to file briefs, the General Council, the body assigned with
the ‘day-to-day’ supervision of the WTO matters in between Ministerial Conferences,
held a meeting discussing the issue of the amicus brief submissions. An overwhelming
majority of member states expressed their disapproval to the Appellate Body practice,
with only the United States agreeing to amicus brief submissions48. The representative of
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WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001 paragraphs 74-77.

Asbestos

and

220

Egypt who requested this meeting notably acting on behalf of the Informal Group of
Developing Countries said that the issue before the General Council “was not a
transparency issue but was about the Appellate Body crossing its limits”49 further citing
the danger of “severe harm and a grave imbalance” for developing countries.50 The
question of amicus curiae briefs was also characterized as “constitutional”51, challenging
the very “intergovernmental nature of the organization”52, threatening to contaminate the
dispute settlement mechanism with “political issues”. 53 Furthermore, a number of
members argued that it is a mistake to frame the amicus brief issue as an external
transparency.54
The next case, EC-Bed Linen55, simply repeated the unwillingness to accept the single
brief submitted. Following that, the case of EC-Sardines on appeal faced another unique
issue: the possibility for an amicus curiae brief coming not from a non-state actor but
from a WTO Member State. After Morocco submitted an amicus brief, the Appellate
Body ruled on the issue that lied behind the objection expressed by representatives of
WTO countries that member states were put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-state actors
and it was unclear whether they could be part of the same procedure. On the issue of the
Moroccan submission, the Appellate Body, basing its reasoning on US- Lead and
Bismuth II, argued it can accept amicus briefs from any party.56 However, the question
arising in this context is that of a legal right of the member states to submit such briefs
and a corresponding obligation of the Panels and Appellate Body to accept them. To this
question, the Appellate Body in EC-Sardines answered negatively.57 Once a member
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state decides to participate via an amicus curiae brief, then it no longer has the right to be
heard (as it would if it were a third party to the dispute)58.
Reaffirming that the WTO is a member-driven organization, the Appellate Body for the
first time summarized and addressed the arguments in an amicus brief. 59 It continued to
reject most of the arguments (with the exception of the arguments on Article 2.1 TBT and
GATT 1994). Even though the tribunal proclaimed it would treat all amici in the same
manner, regardless of their origin, only one amicus to date from a non-state source has
been given the same attention as the Moroccan brief in EC Sardines60. With respect to the
brief submitted by “a private individual”, the Appellate Body repeated that it has the
authority to accept the brief61 but it is not helpful for the court in this appeal.62
The next case addressing an amicus brief was US-Countervailing Measures on Certain
EC Products.63 The Appellate Body again rejected the single amicus brief submitted, yet
interestingly now both the EU and the US affirmed that the Appellate Body has the
authority to accept and consider briefs from non-state actors. 64 In the next few cases, USSoftwood Lumber III, 65 US-Softwood Lumber IV, 66 US-Softwood Lumber VI 67 , USSoftwood Lumber IV on appeal68 and US-Steel Safeguards on appeal69 the Panels and
Appellate Body eventually dismissed each of the 11 briefs submitted in total in these
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The amicus in Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale
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Id. para. 160.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products WT/DS212/AB/R
adopted 8 January 2003.
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Id. paragraph 76.
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Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III United States — preliminary determinations with respect to
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Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada WT/DS257/R, adopted 29 August 2003.
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cases, either as irrelevant or as submitted too late. Only the Panel in US-Softwood Lumber
VI, in footnote 75 remarked that:
“in light of the absence of consensus among WTO Members on the
question of how to treat amicus submissions, we decided not to accept
unsolicited amicus curiae submissions in the course of this dispute.
However, we noted that we would consider any arguments raised by amici
curiae to the extent that these arguments were taken up in the written
submissions and/or oral statements of any party or third parties.”
This analysis retracts from previous case law, referring in the discontent expressed by
WTO member states with respect to the treatment of amicus briefs. This is the first time
in the six years since the Panel of US-Shrimp that a report returns to a strict memberdriven rhetoric and rejects the brief on these grounds.
Confidentiality of state-parties to a dispute and an amicus curie brief came up again in the
case of EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar.70 This time the Panel directly communicated with
WVZ, an association representing German sugar producers and requested information as
to how they received confidential data from Brazil’s submissions. WVZ responded that:
“it had been ‘able to examine’ an attachment to Brazil's submission.
According to WVZ, this document was not designated as confidential. It
also indicated that WVZ was ‘not in a position to reveal the source of its
information regarding the evidence submitted by Brazil.’”71
The Panel found there was a breach of confidentiality, noted that a similar issue arose in
Thailand H-Beams, rejected the brief and reported the incident to the Dispute Settlement
Body. 72
The next six cases, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar on appeal,73 EC-Chicken Cuts on
appeal, 74 Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks on appeal, 75 US-Zeroing (EC),

76

EC-Selected
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Panel Reports, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R,
WT/DS283/R adopted 19 May 2005.
71
Id. paras. 7.92, 7.93.
72
Id. 7.96-7.100.
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Customs Matters77 and EC - Biotech Products (GMOs)78, the Panels and Appellate Body
once again rejected the briefs on the usual grounds. In the case of Brazil- Retreated
Tyres79 a unique request for webcasting the proceedings was made by the Center for
International Environmental Law. The proposal was discussed with the parties to the
dispute and was subsequently rejected. 80 Similarly, the Panels and Appellate Body
rejected the total of sixteen amicus briefs submitted in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres on
appeal81, EC-Salmon, 82 China-Auto Parts on appeal,83 EC and certain member statesLarge Civil Aircraft84 Australia- Apples,85 Thailand-Cigarettes,86 US- Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties (China) on appeal,87 Canada - Renewable Energy during the Panel
process 88 and on appeal,89 and US-Clove Cigarettes on appeal90 either outright rejected
the briefs or found their consideration unnecessary. In US-COOL the Panel accepted the
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Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar WT/DS265/AB/R,
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Id.
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Panel Report, European Communities – Anti Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway,
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WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011.
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Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011.
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Panel Reports, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector
WT/DS412/R WT/DS426/R adopted 24 May 2013.
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WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012.
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claims in the one brief it received for the part that it coincided with the parties’
submissions91.
One of the more recent cases which significantly departed from the previous case law is
US-Tuna II.92 The Panel here not only accepted the submission of Humane Society, an
organization which has frequently submitted amicus curiae briefs, but it went as far as to
consider the claims contained in the brief, even beyond the parts cited by the United
States, agree with their content, and utilize them in its decision-making.93 For example,
the Panel said:
We further note that it is undisputed that US consumers are sensitive to the
dolphin-safe issue. This is acknowledged by both Mexico and the United
States, and is also confirmed by the evidence presented with the amicus
curiae brief to which the United States has referred to in its answers to
questions. This evidence suggests that, following public campaigning by
the environmental organization “Earth Island Institute” in the late 1980s
(including through film footage shot in 1987-88 showing the capture and
killing of dolphins during a fishing trip where setting on dolphins was
used), tuna processors were under pressure to stop purchasing tuna caught
in conditions that were harmful to dolphins. […] While this is only
indirect evidence as to the final consumers’ behaviours, it suggests that the
producers themselves assume that they would not be able to sell tuna
products that do not meet dolphin-safe requirements, or at least not at a
price sufficient to warrant their purchase. 94
We further note in this respect that some of the evidence presented to the
Panel suggests that 90 per cent of the world's tuna companies have
adopted a strict “no setting on dolphins” standard. 95
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Panel Report, United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements WT/
DS384,386/R, adopted 23 July 2012 paras. 2.9-2.10.
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Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012.
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Id. paras 7.182, 7.288, 7.289, 7.363, 7.368, Fn 559.
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Id. paras.7.288-7.289
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Id. para 7.368 Emphasis added. The evidence referred to in this paragraph, is cited in Footnote 559 of the
report: Amicus Exhibit-28. As explained in paragraph 2.9 above, insofar as the Panel deemed this
information to be relevant for the purposes of its assessment, it invited Mexico to comment on it in order to
take full account of Mexico's right of response and defense in respect of due process considerations. Panel's
question No. 88.
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On appeal the Appellate Body did not find the three briefs submitted to it to be relevant.96
Similarly in the cases that followed US-Tuna II, the Panels and Appellate Body retracted
the decision’s progressive approach.
Finally, the recent EU-Seals case demonstrates how amicus curiae briefs are treated in
the WTO since it summarizes the scope of the entire issue. The case involves a complaint
brought by Canada and Norway against the European Union involving the latter’s ban on
seal products. The ban mainly targets seal products and prevents them from entering the
European Union market with some exceptions. Canada and Norway are amongst the few
countries still engaging in seal trade. Pamela Anderson, a Canadian citizen, actress and
PETA spokesperson was amongst the few non-state actors to submit an amicus curiae
brief to the WTO Panel examining the case. Pamela Anderson requested that the Panel
uphold the EU seal ban. In her one-page submission on behalf of PETA, she proposed a
“practical exit strategy: a government buyout of the sealing industry, which would benefit
both seals and sealers.” She concluded with the hope that her “beautiful Canada will
finally leave this barbaric practice in the past.”97 It is relevant here to clarify that amicus
briefs are submitted up until the first substantive meeting of the Parties and the Panel. In
fact, the first substantive meeting is the de facto deadline for the submission of any
evidence coming from the parties including third countries parties to the dispute, and the
purpose of this procedural rule is to give members to the dispute time to respond and
process all the information put forward during this meeting.
The five briefs submitted in this case were: the first by a group of organizations, amongst
which was Brigitte Bardot’s foundation. The Bardot set of briefs was promptly endorsed
by the European Union and annexed to its submissions. The rest of the briefs fall under
the category of unsolicited briefs; the second was by professor Robert Howse, another
Canadian, together with Joanna Langille and Katie Sykes; the third, was by Pamela
Anderson on behalf of PETA. The last two briefs were by the International Fur Trade
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Federation and actor Jude Law. The first two briefs were accepted- and considered by
the WTO, while the last three were rejected. Both Jude Law and the fur traders submitted
briefs well after the first substantive meeting. Pamela Anderson and PETA and Professor
Howse et al. both submitted briefs on time, and while one was considered, the other was
rejected.98 No reason was given by the court for either choice- and the court cited
professor Howse’s brief as an exhibit of the “public moral concerns” with respect to the
ban of seal trade (which ended up being the deciding factor of the case as the court found
that there were no less restrictive means to normatively express these concerns other than
a flat-out ban on seal trade). 99 It remains unclear why one brief was accepted while the
other was rejected.
2.

Critique of the treatment of amicus briefs

Overall, regardless of the switch in interpretation and the rejection of the US-Shrimp
dictum that accepting amicus curiae briefs is prohibited by the DSU, the end result is that
the information contained in such documents is only considered during WTO dispute
settlement when submitted as part of the parties’ submissions. When such briefs are
simply annexed to the parties’ memoranda they are taken into account only insofar they
coincide with the main positions of the country at hand, otherwise they are dismissed.
Only in US-Tuna II (Mexico)100 and EC-Seals101 has a Panel addressed the substantive
contribution of a non-state amicus brief and used it in its reasoning. The other amicus
brief examined on the merits so far has been the submission by Morocco in EC-Sardines.
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On submission times see EC- Seals, WT/DS400/R WT/DS401/R (25 November 2013) para.1.17 and fn.
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Thus, the somber truth remains: although the court refined its approach with respect to
unsolicited briefs in the thirty or so disputes since US-Shrimp in 1998, in reality almost
nothing has changed. The Panels and Appellate Body overwhelmingly insist they can
accept unsolicited information from for-profit and non-profit non-state actors, despite the
strong opposition from the vast majority of WTO member states during the EC-Asbestos
proceedings. Yet, they have rejected any information not annexed or referred to in
parties’ submissions, frequently without any further explanation. Non-governmental
actors are only allowed to submit their briefs, but they remain excluded from any
meaningful debate during the dispute settlement process. Moreover, it remains unclear
why the Panels and Appellate Body insist on proclaiming their right to accept briefs, yet
not a single time in the last fifteen years have they actually considered any of the
information contained in those briefs, unless it was attached to a country’s submissions.
Despite the extensive case law examining the issue of unsolicited briefs, in effect all
NGOs since 1998 have by result received the same treatment as the US-Shrimp panel
report.
A brief summary of the amicus curiae statistics to date is illuminating when considering
the doubts raised in the 2000 General Council emergency meeting on the issue. In the
almost twenty years of the organization, a total of 87 amicus curiae briefs have been
submitted for consideration in 41 Panel and Appellate Body proceedings of 33
disputes.102 Of those, only 14 briefs are cited anonymously. The submitting organizations
and individuals of the remaining 73 briefs are mentioned by name in the Panel and
Appellate Body reports. According to these numbers, in 41 out of 329 Panel and
Appellate Body reports combined (including Article 21 reports and the pending seals’
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report)103 non-state parties have submitted amicus briefs. This amount to a little over 12%
of the reports issued.
Approximately 130 organizations and individuals have tried to weigh in during the WTO
dispute settlement process, based in a variety of countries, both developing and
developed. The majority are organizations based in developed countries. Few academics
have also submitted briefs. The mandate of the organizations varies depending on the
case at hand. However, a few recurring names appear in the amici list: the first place is
currently held by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) with nine
submitted briefs. CIEL is a U.S. non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. with a
second office in Geneva. The second most prolific amicus submitter is Humane Society,
also based in Washington D.C. Humane Society is the largest animal advocacy
organization in the world and has submitted briefs either through its central or its regional
offices. It is also the only organization to date whose submissions were explicitly
considered by the Panel in US-Tuna II. Other repeated friends of the WTO dispute
settlement system are Robert Howse, professor of International Trade law, Defenders of
Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development (FIELD), the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Center for Marine
Conservation and the Argentina-based Center for Human Rights and the Environment
(CEDHA).
The organizations or the individuals that submitted them have published some of the
amicus briefs. The public briefs are neither excessive in length, nor do they advance
unreasonable interpretations of WTO law. For example, the brief filed by the American
Institute for International Steel (AIIS) during the appeal of US-Steel104 argues for the
inclusion of consumer perspectives and the views of “users of steel” in public policy
debates. The AIIS, in its 10-page memo further proposes the inclusion of consumers’
interests in the interpretation of the notion of “public interest” in Article 3.1 of the
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Safeguards Agreement. On a similar tone, Ecojustice et al. in a 22-page memo 105
submitted during the Canada-Renewable Energy case argue for an application of Article
XX GATT to the SCM Agreement. Professor Rubini also submitted a brief in this case,
which advances a pro-green policy approach on the determination of subsidies. Similarly
Professors’ Howse et al. offered a polemic approach in their brief on the seals’ case.106
The brief submitted to the Panel argues against the current Canadian policy on seals. The
last two briefs move closer to advocacy than the first two. All four though are examples
of well-thought submissions to the Panel and Appellate Body. If they are indicative of the
general form that amicus curiae briefs have, then they serve to demonstrate that the fears
expressed during the General Council meeting may have been largely exaggerated.
The argument that merits closer attention is the one about overburdening developing
countries in the dispute settlement process. It is a valid concern, however, it is one that
we should discuss more carefully. First of all, as we saw, the “floodgates” element of
amicus brief submissions is highly exaggerated. Thus, the workload for developing
countries will not be as burdensome as it appears. Moreover, this problem can be
mitigated through procedural requirements that restrict the length of amici submissions.
Second, it might be in the interest of developing countries to have a more pluralistic
dispute settlement process. Their worries focus mainly on the possibility of NGOs and
other non-state actors bringing forward environmental and labor concerns before the
DSB. However, such considerations are weighed in during dispute settlement, they are
not the only factor that will produce a decision on for example Article III or Article XX
of the GATT. Labor issues are not covered by the WTO Agreements. Third, it is likely
that the reluctance to accept amicus briefs may be related to the prevalence of the practice
of such briefs in Western legal systems. That also is not entirely accurate. Many countries
around the world have similar participation opportunities during various stages of
national adjudicatory processes.
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V.

Administrative Transparency

The functions of the WTO are carried at the political level by the diplomats who are
employed by WTO member states, and at the administrative level by the WTO
secretariat, namely the permanent staff of the WTO. This chapter will discuss the
transparency aspects in the administrative level of the WTO. Before that, it is noteworthy
to give a summary of the political organs of the WTO, since they are the main organs of
the WTO, which the Secretariat assists in their function. I will then move to describe the
structure of the Secretariat, and discuss the transparency issues that arise in this context
and are mainly related to the selection of the WTO employees, judges and other
participants in the administration of international trade.

A.

Political bodies in the WTO: the various faces of the General Council

The political organs of the WTO are meetings of diplomats, who represent their national
governments, the WTO member states, the candidate members and the countries who
have acquired observer status. Selection of diplomats occurs at the national level, and it
varies from country to country. The structure of the WTO as an organization appears in
Figure 4. The Ministerial Conference consists of minister-level representatives and is the
highest decision-making body, which meets approximately every two years. The
permanent organ in the WTO, the General Council consists of ambassador-level
diplomats and meets approximately every two months. The Chairperson of the General
Council is the highest elected position at the WTO. The Dispute Settlement Body and the
Trade Policy Review Body comprise of the same members as the General Council (they
are in fact the same body), acting under a different capacity and a different Chairperson.1
Below the General Council under its three forms are the Specialized Councils,
Committees, such as the Committee on Trade and Environment, the Committee on
Balance of Payment Restrictions, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, the
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Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Trade Negotiations
Committee, and Working Parties in the WTO. [see following table]

WTO structure
All WTO members may participate in all councils, committees, etc, except Appellate Body, Dispute Settlement panels, and
plurilateral committees.

Ministerial Conference

General Council meeting as

Dispute Settlement
Body

General Council meeting as

General Council

Trade Policy Review
Body

Appellate Body
Dispute Settlement panels

Committees on

Trade and Environment
Trade and Development
Subcommittee on LeastDeveloped Countries
Regional Trade Agreements
Balance of Payments
Restrictions
Budget, Finance and
Administration

Working parties on
Accession

Working groups on

Trade, debt and finance
Trade and technology
transfer
(Inactive:
(Relationship between
Trade and Investment
(Interaction between
Trade and Competition
Policy
(Transparency in
Government Procurement)

Council for
Trade in Goods

Council for
Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual
Property Rights

Council for
Trade in Services

Committees on

Market Access
Agriculture
Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
Technical Barriers to Trade
Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures
Anti-Dumping Practices
Customs Valuation
Rules of Origin
Import Licensing
Trade-Related Investment
Measures
Safeguards

Working party on

State-Trading Enterprises

Committees on

Trade in Financial Services
Specific Commitments

Working parties on
Domestic Regulation
GATS Rules

Plurilaterals

Trade in Civil Aircraft Committee
Government Procurement Committee

Doha Development Agenda:
TNC and its bodies

Trade Negotiations
Committee
Special Sessions of

Services Council / TRIPS Council / Dispute Settlement
Body / Agriculture Committee and Cotton SubCommittee / Trade and Development Committee /
Trade and Environment Committee

Plurilateral

Information Technology Agreement
Committee

Negotiating groups on

Market Access / Rules / Trade Facilitation

Key
Reporting to General Council (or a subsidiary)
Reporting to Dispute Settlement Body
Plurilateral committees inform the General Council or Goods Council of their activities, although these agreements
are not signed by all WTO members
Trade Negotiations Committee reports to General Council
The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and Dispute Settlement Body

Figure 4 WTO Organizational Chart2
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B.

The WTO Secretariat

At the administrative level, the WTO Secretariat consists of about six hundred
employees, hired on temporary or permanent contract status.3

Director-General
Roberto Azevêdo

•
•
•
•

Office of the Director-General
Council and Trade Negotiations Committee Division
Office of Internal Audit
Information and External Relations Division

Deputy Director-General
Yonov Frederick AGAH

•
•
•

Trade Policies Review Division
Development Division
Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation

Deputy Director-General
Karl BRAUNER

•
•
•
•

Legal Affairs Division
Rules Division
Administration and General Services Division
Human Resources Division

Deputy Director-General
David SHARK

•
•
•
•
•

Agriculture and Commodities Division
Trade and Environment Division
Accessions Division
Information Technology Solutions Division
Languages
Documentation
and
Information
Management Division

Deputy Director-General
Xiaozhun YI

•
•
•
•

Market Access Division
Trade in Services Division
Intellectual Property Division
Economic Research and Statistics Division

* The Appellate Body Secretariat reports to the DG for non-disputerelated administrative matters
** The Enhanced Integrated Framework Secretariat reports to the DG for
administrative matters

Table 10 The WTO Secretariat: Divisions4

The head of the Secretariat is the Director-General, who is appointed by the Ministerial
Conference. Although the issue of choosing a Director-General has become contentious
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at times,5 he has always been appointed through a highly politicized process by the
Ministerial Conference and as such he enjoys a minimum form of democratic legitimacy.
His role is that of a facilitator in the decision-making process of member states. A similar
selection process by member states applies to Deputy Directors General, who are
appointed by the Director-General in consultation with member states. To this date, only
men have been appointed Director Generals. All of them are career diplomats and/or
former trade ministers in their countries. Only two holders of the post, the current
Director General, Roberto Azevêdo as well as Supachai Panitchpakdi come from a
developing country (Brazil and Thailand respectively). Panitchpakdi and Mike Moore
shared the post for one half of a six year period each. To date, six Europeans have held
the post as well as one New Zealander.
The rest of the Secretariat, most of which are lawyers or economists are hired through a
different process. The original GATT was administered by a very small number of
international officials6 whose duties were not only administrative, but they were required
to help the committees working on tariffs, provide expert assistance to national
delegations, support negotiations among different groups and provide statistical
assistance.7 Even though the organization expanded, the size of the secretariat remained
proportionally small. In the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the secretariat
doubled in size and the WTO delegations have proportionately increased.
Still, the total number of WTO officials is very small. Currently, the WTO employs
approximately six hundred employees 8 who are still mostly trade lawyers and
economists. 9 Together with them, another six hundred or so liaison officers and
representatives to WTO located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva, manage

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS at 132-133 (2008).
6
DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL. THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 118 (2008).
7

Id.
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS at 135 (2008). Today its staff consists of 640 people. See WTO Secretariat
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm.
9
WTO Recruitment http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/vacan_e/recruit_e.htm .
8

234

international trade. 10 Interestingly enough, it used to be very difficult to find an
approximate number of the liaison officers and representatives to the WTO. In any event
an accurate number could be found in the internally published annual phone directory. In
1999 C. Michalopoulos, based on this directory, reported that the number of memberstate representatives was 540. The entry of China and Russia to the organization has
changed this number, currently reported as 640.11 Only recently has the WTO website
provided specific information with respect to the Secretariat. The selection appears to be
related to nationality more than merit.12
The hiring process for the WTO personnel begins in the WTO website where vacancies
are announced. There, interested candidates, who must be citizens of one of the WTO
member states and under the age of 65, can submit an application for the advertised
positions. Before that, candidates fill out an elaborate online form in lieu of a curriculum
vitae, together with an optional cover letter. The form contains personal details, contact
information, family information, secretariat, language and computer skills, areas of
expertise, education, employment history, an optional, vacancy-specific cover letter and
names of references.13
Beyond this information, little is known about the selection process. The WTO website
contains little information with respect to the duration of the selection process, which
may last several months “due to the rigours of placement.”14 Moreover:
As the organization is a relatively small one, the turnover of staff is
accordingly limited. The vacancies which do occur are the subject of open
competition and advertised by means of vacancy notices, the distribution
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of which is made to all of the official representatives of the governments
participating in the WTO and they are posted on this website. They are
also occasionally advertised in the press. Upon receipt, applications for a
specific vacancy are forwarded to the Division concerned for evaluation
and selection of candidates. Selected candidates may then be invited to
Geneva for an interview, which will normally be supplemented by a
written test. After approval of the selection by the Director General, an
offer of appointment is sent to the selected candidate. […] A person
wishing to apply for such a position in the Secretariat should possess a
post-graduate university degree in economics, international relations or
law, with an emphasis on trade issues. The academic qualifications should
be supplemented by at least five years of experience with a national
government or with an international organization or other organizations or
enterprises dealing with issues of trade policy and international trade
relations. For the professional staff the general duties, in addition to any
particular functions of an advertised position, consist of preparation of
reports, research and analysis, both economic and legal, servicing of
meetings, and working with delegations of member states. Drafting skills
are particularly important.15
Beyond this information, nothing is known on the content of the examination. No other
information exists publicly with respect to the interview process and the types of
questions asked, or average candidate profiles.16 For those who have not participated in
this process, very little information is publicly available, unlike, other organizations,
which are quite transparent with respect to their examination process, as it happens for
example in the United Nations17 or the European Union EPSO exams.18 Candidates for
the posts in the UN or the EU can be well-acquainted with the nature of the exam they
will be taking in order to qualify for employment to the organizations. There is no
available information for the exams in the WTO19 and candidates usually sign waivers
not to disclose any information after sitting for an exam.
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The administrative segment of the WTO has accentuated the organization’s legitimacy
crisis, since it is perceived as non-transparent and unaccountable. To a large extent, the
organization’s legitimacy issues are emphasized by its perceived significant
compositional flaw: a very small number of unaccountable diplomats and international
technocrats are the key actors of the international financial system has put the WTO
under a lot of scrutiny. This “elite administration” has not been elected and remains
politically unaccountable for advancing normative changes in the area of international
trade that affect development and economic factors of all countries, developing and
developed and by consequence the lives of a very significant fraction of the world
population.
The WTO Secretariat has contributed significantly in the development of the so-called
Global Administrative Law. Transparency in particular is viewed as a fundamental value
of public institutions in liberal democracies 20 . Transparency and accountability are
structurally linked. 21 Shaffer and Nicolaides22, Benvenisti23, Chimni24 and Cassese25 have
linked transparency and accountability.
Transparency in the WTO secretariat context has been linked to the circulation review of
documentation.

26

This focus is consistent with a Weberian analysis, whereby

governments are seen as seeking exclusive access to knowledge as a method of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20

Armin von Bogdandy et al, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal
Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1375-1400, 1384 (2008).
21
Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global administrative law dimensions of international
organizations law, 2 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 319-356 (2009), pp and Nico Krish & Benedict Kingsbury,
Introduction: Global governance and Global administrative law in the international legal order, 17:1 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 1-13 (2006).
22
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without
Global Government 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 263-317 (2005).
23
Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative Law
in International Institutions 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 323-340 (2005).
24
Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1-37 (2004).
25
Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS
111-126 (2005).
26
Isabel Feichtner, The Administration of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO
Schedules to Changes in the Harmonized System 9 GERMAN L. J. 1481 at 1494 (2008).
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increasing their power 27 and therefore the publication of documentation becomes
important as part of increasing the accountability of governments. We analyzed the
circulation of documents in the previous section, as it is part of external transparency.
Less attention has been directed towards the elite nature and the intransparent hiring
processes of the organization, even though it is equally important. Steward and Ratton
argue in this respect that strengthening the WTO’s “internal administrative branch” will
assist the organization in addressing its legitimacy deficit. 28

C.

Panelists and Appellate Body Members

The members of the Panel and the Appellate Body are selected through a process
explained at the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The panelists are not permanent but
they are selected ad hoc only for the dispute before them. On the contrary, the Appellate
Body members serve four-year terms once renewable.29
According to Article 8 DSU:
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental individuals, including persons who have served on or
presented a case to a panel […].
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the
independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a
wide spectrum of experience.
3. Citizens of Members whose governments are parties to the dispute or
third parties as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a
panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree
otherwise.30
Even though panelists are only selected for the dispute before them, in the last two
decades we can observe a few of trends in terms of panel member selection. The first is
that certain members reappear in multiple disputes. It seems there is a reputational effect
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
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Emphasis added.
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in the judges’ approach to trade disputes, and thus panelists have incentives to decide in
certain ways in order to get reappointed by countries.31 Second, possibly as a result from
the first, there is a significantly large number of judges are citizens of certain countries,
such as New Zealand and Canada.32 Panelists are selected from a roster as it is described
in Article 8 DSU.
4. To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an
indicative list of governmental and non-governmental individuals
possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from which panelists
may be drawn as appropriate. […]. Members may periodically suggest
names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on
the indicative list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of
international trade and of the sectors or subject matter of the covered
agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon approval by
the DSB.
[…]
6. The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to
the dispute. The parties to the dispute shall not oppose nominations except
for compelling reasons.
7. If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of
the establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the DirectorGeneral, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman
of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of
the panel by appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers
most appropriate […] after consulting with the parties to the dispute.
[…]
Paragraph 9 of Article 8 DSU discusses the independence of judges from their respective
governments.33 In particular, panelists serve in their individual capacities and cannot
receive instructions or be in any way influenced by their governments. Moreover, ex
parte communications are not allowed, and as such both parties must be present in all
communications with the Panel. Here, however we should note again the reputational
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value of serving as a panelist and the desire to be re-appointed. As such, the temporary
nature of the appointment as well as the popularity of certain panelists contributes to
compromised independence as well as the transparency of the process. The expenses of
panelists, according to paragraph 11 are covered from the WTO budget.
Similar provisions apply to the Appellate Body. Since it is a standing body, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding provides that “[t]he Appellate Body membership shall be
broadly representative of membership in the WTO.” The Appellate Body has its own
administrative infrastructure, the Appellate Body Secretariat. Former members of the
Appellate Body have oftentimes been very vocal in describing the process and culture of
decision-making. As a result, we know much about the process on appeal, although the
information relies solely on personal accounts from former members. 34 Moreover,
Appellate Body members have been vocal towards the political WTO organs and the
need for more explicit and robust decisions.35 It appears that since the WTO decisionmaking process is very intricate, the Appellate Body experiences some pressure to cover
voids in the Agreements.36 This has been hailed as forward looking, and the Appellate
Body is seen as transitioning “from legalistic reasoning to public reason and deliberative

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021 (2002), Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate
Body 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 469 (2003.
35
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 469 (2003) “At
least among lawyers there should be no doubt that one of these legal channels has to be used by WTO
Members if they want to guide the Appellate Body in its future attitude towards the amicus curiae issue or
any other contested problem of interpretation” confirming what Ginsburg says (infra) Tom Ginsburg,
Political Constraints on International Courts in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 483-502 at 492 (C. Romano ed. 2013).
“I’m afraid that the results achieved during the Uruguay Round with respect to dispute settlement can only
be sustained in the long run, if political decision-making becomes easier and a true complement to judicial
decision-making”
36
Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 483-502 at 492 (C. Romano ed. 2013) “Multiple parties typically do not
build easy amendment procedures in to the treaty design and the more parties involved the more difficult
any amendments will be to conclude. The WTO treaty is amended as a package in multinational
negotiations that last years. The transaction costs are intentionally high; in order to make commitments
effective, they must be difficult to escape. This makes the potential scope of law making capacity greater in
multilateral settings and is a source of concern about the courts becoming runaway lawmakers. […] the
bundling of international courts with broader regimes insulates the tribunals from certain forms of
pressure.”

240

reasoning, from retrospective compliance with the law to a prospective modeling of
consequences.”37
Additionally, with respect to transparency, according to Article 14 of the DSU, much of
the formal and informal part of the dispute settlement process is confidential, such as the
submissions of the parties, the first draft of the Panel Report, and the consultations
leading to the circulation of the Report. The first oral hearing is usually taped.38 The
submissions of the parties are published in the “descriptive part” 39 of the report, and
parties are free to disclose their own submissions to the public at any time.40 Several
members publish their submissions in their websites.41 Once circulated to the WTO
member states, the report is immediately made public and uploaded at the WTO website.
In this sense, the procedure is quite transparent. As we noted previously, some of the
meetings of the Panels can be publicly viewed in the WTO building if the parties agree to
do so. Overall, the process is not different from many tribunals, and it could be improved.

D.

Selection of experts for the Dispute Settlement Process

Lastly, the selection of experts is based on the right of the Panel to seek information
according to Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Many agreements have
similar provisions and discuss the advisory role of experts with professional experience.
As with Panelists, citizens of parties cannot participate as experts unless parties consent
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to it. To date only individuals have been invited as experts, instead of expert review
groups although the Dispute Settlement Understanding allows both.42 The Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement43 and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement44
establish permanent groups of experts in order to assist and consult the Panels and
Appellate Body or provide the relevant committee with advisory opinions.
The choice of expertise in the WTO carries important consequences. Many of the issues
discussed are highly technical and expertise is necessary especially for the Panels but also
for the Appellate Body in order to deliberate. The reliance upon the Secretariat and
experts, both of which lack democratic legitimacy shifts our examination in this chapter
towards the choice of these “expert” groups. First of all, expertise alone is not a
legitimizing factor. 45 In numerous disciplines exist multiple discourses and different
results. The lack of transparency in choice of the experts together with the obscurity
during the hiring process of WTO secretariat employees needs to somehow be countered.
A very important way is the introduction of alternative views through amicus curiae
briefs as was discussed in the chapter for external transparency. Even though the main
premise of this thesis is a holistic approach on transparency and the idea that each of the
issues related to transparency should be examined separately and the WTO should
perform adequately in all of these areas, this is an exception. In particular, experts can be
invited by the Panels and Appellate Body following any selection process, as long as
alternative view points are introduced by the civil society through briefs. Such a balance
would add to the legitimacy of the process before the Dispute Settlement Body.
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VI.

Legal Transparency

The previous chapters discussed various forms of transparency affecting the WTO, its
member states and civil society at an institutional level. The last chapter will discuss a
different form of transparency, namely the obligation of WTO member states to publish
their trade-related legislation and the rule of law obligations to maintain adequate
recourse mechanisms for traders and consumers in order to resolve issues that may arise
in transnational trade matters, both at the border upon the entry of products, and at the
domestic market context.
The lack of transparency in the legal orders of WTO member states is considered to be a
non-tariff barrier to trade and WTO member states are obligated from the GATT to
refrain from allowing, enabling or imposing such a barrier. Even though this obligation
existed from 1947, it has acquired attention only after the mid-eighties, to become “the
best insurance policy against protectionism.”1 When explored, both the content and the
recipients of benefits from transparency are the same in the WTO context, for all the
types of transparencies, including the legal transparency of Article X. Disclosure of
information, recourse mechanisms, platforms for stakeholders and shareholders to raise
their concerns and voice their opinions is the content of both transparency as a legal
principle in the WTO at the institutional level and the GATT for member states. The
beneficiaries of transparency are other states, their citizens, the citizens of the host state,
consumers and traders at large. Similarly, the different forms of WTO transparencies
explored in the previous chapters have in one way or the other the same recipients.
As such, transparency within the WTO’s institutional culture and administration needs to
be examined together with legal transparency, since attitudinal changes with respect to
openness tend to cross-fertilize the different forms of transparency. This holistic approach
to transparency has prompted the inclusion of this chapter, and in particular, the elaborate
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analysis on the different aspects of legal transparency, the monitoring mechanisms, which
are in place to maintain updated information on trade legislation of WTO member states
and their trade policies, and finally, the impressively large amount of disputes brought
before the Panels and the Appellate Body, with transparency as a main or a secondary
issue. Essentially, monitoring mechanisms and dispute settlement are the two tiers of the
implementation of the letter and the spirit of Article X of the GATT.
Additionally, legal transparency refers to the knowledge of the rules of trade “on the
ground” at the site of their application, the borders and the markets of WTO member
states. It is in many ways a prerequisite for other forms of transparency, and the first
“contact” point between the importer, the exporter and the consumer with the WTO rules
of trade. Article X does not establish a right of the above actors towards the WTO, but
under certain conditions it creates (or reiterates- if they already exist) rights in the
domestic legal order. It certainly creates a right to challenge tariffs other border measures
before an administrative or adjudicatory mechanism.
Finally, this chapter adds to the discussion on the value of the WTO as a game-changing
organization in international trade by reducing the cost of information and ensuring that it
is made available to all interested parties. This contribution is achieved because of the
focus on transparency. This chapter will examine the law of transparency in the first
section, the monitoring mechanisms in the second and the GATT and WTO case law in
the third. Last, it will discuss the connection between legal transparency and the other
forms, as it is one that needs further explanation.
A.

The law of the transparency obligations

Surprisingly, Article X did not come to the forefront of adjudication and general attention
until the nineties. On one hand, On the other hand, transparency as a legal rule has
received significant attention. In particular, it will examine the history and evolution of
transparency as a legal rule, its position in the accession process and the trade policy
review mechanism and most importantly, its interpretation by the Dispute Settlement
Body. In the WTO Agreements there are several provisions that impose transparency
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obligations on WTO Member States. Member States are required to publish information
with respect to legislation on any trade related issues that are regulated by the WTO
Agreements that they are parties to and notify other members with respect to any changes
in such legislation (publication and notification requirement). Additionally, WTO
Members are required to establish enquiry points to provide information. Finally, several
committees and mechanisms are put forward, including the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, in order to produce reports with respect to trade policies of Member States
(trade policy review process). 2 A list of articles related to transparency will be mapped
here.
In general, lack of transparency is viewed as a Non-Tariff Barrier to international trade.3
Transparency provisions in the WTO have been viewed in a positive manner. As
Bhagwati has stated:
The mere exposure of a country’s policies in a coherent and impartial
fashion can bring moral pressure to bear for change in the desired
direction. I call it the Dracula Effect: expose evil to sunlight and it begins
to shrivel and then die. 4
The incorporation of transparency obligations and other provisions in the WTO
Agreements first stresses the significance of openness and information sharing with
respect to tariffs and trade regulation in the conduct of international trade. Second, it
promotes a culture of peer-to-peer knowledge communication on measures affecting
trade, and it creates a noteworthy platform of continuous cooperation for the smoother
and more legitimate conduct of trade. Presumably transparency provisions will help draw
at least some political support from civil society towards the WTO and from national
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constituencies towards their governments. Thirdly, transparency potentially facilitates the
settlement of disputes between countries outside the Dispute Settlement Body, which is
also encouraged by the organization.5 Finally, it provides access to valuable information
to investors, traders, individuals and corporate entities, thereby facilitating their
participation in trade.
Article X, the main provision of transparency in the GATT, was included during the
negotiations for the International Trade Organization (ITO) after 1944, and was
incorporated in the GATT. 6 According to the ITO negotiation history, Article X was
loosely formed in accordance to Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International Convention
Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities7. It was included as Article 15 of the
US’ Department of Trade Suggested Charter for the ITO of the UN8 and then became
Article 38 of the Havana Charter. Finally, it was integrated into the GATT, as Article X.
Article X, entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”, in its first
paragraph requires WTO Member States to publish any laws, regulations, judicial
decisions, administrative rulings of general application and international agreements
which are related to trade. Such publication should occur promptly and in a manner that
enables governments and traders to become familiar with them. Confidential information
and information whose publication would either be detrimental to the public interest or to
the interests of enterprises are not required to be published.
Paragraph 2 adds a temporal character to the obligation of Paragraph 1; in particular, it
provides that measures with respect to trade can be enforced only after they are
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published, reflecting the legal maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no
crime, no penalty without a law that precedes the act).
Paragraph 3 (a) requires the administration of laws in a “uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner.” Paragraph 3 (b) outlines the obligation of WTO member states to
maintain judicial review mechanisms and procedures, which should be prompt and
independent, thus guaranteeing impartiality and minimum Rule of Law safeguards. The
last part (c) of paragraph 3 discusses the existence of agencies that are not formally or
fully independent at the date of entry into force of the GATT.
There are equivalents of Article X, with some differentiation depending on subject
matter, in many other WTO Agreements. Here we will examine briefly some of the most
important articles within the WTO Agreements. 9
Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains a provision
on transparency, again imposing obligations for publication of legislation and notification
of changes in laws that affect trade in services and prompt response to requests by other
members on any of the regulations affecting trade in services. 10
In the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Part
V, under the title “Dispute Prevention and Settlement”, contains Article 63 on
Transparency, effectively extending the obligations of publication, notification and
establishment of review mechanisms to the subject matter of this Agreement.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) contain provisions
that address issues relevant to anti-dumping investigations. In particular, they describe
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the kinds of information that need to be included in an application for an investigation
and how authorities will respond to requests for information. For example, Article 6.4
provides that authorities will provide “timely opportunities for all interested parties” to
have access to all information relevant to their claims. Article 6.9 requires authorities to
inform all interested parties of all the essential facts under consideration before reaching
a final decision. Article 12 outlines the content required in public notices of the initiation
of an investigation and the explanation of the determinations on the anti-dumping
investigation. Finally, Article 13, under the title “Judicial Review”, provides for the
establishment of tribunals or procedures for the “prompt review of administrative actions
relating to final determination.” Such tribunals must be independent of the authority that
made the original decision.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in Article 11 regulates the
initiation and conduct of an investigation on existence, degree and effect of subsidies.
Article 12 discusses information on evidence, and finally Articles 22 and 23 set out
detailed requirements for public notice and judicial review.
Article 1.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement provides that all licensing procedures will
be administered in a “fair and equitable manner.” Article 1.4 provides for publication of
rules that enables “governments and traders to become acquainted with them.” Paragraph
5 of the same article discusses application forms and procedures.
The first paragraph of Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards also contains publication
requirements during the investigation phase by national authorities. The second
paragraph describes the appropriate treatment of confidential information during the
investigation. Also, Article 12 provides for notification obligations to Committee on
Safeguards. The Agreement on Safeguards explicitly refers in Article 3 to Article X of
the GATT. Similarly, Article 2(g) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin and Article 12 of
the Valuation Agreement make reference to Article X.
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Finally, the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement also contains provisions
to ensure transparency in laws, regulations, procedures and practices with respect to
government procurement, in Article V which provides for the establishment of
information centers, Article VII paragraph 2, on not providing information in a manner
that would have an effect of precluding competition, Article VIII on the qualification
procedures for suppliers, Articles IX to XVII describing various procedural aspects
during the tendering process, with Article XVII explicitly focusing on transparency. 11
In addition to the above articles, several other decisions and Councils are related to
transparency, publication, notification, judicial review and exchange of information. The
most important one is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which will be examined in
detail later. It is based on the Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance where the GATT contracting parties agreed in 1979 to
establish a periodic trade review process of laws and practices of parties to the GATT
that affect trade. Besides the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, other bodies and
procedures in the WTO that perform functions related to transparency are, inter alia, the
Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures (established in 1995 by the
Council for Trade in Goods, it focuses on import licensing procedures), the Council for
Trade in Services, the Committee on Trade and Development (established in 1965), the
Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions, the Committee on Safeguards and the
Textiles Monitoring Body.
Ensuring compliance with Article X comes at a high cost for many countries. Some of the
WTO members already have, and possible have had for quite some time mechanisms in
place to publish their trade laws, inquiry points and administrative and adjudicatory
processes. For others, the cost of Article X has been proven to be high.
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Agreements placed an undue burden to many WTO member states and in particular
developing and least developed countries whose resources are more limited. Not only did
many states have to change their legislation in order to conform with technical aspects of
the new Agreements, they also had to ensure there is appropriate information and
recourse processes for traders. The value of Article X is great, but there needed to be
additional consideration for a phase-in process. Some technical assistance was provided
but only to least developed and some developing countries.13 It would have been optimal
if similar support was provided for middle income countries as well as any country whose
domestic legal system had to undergo a serious adaptation in order to comply with the
abundance of transparency rules.
B.

Transparency monitoring bodies

Trade monitoring and surveillance began in the late 1970’s and the 1980’s.14 It is yet
another very important mechanism fostering the culture of transparency in the WTO is
monitoring of countries’ trade policies and practices. Trade monitoring first occurs on an
ad hoc daily basis at various WTO committees. Second, the member states have
established two permanent monitoring bodies, one general and one specific, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB).
The various councils and the committees in the WTO act as ad hoc monitoring
mechanisms, since, among other things, they are responsible for observing members’
activities related to the GATT and other agreements.15 The three specialized councils
working under the General Council are: the Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for
Trade in Services; and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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Rights. The specialized committees issue reports and updates on countries’ notifications
and compliance with WTO obligations. They then report to the General Council or the
three specialized councils, which further report to the General Council. They also issue
annual reports to the General Council. The WTO Secretariat assists this process since
monitoring developments in trade is one of its duties. Some of the notification,
information-sharing and monitoring procedures at the committees’ level are directly
linked to transparency,16 especially when the documents produced are de-classified and
published. But even prior to publication, the internal information monitoring and sharing
promotes a culture of transparency within the organization.17
Organized trade monitoring happens at the TPRM. The TPRM conducts periodic reviews
of the trade policies and practices of all WTO members. In effect the TPRM embodies a
consolidated effort towards the systematic implementation of all the different provisions
in various WTO agreements which provide for the obligation of member states to publish
their legislation and inform the organization on any changes in their trade policies or the
adoption of new ones.18
The TPRM was established during the Uruguay Round negotiations and was included in
the Marrakesh Agreement of 1995 as Annex 3. It is therefore part of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO.19 OECD and IMF review practices likely influenced its creation.20
The TPRM was officially established in April 198921. Originally the TPRM focused on
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trade in goods, but after the birth of the WTO it extended its works in the areas of
services and intellectual property.
Trade Policy Reviews consist of two reports, one by the member state undergoing review
and one by the WTO Secretariat, and it includes the minutes of meeting of the Trade
Policy Review Body and the concluding remarks of its Chairperson. There reviews are
then published in the WTO website. To date, the Trade Policy Review Body has
conducted 291 Trade Reviews. 22 The periodicity of the reviews depends on each
member’s share of world trade. Thus, the United States, the European Communities,
China, Canada and Japan are reviewed bi-annually.23 The next sixteen largest trading
members are reviewed every four years and the rest every six years.24 Review of LeastDeveloped countries can occur less frequently.25 The General Council of the WTO,
acting as the Trade Policy Review Body26, meets on a monthly basis and under its Rules
of Procedure appoints a Chairman, who has to be different than the Chairman of the
General Council or the Dispute Settlement Body.27
The TPRM focuses on national trade policy openness as part of the overall agenda of
supporting the effectiveness of the world trading system and achieving coherence in
global policy making28. The TPRM is a mechanism that is directed to the benefit of both
individuals and companies involved in trade, and it has as its objective to inform them as
much as possible on all different aspects and conditions of trade. 29 According to Part B
of Annex 3, entitled “Domestic Transparency”
Members recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of
government decision-making on trade policy matters for both Members'
economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree to encourage and
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promote greater transparency within their own systems, acknowledging
that the implementation of domestic transparency must be on a voluntary
basis and take account of each Member's legal and political systems.30
The TPRM is not to be used as a corrective mechanism and is not established to assist
with actionable violations of WTO law.31 This means that the TPRM is not to be used as
an information platform for launching disputes among member states.32 Rather, the focus
of the TPRM on transparency and the empowerment of private market actors through
information. Additionally, the TPRM is to a very large extent complimentary to the
concrete obligations of Article X. As the GATT was reaching its fourth decade of
existence, the spirit of Article X was supported by the TPRM as a new institutional form
that does not have as a primary goal to enforce, but to inform all actors in international
trade rather than just the members to the Agreements. Thus, the WTO focuses on
transparency and the systematic review of trade policies as part of providing trade-related
information not only to governments but also to private parties.
It is interesting to take a look at an example of the Trade Policy Review of a country.
China is an interesting case, since it is a recent WTO member, has requested developing
country status and its economy is very substantial for the global economy.33 For that
reason, China is reviewed every four years and here we will look at the last four reports.
In the 2006 the TPRM acknowledged that the Chinese government has taken significant
steps to improve transparency. Standardization of the behavior of administrative
departments, public participation at various phases of the legislative process,
establishment of enquiry points and websites are some of the measures mentioned in the
Trade Policy Report. Two years later the TPRM revisited Chinese legislation and found
that it had taken further steps to improve transparency. “Nonetheless,” the TPRM notes
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“some aspects of China's trade policy regime remain complex and opaque.” The Chinese
government has focused on publication of laws and the prevention and reduction of
corruption but is still not publishing the economic evaluation of policies and measures,
including tax and non-tax incentives, “to the detriment of public accountability, and thus
governance.” In 2010 China had not improved significantly in terms of transparency. The
Report of the TPRM mentions that China ranked 38th among 48 countries in the 2009
Opacity Index. Complexity and opacity are seen as leading to corruption. The Report also
mentions the Corruption Perceptions Index, where China ranked 72nd, with a score of 3.6
out of 10 in 2008. Finally, in 2012, the TPRM focused again extensively on transparency
and noted the same deficits in publication of laws and information disclosure. The TPRM
noted that there is still room for discretion and thus for corruption. The Report cites the
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index again, in which in 2011 China
ranked 75th, with a score 3.6 out of 10, almost identical to its ranking in 2009. Then the
report looks at information dissemination, still noting the lack of publication for tax and
non-tax incentives. It also explores consultations with the private sector, including notice
and comment procedures.34
A continuous scrutiny on the issue of transparency is obvious from these Reports. Even
though the TPRM has little to no enforcement power, still, the exposure of inadequacies
in the reform of the Chinese legal system according to WTO obligations is noteworthy.
The lack of transparency in China has become both pervasive and costly.35 There is
intense criticism for China’s judicial process and lack of transparency36, which further
causes a number of credibility problems for the country.37 The WTO has helped to shed
light to the country’s previously corrupt practices. Prior to the accession of China to the
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WTO such a thorough inspection process, which most importantly occurs with the
participation of China, was nonexistent.
The second permanent monitoring body is the Textiles Monitoring Body or TMB
established by article 8 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.38 The Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, singed in 1995, established a 10-year transitional program in order
to eliminate previous quotas in textiles and integrate the sector into GATT rules. Thus,
the Textiles Agreement is a transitional instrument. According to the Agreement, the
TMB supervises the implementation of the Agreement and ensures that the rules are
faithfully followed. It is a quasi-judicial, standing body39 with unique characteristics in
the organization. It consists of a Chairman and ten members, appointed by WTO Member
governments and rotating at “appropriate intervals”40. The TMB issues annual reports to
the Council for Trade in Goods.41
Another new mechanism is the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, which in
theory aspires to mitigate he negative consequences from RTAs and PTAs to global trade
and the WTO Agreements.42 Finally, Mavroidis and Wolfe discuss the “specific trade
concerns” procedure, as
“the most elaborate monitoring and surveillance mechanism[…] not
mentioned in the text of any WTO agreement, although many agreements
encourage a process where members may engage in ad hoc
“consultations””43
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In its most elaborate form the specific trade concerns procedure has consolidated in the
SPS and TPT Committees.44
C.

Case law (GATT/WTO)
1.

GATT

This part will provide an overview of the key Panel reports in the GATT era. As the
analysis progresses through time, we can see how the reports become more prolific and
examine the issue. However, it is not until the establishment of the WTO that
transparency moves to the forefront of disputes and is examined in depth.
The examination of transparency started with the case of EEC-Apples from Chile in
198045 where transparency is only mentioned briefly. The Panel examined the EEC
suspensions applied to imports from Chile compared to voluntary restraint agreements
negotiated with the other southern hemisphere suppliers, Argentina, Australia, New
Zealand and South Africa. The EEC tried to negotiate similar voluntary restraints with
Chile, but without success, and proceeded to adopt quantitative restrictions on Chilean
apples. The suspensions were found to differ from the voluntary restraints because the
Panel, inter alia found differences in transparency between the two types of action.
The next report examining transparency was EEC- Wheat Flour in 1983, which was not
adopted. 46 The Panel, examining calculation of wheat prices observed that “certain
problems might be reduced by improved transparency and possibly other forms of
multilateral co-operation in either the International Wheat Council or the GATT.” 47
Further, in Annex B, it moved to make a more substantive statement when it observed
that “there are a number of problems in establishing price levels on the international
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wheat flour market since there is no recognized world price” and “there is lack of
transparency in international wheat flour sales generally.”48
In 1984, the Panel issued a report on Japan- Leather II (US)49, a case concerning import
restrictions by Japan on leather. The United States asked that the Japanese government, in
addition to the elimination of the quota, eliminate the “administrative obstacles
intertwined with the quota” since Japan’s administration of quota was inconsistent with
the reasonableness requirement of Article X:3. Moreover, according to the United States,
Japan failed to publish information with respect to the regulation of quotas, thus violating
Article X:1.50 The Panel noted that it was not necessary for it to make findings on the
matter of Article X. 51
The Panel examined Article X again in 1987, in Japan-Agricultural Products I. The case,
concerning import restrictions through an import monopoly, discussed more extensively
than in the two previous cases the obligation under article X. According to the
complainant, the United States, the operation of the Miscellaneous Import Quota was
non-transparent, and Japan failed to publish a complete list of the quota amounts to be
allocated to individual items within the MIQ. Japan maintained it was complying with
Article X.52 The Panel for the first time elaborated on the Japanese practices and the
requirement for transparency in administration of quotas. In particular, the Panel noted
that:
As regards the method used to enforce these measures the Panel found that
the practice of "administrative guidance" played an important role.
Considering that this practice is a traditional tool of Japanese Government
policy based on consensus and peer pressure, the Panel decided to base its
judgments on the effectiveness of the measures in spite of the initial lack
of transparency. In view of the special characteristics of Japanese society
the Panel wishes, however, to stress that its approach in this particular case
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should not be interpreted as a precedent in other cases where societies are
not adapted to this form of enforcing government policies.53
The same year in US- Customs User Fee 54 New Zealand claimed that an ad valorem tax
imposed by the US may be “particularly non-transparent.” A year later, CanadaAlcoholic Drinks very briefly mention the notion of transparency in combination with
Article II of the GATT. 55
In Japan-Semiconductors (1988)56, the Panel examined Article XI and concluded that any
measures, regardless of their legal status in the domestic legal order violate Article XI if
they restrict imports. Thus, the measures imposed by Japan restricting the export of
certain semi-conductors at a price below the cost were considered to be restrictive
regardless of their non-mandatory nature. 57 With respect to transparency, the EEC
claimed that the measures applied to export of semiconductors to third countries and the
measures to improve access to the Japanese market lacked transparency, and thus
violated Article X. 58 The Panel felt it was not required to decide on the violation of
Article X and was further unable to identify any measure required to be published under
Article X.59
The Panels were requested to examine transparency in a series of cases in the next few
years, but refused to explore the matter extensively. The panels this first decade of
jurisprudence on transparency are sometimes engaging with the issue and sometimes not.
Some examples follow. In Canada-Alcoholic Drinks II (1991) 60, the Panel:
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“considered it important that, if fiscal elements were to be considered as
internal taxes, mark-ups would also have to be administered in conformity
with other provisions of the General Agreement, in particular Article X
dealing with the Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”.61
In EEC- Dessert Apples (Chile) (1989) the Panel said that
“the EEC had observed the requirement of Article X:1 to publish the
measures under examination ‘promptly in such a manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them’ through their
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It noted
that no time limit or delay between publication and entry into force was
specified by this provision.”62
It repeated the same reasoning in EEC- Dessert Apples (US) (1989) 63 where the United
States claimed that The European Communities violated the obligations of Article X
paragraph 1 because it did not give adequate public notice of the import quotas on
apples.64 The Panel, further said that Article X paragraph 2 prohibits backdated quotas
and concluded the European Communities had acted inconsistently with Article X
paragraph 2 since it gave public notice of the quotas only about two months after the
quota period had begun.
In Korea-Beef cases 65 (United States, Australia, New Zealand) the Panel examined
transparency as a subsidiary claim. According to the complainants, Korea had not met its
obligations under Article X by not providing proper public notice of the import restrictions.
The Panel found that:
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“[Australia/New Zealand/the United States] had, as a subsidiary matter,
claimed that Korea had not met its obligations under Articles X and XIII by
not providing proper public notice of the import restrictions. It also noted
that Korea had stated that the withdrawal of the measures imposed in
1984/85 and the import levels in 1988 had been widely publicized. In view
of the Panel’s determinations as concerned the consistency of the Korean
measures with Articles II and XI, the Panel did not find it necessary to
address these subsidiary issues. The Panel noted, however, the requirement
in Article X:1 that ‘laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting party,
pertaining to ... rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements,
restrictions or prohibitions on imports ..., shall be published promptly in
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted
with them’. It also noted the provision in Article XIII:3(b) that ‘[i]n the
case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting
party applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity
or value of the product or products which will be permitted to be imported
during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or
value’”.66
Other cases under the GATT that touched very briefly upon transparency but did not
consider it, either because no other violation was established or because it was seen as a
secondary issue were: US-Sugar Waiver (1990) 67 ; EEC-Oilseeds I (1990) 68 ; EECRegulation on Imports of Parts and Components (1990) 69; Canada-Grain Corn (1992)70;
US-Malt Beverages (1992)71 ; US-Cement (1992) 72 ; US-Softwood Lumber II (1993) 73;
Korea- Polyacetal Resins (1993) 74 ; EEC-Bananas I (1993) 75 ; US-Salmon (AD)
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(1994)76;US-Salmon (CVD) (1994)77; Brazil-Milk (1994)78; EEC-Bananas II (1994)79; USStainless Steel Plate (1994)80; US-Auto Taxes (1994)81; and, US- Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel (1994). 82 Some of these reports were not adopted.
2.

WTO

After the establishment of the WTO, the Panels and Appellate Body constructed a more
systematic interpretation of Article X. As of 2013, fifty four legal claims were brought
before the WTO Dispute Settlement relating to transparency in article X. 83 Here I will
outline the reports that set the most important aspects of this jurisprudence.
One of the first cases to examine measures of general application of Article X was the
case of US-Underwear84 in 1997 brought before the WTO by Costa Rica against the
United States. It involved a complaint on the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and an
alleged quantitative import restriction by the US under Article 6 of the Agreement. The
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that certain country-specific measures may
constitute “measures of general application” under paragraph 2 of Article X, while a
measure related to a company or a shipment may not. In the case the Appellate Body
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noted that Article X and paragraph 2 more specifically embodies “a principle of
fundamental importance– that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting
Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality”
which can be seen as a reflection of “the principle of transparency” with “due process
dimensions.” The due process value has further been cited in many other WTO reports
dealing with transparency. It concluded that:
“members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by
governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic
information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust
their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures.” 85
The same year, in EC-Bananas III86 and with respect to Article X paragraph 3 (a), the
panel ruled that Article 1.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement and Article X paragraph 3
(a) have “identical coverage.”87 Also it said that the provisions apply to the administrative
procedures for rules only, not the rules themselves.
In 1998, three more disputes involved transparency issues under Article X. First, ECPoultry88, a complaint by Brazil against the European Communities, concerned the tariff
rate quota system in the EC Schedule LXXX and the licensing requirements imposed by
the European Communities with respect to frozen poultry originating from Brazil. Brazil
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argued that the frequency of changes in licensing rules of poultry were not allowing
WTO members to familiarize themselves with the rules as Article 1.4 of the Import
Licensing Agreement provides. The Panel rejected this complaint, noting that
“the transparency requirement under the cited provisions is limited to
publication of rules and other information. While we have sympathy for
Brazil regarding the difficulties caused by the frequent changes to the
rules, we find that changes in rules per se do not constitute a violation of
Articles 1.4, 3.3, 3.5 (b), 3.5 (c) or 3.5 (d).”89
The Appellate Body upheld the ruling that Article X applies only to measures of general
application since Brazil’s claims involved specific transactions such as individual poultry
shipments and thus were outside the scope of Article X.
The second report with respect to transparency that year was Japan-Film90, in which the
Panel examined the publication requirement of Article X paragraph 1. A complaint was
filed by the United States against measures taken by the Japanese government concerning
the distribution, restrictions on sales and promotion of photographic film and paper.
According to the Panel, the publication requirement of Article X paragraph 1 extends to
administrative rulings of “general application” and administrative rulings addressed to
“specific individuals or entities.” The Panel found that Japan had not violated its
obligations under Article X paragraph 1 because the United States failed to demonstrate
that Japan’s administrative rulings belonged to either of the above categories, which
would result in the application of Article X.
The Appellate Body briefly looked at Article X paragraph 3 the same year in the USShrimp case where it noted as follows:
“It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain
minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the
administration of trade regulations which in our view are not met here.
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The non transparent and ex parte nature of internal government procedures
applied by the competent officials in the Office of Marine conservation,
the Department of State and the US National Marine Fisheries Service
throughout the certification processes under Section 609 as well as the fact
that countries whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice
of such denial nor of the reasons for the denial and the fact too that there is
no formal legal procedure for review of or appeal from a denial of an
application are all contrary to the spirit of Article X:3 of the GATT.91
The next case examining transparency was Argentina-Hides and Leather in 2001.92It
focused on Article X paragraph 3 (a), which concerns the administration of trade
regulations.

The case involved an Argentinian regulation on the participation of

representatives of the domestic tanners association in the customs inspection procedures
for leather destined for export. The role of the representatives was to “assist” the customs
authorities in their application of rules on customs classification and export duties.
According to the European Communities, the participation of the representatives, who
had a clear interest in the trade of hides, violated the principles of impartiality and
reasonableness under Article X paragraph 3 (a). This form of transparency can be seen as
assisting traders.93
In the report of US-Stainless Steel94, also adopted in 2001 Korea complained that the
United States acted inconsistently with Article X Paragraph 3 (a) by not following its
own established policy in its antidumping investigation. The Panel rejected this claim of
inconsistency. The panel held that Article X Paragraph 3 (a) is
“not intended to function as a mechanism to test the consistency of a
Member’s particular decisions or rulings with the Member’s own domestic
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law and practice; that is a function reserved for each Member’s domestic
judicial system.”95
It is very interesting that the Panel here clarifies that regulation with respect to
transparency occurs at the level of the member states. With regard to the requirements of
‘uniform administration’ and ‘reasonable administration’ the Panel said that:
“The requirement of uniform administration of laws and regulations must
be understood to mean uniformity of treatment in respect of persons
similarly situated; it cannot be understood to require identical results
where relevant facts differ. Nor do we consider that the requirement of
reasonable administration of laws and regulations is violated merely
because in the administration of those laws and regulations, different
conclusions were reached based upon differences in relevant facts.”96
The Panel looked at the “real effect” that these administrative measures might have on
traders. The focus of the Panel on traders is very important since it looks at the protection
of interests of private actors in the WTO context. 97The harmed party would not need to
establish the existence of damage; it would only need to show potential impact on
competitiveness due to partiality on behalf of the administrative body. The Panel here
established that for the third paragraph of Article X to be applicable, it is not necessary to
establish that a member discriminates between other members in the administration of its
trade regulation. This means that Article X paragraph 3 can be examined regardless of
any claims on discriminatory treatment. In particular, the Panel ruled that “the focus is on
the treatment accorded by government authorities to the traders in question.” It also found
that under paragraph 3 (a) members can challenge the substance of an administrative
regulation.
The Panel did not find a violation of the “uniform administration” obligation but did find
a violation of the “reasonable administration” requirement in Article X paragraph 3 (a).
With respect to partiality, the Panel found that “there is an inherent danger that the
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Customs laws, regulations and rules will be applied in a partial manner so as to permit
persons with adverse commercial interests to obtain confidential information to which
they have no right”98. Should adequate safeguards had been in place, this could have
remedied the situation, but the Panel did not find that such measures were in place. Thus,
Argentina acted inconsistently with Article X, paragraph 3 (a).
In 2001 the Panel decided another case involving Article X, US-Hot-Rolled Steel99. The
case brought by Japan against the United States involved antidumping duties imposed by
the US on hot-rolled steel products originating from Japan. The Appellate Body later did
not review the Article X claims. The Panel examined the notion of “general application”
of Article X paragraph 1 and found that, even though a single instance of a member
state’s actions might be “evidence of lack of uniform, impartial and reasonable
administration” of its legislation, a significant impact on the overall administration of the
law is required. 100
In 2003, Japan filled a complaint against the United States again, this time for a measure
of sunset review of antidumping duties on corrosion resistant carbon steel flat products
originating from Japan. In US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review 101 the Panel
examined Japan’s complaint under Article X paragraph 3(a). Japan claimed that the selfinitiation of sunset review laws was not uniform. The Panel said that the claims from
Japan did not fall under the administration of laws and regulations and thus were not
within the scope of Article X paragraph 3(a). The Panel said that:
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“[W]e find that this aspect of US law cannot be challenged under Article
X:3(a_ of GATT 1994 because it relates to the substance rather than the
administration of US law”102
In 2004 the Appellate Body in US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews 103
addressed the issue of bringing an Article X case before the Dispute Settlement Body.
“We observe first that allegations that the conduct of a WTO Member is
biased or unreasonable are serious under any circumstances. Such
allegations should not be lightly or in a subsidiary fashion. A claim under
Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 must be supported by solid evidence;
the nature and the scope of the claim and the evidence adduced by the
complainant in support of it should reflect the gravity of the accusations
inherent in claims under Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994.104
Another very important case on Article X jurisprudence was decided on 2005. Dominican
Republic- Import and Sale of Cigarettes105 was a complaint brought before in the WTO
dispute settlement process by Honduras, regarding charges, fees and other measures by
the Dominican Republic on sale of cigarettes. The Panel examined both the publication
requirement of Paragraph 1 and the administration of trade regulations of paragraph 3 (a)
of Article X. First it looked whether the surveys needed to make the tax determination for
cigarettes were “administrative rulings of general application.” These surveys had not
been published, and they would provide the basis for administrative determination on
taxes on cigarettes. Thus, the Dominican Republic was found in violation of Article X
paragraph 1.
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With respect to Article X, paragraph 3 (a) the Panel found that the Dominican Republic
had applied the provisions under examination in an unreasonable manner. Specifically,
the Panel said:
“The fact that the Dominican Republic authorities did not support its
decisions regarding the determination of the tax base for imported
cigarettes by resorting to the rules in force at the time and that they
decided to disregard retail selling prices of imported cigarettes is not ‘in
accordance with reason’, ‘having sound judgment’, ‘sensible’, ‘within the
limits of reason’ nor ‘articulate’.”106
The next case on Article X was EC-Selected Customs Matters, a case dealing exclusively
with article X.107 The United States challenged European Community’s administration of
several laws and regulations on the valuation and classification of products for customs
purposes because the procedures for review were different from one EU Member State to
another. The Panel here examined Paragraph 3 (a), administration of trade regulations,
and (b) obligation of prompt review and correction of the violation by an adjudicative
body. The Panel said that the requirements of Article X Paragraph 3 (a) do not apply to
laws, regulations and rulings but rather to their administration, reaffirming the ruling in
Argentina-Hides and Leather in the sense that a separate examination of these rules
would establish whether there is a violation of the Most Favored Nation treatment or the
National Treatment rules of Articles I and III of the GATT.
However, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that “without exception”,
Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 always relates to the application of laws and
regulations but not to laws and regulations as such.” It upheld the Panel’s conclusion that
“substantive differences in penalty laws and audit procedures among the member States
of the European Communities alone do not constitute a violation of Article X:3 (a) of the
GATT 1994.”108
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With respect to Article X Paragraph 3 (b) the United States claimed that it was not
possible to get a review of a customs decision unless the importer had exhausted local
(national) remedies. The Panel said that it is not reasonable that first instance national
review tribunals, with limited jurisdiction, bind with their decisions all agencies within an
EU Member. 109 So, the requirement to exhaust local review possibilities is reasonable.
One of the most recent cases examining Article X is EC-IT Products. 110

The

complainants were the US, Japan and Taiwan against measures of the European
Communities on tariff classification and treatment of information technology products.
The Panel found that the European Communities had violated both paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article X. In particular, the Panel in examining the EC measures said that:
"Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings" can
encompass more than those instruments formally characterized as such by
a WTO Member. Otherwise, WTO Members themselves could determine
which provisions would be subject to WTO obligations under Article X:1
of the GATT 1994 merely by the labelling of those instruments.”111
This is a rather expansive interpretation on what could fall under Article X Paragraph 1.
Examining the notion of “made effective” the Panel adopted a rather expansive
interpretation:
“In our view, "made effective" also covers measures brought into effect in
practice. In other words, it may include measures that have not yet been
formally adopted in accordance with municipal law.” 112
Another recent case is Thailand- Cigarettes.113 Philippines filed a complaint against
Thailand on a number of measures affecting cigarettes from Philippines. The Philippines
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challenged the system under which Thai government officials served on the board of a
state-owned domestic cigarette manufacturer. According to the Philippines, Thailand
administered the measures under examination in a partial and unreasonable manner and
there were delays in the administrative review process. Thus Thailand acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Article X Paragraph 3 (a). Additionally the
Philippines claims that Thailand’s ad valorem tax, health tax, and TV tax are inconsistent
with Article X paragraph 1 because violates the publication requirement. Finally, the
Philippines claimed that Thailand did not maintain an independent review process with
respect to customs, and thus is in violation of Article X Paragraph 3 (b).
The Panel did not find that Thailand was in violation of the impartiality and
reasonableness requirement, however it found that there were delays in the review
process and thus Thailand violated its obligations under Article X paragraph 3 (a). It
found that Thailand violated Article X paragraph 1 because it did not publish laws that
determine the VAT for cigarettes and the release of a guarantee in the customs valuation
process. With respect to the Excice, Health and TV taxes, the Panel said that the claim
was improperly brought under Article X paragraph 1. Finally with respect to the
Paragraph 3 (b) claim the Panel found that Thailand had acted inconsistently since it did
not maintain an independent review process. The Panel also agreed with the Philippines
that Thailand violated Article X:1 by failing to publish laws and regulations pertaining to
the determination of a VAT for cigarettes and the release of a guarantee imposed in the
customs valuation process.
Thailand appealed the case with respect to Article X:3 (b) and the Appellate Body upheld
the Panel's finding that Thailand acts inconsistently with Article X:3(b) of the GATT
1994 by failing to maintain or institute independent tribunals or procedures for the
prompt review of customs guarantee decisions.
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In the case of China-Raw Materials114, the United States, Mexico and the European
Communities claimed that China's restraints on the export from China of raw materials
such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal,
yellow phosphorus and zinc violated among other provisions, Article X in general and
paragraphs 1 and 3 more specifically. The Panel after a very extensive analysis found
that China acted inconsistently with Articles X paragraphs 1 and 3(a) as well as
paragraphs 1.2, 5.1 and 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol and Paragraphs 83 and 84 of
China's Working Party Report.
Article X was mainly examined in the Panel report in the case of US-COOL. In this case
Canada complained that the United States were violating their Article X paragraph 3
obligations by implementing the 1946 Agricultural Marketing Act as amended by the
2008 Farm Bill.

The Act imposed mandatory country of origin labelling (COOL)

including the obligation to inform consumers on the country of origin of commodities
such as beef and pork. In order for products to be considered of US origin the animal had
to be born, raised and slaughtered in the United States. Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack
wrote in 2009 a letter urging industry representatives to voluntarily adopt suggested
labeling changes in order to provide more useful information to consumers. The Panel
after examining Vilsack’s “suggestions for voluntary action” ruled that it constitutes
unreasonable administration of the COOL measure in violation of Article X paragraph
3(a) of the GATT.
Finally, in the case of China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten and Molybdenum, the United States, Japan and the European Union have
requested consultations with China involving the Chinese Customs Commodity Codes
and other published and unpublished measures, which impose export restrictions on rare
earths. Among other provisions, the US, Japan and the EU claim that such measures are
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inconsistent with Article X of the GATT. The Panel did not examine Article X in detail,
even though it briefly looked at Chinese obligations to publish certain related legislation.
3.

Other agreements

Currently there is no jurisprudence on Article III of the GATS, Article 63 of the TRIPS
and Articles V, VII, and IX to XVII of the Government Procurement Agreement. With
respect to the Antidumping Agreement, the cases on Articles 5, 6 and 12 are Guatemala
Cement I and II, Mexico-Corn Syrup, Thailand H-Beams, US-Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), Argentina-Poultry Antidumping Duties, US-Lumber 5, US-DRAMS,
Argentina Ceramic Tiles, Egypt- Steel Rebar, US- Hot-Rolled Steel, US- Corrosion
Resistant Steel Reviews, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, US Stainless
Steel (Mexico). There is no jurisprudence on Article 13. On the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, the cases on Articles 11, 12 and 22 are US-Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), China-GOES, US Carbon Steel, US-Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties (China). With respect to the Import Licensing Agreement, there are two cases on
articles 1.3, 1.4 and 5, EC-Poultry and Turkey –Rice. Finally, on the Agreement on
Safeguards, Article 3, the cases in the Dispute Settlement Body are US-Lamb, US-Line
Pipe, Chile-Price Band System, Argentina-Preserved Peaches, US-Steel Safeguards and
Dominican Republic-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Polypropylene Bags and
Tubular Fabric.115

D.

The link between legal transparency with the other three forms

Legal transparency establishes the core contact point between the trader and the
government of the importing or exporting country. It involves tariffs and other trade
regulations directly, so at first, it is not clear how it relates to the other three forms of
transparency, and whether there is any mutual effect at all. Besides the argument that was
made earlier that all four are linked through their relationship to different composite
democracy facets, there is one more layer of connections.
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External transparency, mostly the amicus curiae briefs but also its other aspects give
consumers, business associations, trade unions and others who are affected by the
outcomes of WTO decisions and national trade policies to take their case directly before
the Panels and the Appellate Body. Without Article X and information dissemination and
the experience of the application of national trade rules (including administrative and
judicial recourse mechanisms), external transparency would be less effective. External
transparency, if it becomes procedurally specific and institutionalized, it can add an
additional layer of review beyond the national legal systems. The amicus form moreover
works very well within the intergovernmental organization paradigm: it does not create a
right to file a case and pursue essentially a course tantamount to that of the European
Court of Human Rights. Instead, when a case has been filed by one member state against
another, if citizens, consumers, interested parties at large feel they have not had the
opportunity to be heard or did not think the national processes gave adequate weight to
their voice, the WTO Panels might. Similarly, NGOs and industry representatives can
participate, in a limited way during Ministerial conferences. In one sense, Article X and
external transparency are not two sides of a coin but two sides of the same dice. As in a
dice each side has a different value, the legal standing of interested parties varies
depending on the type of transparency at hand.
Internal transparency also represents one side of the same dice. Article X allows for
WTO rules to be scrutinized in national debates and within domestic legal systems. The
political outcomes from this process, whether they come in the form of lobbying, dissent,
legal proceedings, or even voting for another government need to be re-directed towards
the international forum. Internal transparency ensures that national governments can
adequately represent the interests of their constituents at the multilateral stage. For
developing countries this has now become a condition for participation in the
international trading regime. Further liberalization does not appeal any more to their
nationals. The WTO rules have been tested over the last twenty years, and the
dissatisfaction at the domestic level has been filtered upwards towards the WTO through
protests and through the national governments. Such critique needs a proper exit voice
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especially at the WTO level, where all these decisions were made in the first place.
Article X provides the formal mechanism for rules to be published and administered, and
therefore tested at the domestic level. Internal and external transparency ensure that the
outcomes of the domestic political debates regarding these rules will be communicated to
all other WTO members and the representatives of each government will fully participate
in reviewing the rules further.
Finally, administrative transparency is mostly the background against which all the other
three operate. It would be a stretch to argue it also represents a side of the dice. It ensures
however that the WTO’s institutional structure functions as well as it can for trade
ministers, diplomats, consumers, NGOs and everyone with internet access to remain
informed and involved in the process.
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VII.

Evaluation

After having examined the four aspects of transparency in the WTO, I would like to offer
an evaluation of the WTO’s performance with respect to transparency. In the first part
this chapter will discuss the outcome of each of the four previous chapters, on internal,
external, administrative and legal transparency and the WTO’s scorecard on benefiting
from the normative and discourse space available to its members and stakeholders.
Second, I will revisit the constitutionalist paradigm and reiterate that democratization and
the flexibility it offers with respect to the expansion of discourse and the meaningful
inclusion of voices from all stakeholders is more appropriate, especially in view of the
many transnational processes that are already in place in global trade governance. The
WTO’s focus on transparency as a principle and a legal rule contributes to the
transnationalization of the organization. This alters, as I will argue, the current content of
state sovereignty. Finally, I will discuss the links between each form of democratic
legitimation and the forms of legitimacy in global governance. As holding global
elections may be a scenario that exists only in the distant future, different forms of
legitimation explored in this thesis can be improved and temporarily fulfill input and
output legitimacy roles. Moreover, there exist process and goal-specific legitimacy types,
such as throughput and mission legitimacy that can also be linked to transparency forms
in the WTO.
The WTO has engaged in a rudimentary attempt to remedy its lack of democratic
legitimacy. However, this attempt is insufficient and there is still a long way to go from
here. For the evolution of hybrid forms of global democracy, the WTO needs to review
its transparency approach in a holistic manner, address some extant issues (such as the
amicus curiae problem) and develop a more coherent mid-term and long-term agenda for
the future. The transnational fragments within the WTO have multiplied to the extent that
the organization and its member states can no longer “hide” behind the intergovernmental
nature of their commitments, especially in view of individuals being the direct
beneficiaries from some of these commitments. Moreover, the structure of the
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organization and the emphasis on transparency can significantly contribute to the
transition of the WTO to a more democratic global governance regime.

A.

The WTO’s transparency profile

Chapters III, IV, V and VI explored the different forms of transparency in the WTO.
Transparency has gained a considerable amount of attention in the last two decades in the
WTO. The organization’s performance oscillates between glimpses of exemplary
openness, as in the case of publication of decisions in the WTO’s website and complete
lack thereof, as evidenced in the problems associated with the Green Room. In some
cases, transparent practices are more meaningful, in others they are positive but not
useful in addressing the extant legitimacy concerns and in some cases, the transparency
actions are inconsistent.
More specifically, the best performance of the WTO with respect to transparency occurs
in the area of external transparency. As we saw, the WTO has been systematically
publishing all the documents, and following a very short declassification timeline. This
practice is not based on custom, but a General Council decision. The Sutherland Report
emphasized this form of transparency, most likely because the drafters of the Report were
aware that this may be the WTO’s strongest legitimacy rating. Indeed, the WTO website
appears to be very user friendly. However several heated issues in the WTO are absent
from the website. Despite the enormous number of documents published, the WTO
website does not allude to the paradoxes in international trade regulation. It remains
entirely unclear how the pursuit of competitiveness and fairness for less developed
countries can be compatible within the same organization. This paradox is exacerbated
considering that most assistance to developing countries occurs at a voluntary basis,
while the rules that promote competitiveness are obligatory.
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Trying to eliminate nontransparent practices of member states and considering
transparency “the best insurance policy against protectionism”1 cannot coincide with
complaints from developing countries on access problems during Green Room talks, the
rejection of amicus curiae briefs without any justification and secrecy in PTA and RTA
negotiations.2 Hailing a fast-paced liberal market paradigm cannot be done in the same
setting as the commitment to assist countries that suffer from extreme poverty conditions
and no context-specific exit strategy. This lack of consistent narrative renders the large
amount of information less meaningful.
The second form of transparency that functions well is legal transparency. The numerous
transparency provisions in the WTO Agreements described in the chapter on Legal
Transparency introduce the largest body of mandatory transparency-related supranational
legislation. However, as the GATT history of Article X indicates, these provisions would
not be as important without the robust case law, starting from the 1980s. The numerous
panel and Appellate Body reports gave transparency its current content. Similarly, the
Appellate Body actively opened up towards external transparency, despite the opposite
desire of the Member States.
Article X was neglected for most of GATT’s history. In comparison the current attention
to Article X is disproportionate to its early years. The evolution of WTO law includes
attention to non-tariff barriers and one of the greatest obstacles for cross-border trade is
the lack of clarity in border processes. This was not as obvious in the early GATT years
when elimination of tariffs mattered the most. Possibly, WTO member states found it
more difficult to violate the tariff elimination rules, but non-tariff barriers to trade, where
lack transparency belongs, are murkier and easier to introduce and sustain, at least for a
while, at a national level. Information is an invaluable element for traders knowing how
to navigate border procedures. Article X also imposes infrastructural costs to smaller
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countries, which are further exacerbated by internal transparency deficits and the inability
to adequately engage at the multilateral level on how to mitigate these costs.
The GATT and the WTO to some extent exist in order to level the playing field as much
as that is possible. It was inevitable for the attention to Article X to rise over the years.
However, WTO members have made numerous efforts to distinguish this obligation from
any other transparency elements, especially ones of administrative and external
transparency. This is inconsistent, if not ironic: if information is important to traders, its
importance not limited to tariff schedules, it extends to the entire WTO system and the
way it functions. WTO members are nowadays very keen on pursuing Article X disputes,
to the point that almost half of the disputes filed before the Dispute Settlement Body are
transparency related, and more specifically, related to Article X. Yet, a common
understanding exists that transparency quests end at a state-to-state level. Holding each
other accountable with respect to trade-related policies is the limit of transparency, as
member states see it. Going beyond that, and being transparent as an organization is a
secondary priority, one of little to no legal validity, limited to the publication of
documents ex post facto.
In the case of external transparency and the participation of NGOs, the non-decisive role
of transparency and participation are even more evident. NGOs have a hybrid observer
status in Ministerial Conferences. It would not be a stretch to say that their contribution
does not extend to any of the negotiations. Their presence became essential not for the
multiplication of voices in international trade discourse but because the Seattle events and
the dissatisfaction of civil society was so strong that the WTO needed to do something in
order for the high-profile Ministerials to stop being opportunities for protests on the
streets. They complemented NGO participation with meetings done with high police
presence, and in some extreme cases, offered life insurance to WTO administrators.3 This
is only a temporary measure, not only because civil society will demand a more
important role in the organization, but also because in the next few decades the
multiplicity of voices in the WTO will become necessary for the organization to
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effectively monitor and regulate international trade – otherwise it will become irrelevant.
Citizen-consumers have always been at the center of cross-border trade as they are the
recipients of trade benefits. For years governments have been hiding behind the
sovereignty veil and it is time that they move the citizen consumer to the center of the
international trading system.
The WTO has a very clear institutional path for the integration of civil society in a
decisive manner. This path, created by the WTO Appellate Body is through amicus
curiae briefs. However, this path is currently not functioning. The progress made in terms
of external transparency is meaningless if NGOs still remain clueless as to what type of
brief, with what content and in which cases could be truly useful to the members of the
Panel and Appellate Body. First, amicus briefs are either simply dismissed, admitted in
order to be dismissed as unnecessary or considered only inasmuch as the arguments they
advance coincide with those of parties’ submissions. This approach negates meaningful
participation of NGOs in the dispute settlement process and thus exacerbates the
participation deficit in the area of external transparency. Second, the laconic responses
published in the reports do not explain the reasons behind the amici rejections, adding to
the lack information with respect to the process. NGOs who wish to submit briefs in
future cases are faced with ambiguous dicta. In future cases, if they coincide with the
members’ submissions, they might be rejected as redundant. If they deviate a lot, they
might be rejected as non-relevant. 4 Either way, they have no guidance on how to
proceed.5
The lack of information on reasons for overlooking amicus briefs points towards a deficit
on two forms of transparency. The organization’s commitment to external transparency is
compromised, on both its informational and participatory aspects. At the same time, the
DSB is part of an international administration. The absence of case-specific justification
for the decision to reject a brief points towards gaps in institutional transparency. If we
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approach the issue of NGO participation as distinct from reasoned decision-making in
international trade administration, then there is no flaw in all the short responses by the
Panels and the Appellate Body: the issue of degree of NGO involvement is unrelated to
the lack of justifications. In fact, only member states have a legal right to request answers
to their questions. NGOs are not parties to the disputes, and they can be dismissed
without further explanation. When treating the two transparencies separately, the WTO
can report progress with respect to external transparency just by allowing the submission
of briefs.
A viable alternative for a participation platform in the WTO dispute settlement can be
found in the likeness test of Articles I and III of the GATT. Reports have cited consumer
tastes and preferences as one of the criteria for the determination of likeness of products.
Consumer organizations could weigh in during this process. The testimony of consumers’
organizations regarding their tastes and preferences would be essential in determining
likeness. An organized process, whereby unsolicited briefs can be submitted in order to
argue on consumer’s views on whether two products are like or not can first, signal to the
consumers that their opinions matter in trade disputes; second, it can assist Panels in the
fact-finding process; third, it can create a small but significant gateway for submissions.
Interested parties would be allowed to indicate their preferences directly to the DSB. The
WTO would then accumulate some experience on amicus briefs and their management
within this narrow legal window. Possibly, member states could end up trusting this
process more than one allowing for blanket submissions. The submission option could be
limited through time and length constraints, and it could be restricted only to include
NGOs registered with the WTO. Considering that the largest number of briefs submitted
to the WTO in a single dispute was 17, and if the permissible length of briefs is 5 or 10
pages, the response tasks for the parties and the dispute settlement panel would not be as
burdensome. This proposal is a positive step towards addressing concerns regarding
legitimacy and stakeholder participation in the WTO since it aspires to demonstrate a
permanent opportunity for consumer association involvement in the Dispute Settlement
Process. By introducing the consumer society as a potential friend of the court, the Panels
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would further rationalize and democratize Article I and III likeness tests, thus paving the
road for possible future participation of additional non-directly-trade related stakeholders
once amicus curiae briefs are consistently introduced and advised.
An even more imminent problem is the position of developing countries. The internal
transparency concerns as we examined them in the chapter on transparency and
development have become critical for the future of the Doha Development Round. This is
the biggest challenge facing the WTO. The lack of a coherent development approach and
the persistence on a neoliberal trade liberalization paradigm, compatible with the
Washington Consensus has stopped being a viable trade rhetoric almost since as early as
1995. Developing countries have stood up to their developed counterparts during the
most recent conferences. Not only this is a recent phenomenon, after years of falling
through the cracks during such meetings, but also developed countries responded with
resort to PTAs and RTAs amongst themselves. Moreover, the solutions we proposed may
mitigate some of the issues but they will be difficult (or better, impossible) to be agreed
on under the current consensus rule.
For acceding countries the internal transparency issues appear more limited. The number
of countries outside the WTO system is very few at this point. The issue is more one of
principle rather than substance: if the WTO wants to maintain a platform of trust for
future negotiations, this culture of trust must be present from the beginning of the
accession process for candidate members. Moreover, many of the candidate members and
the UN countries that have not applied for membership yet are developing and leastdeveloped countries. This renders the relevance of trust much more prevalent. Examples
such as the accession of Vanuatu, which was pressured by the United States as part of its
accession to sign the Aviation Agreement (a plurilateral agreement) even though the
country does not have a civil aviation system, should not occur in the WTO. The United
States had a clear interest to “multilateralize” the Aviation Agreement by pushing
towards the addition of signatory member states, to the point that this agenda became
unreasonable, as the case of Vanuatu indicates. Products entirely absent from a national
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market, either as imports or exports should at least be off the table during accession
negotiations and should not be allowed to produce deadlocks.
The space for improvement in the WTO with respect to transparency and legitimacy is
not only present, but easy to locate, and to regulate. Improving and expanding discourse
by introducing, filtering and taking account of different voices is neither impractical nor
requires a normative stretch, such as a new agreement, or even new decisions from the
General Council. The aim of the four chapters on each transparency was to examine the
problems, seek normative space and propose immediate solutions, without the
requirement of painstaking multilateral negotiations.

B.

Transnationalism, Constitutionalism and Democratization

The content of transparency as a rule and as a legal principle has been conducive to the
transnationalization of the WTO. Information acts as the link between global civil
society, citizens around the world either organized as NGOs or as consumers, traders,
multinational corporations and voters facing the results of Articles I and III of the GATT
and other cardinal rules from the Agreements. They also face the effects of subsidization
of key sectors, violations of WTO rules and hand-twisting into further liberalization. The
first level of transnationalization occurs at the level of national markets, as the WTO
through the lowering of tariffs changes the competition balance in the domestic context.
The relationship of domestic industries and their representatives as well as importers and
exporters occurs through Article X, which obliges the importing state to publish its laws
related to trade and to maintain adjudication mechanisms for challenges of administrative
measures. Legal transparency is the most prevalent transnationalizing factor.
Additionally, some WTO members maintain inquiry points on the WTO domestically and
have established mechanisms for their citizens to report violations of the WTO
Agreements that they experience as they engage in international trade.
External transparency also contributes to the transnationalization of the WTO. Non-state
actors have a formal status in the organization and the Secretariat connects with them by
maintaining a list of NGOs that can participate in events open to them. Moreover, the
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controversial amicus curiae practice links non-state actors directly to the Dispute
Settlement Process. If institutionalized, the submission of amicus briefs can become a
major gateway for the representation of civil society interests at the international level
and with time it will allow for the filtering of global citizenry interests in the WTO
adjudicatory process, thus moving the WTO citizens, consumers and traders to the center
of the world trading system. 6
At a theoretical level, treating the four transparencies separately obscures the
phenomenon of transnationalization resulting from increasing integration in the WTO
context. The evolution of the GATT from diplomacy to law, the move towards
transparency7 and the creation of the WTO set in motion processes for the pursuit of nonstate interests at the WTO level. Corporations and individuals participate indirectly in the
WTO processes through national mechanisms that allow for them to notify their
governments on WTO law violations, file complaints and generally exercise pressure on
their governments to further pursue cases of violations of WTO law. Some examples of
such practices are the United States Representative Open Government,8 the Civil Society
Dialogue initiated by the European Commission9 and Canada’s consultation venue in the
Department of International Affairs and International Trade.10 As we saw, in some cases,
companies will even participate in the dispute settlement process. 11
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All the above elements demonstrate that state sovereignty of the 1947 GATT has changed
drastically. Countries still hold an important role in international trade regulation while a
large number of actors are now demanding to be heard during WTO processes. Civil
society and traders are not satisfied with having an observer status, even if that is an
institutionalized one (such as the Ministerial Conference). Multinational corporations
have been present through their legal representatives in major disputes 12 , NGOs
consistently submit amicus curiae briefs and protestors are so vocal that Ministerial
Conferences are brought to a complete halt. The “old world” center- periphery balance of
western-state international law does not describe the contemporary international trading
system.
Transnationalization

renders

constitutionalist

arguments

less

convincing.

Constitutionalism involves less flexible normative forms, and hierarchically superior
principles that allow for reliable answers during conflict resolution. In this polynormative
world, and in this polynormative regime that the WTO has evolved to, legal analysis
should be able to account for all the phenomena we described without meaning that they
necessarily need to be incorporated in a pyramid-like scheme, or prioritized over one
another. However, this is not to say that domestic analogies are entirely unwarranted. The
WTO as many international organizations exhibits institutional structures that are
reminiscent, even modeled after the national separation of powers paradigm.

The

following tables outline the possible links to the traditional constitutional paradigm. The
different “hats” of the General Council, as a legislative, an executive and a judicial
branch, as well as the Ministerial Conference, with full powers to make any number of
drastic changes to the Agreements (as it happened in the Uruguay Round), might look
like a supranational version of the nation-state governance.
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Figure 5 Separation of Powers in the WTO

However, everything else in the WTO and its most pressing issues today are not solved
by resorting to this separation of powers scheme. To extend constitutionalist analogies
beyond the tables above would be creating problems with incorporating into a single,
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WTO-specific narrative transnational phenomena. Additionally, the ultra-normativity13,
the ability of international institutions to develop beyond the agreed legislation that
created them is not necessarily a reason for the blank cheque skepticism that Peters
cautions against. Peters argues that:
“Another undemocratic feature of global governance is the blank cheque
phenomenon. This problem in theory not only concerns the purely
transitive democratic foundation of international law and global
governance via the democratic nation states, but in practice arises here.
States lack control over international law and global governance because
many international treaties are not precise and static but general and
dynamic. This is most obvious for treaties establishing international
regimes or organizations with bodies which monitor behaviour, interpret
imprecise and incomplete texts, and which develop new norms
(adjudicatory and/or quasi-legislative activity), especially if such
secondary law directly addresses individuals, and thus to some extent
replaces domestic legislation and administrative acts (global governance
properly speaking).”14
The other side of the blank cheque problem is the ultranormative ability of international
organizations. It is a form of progressive adaptability to pressing problems. An
illustrative example is that of amicus briefs in the WTO. Not only are they not explicitly
covered by the WTO Agreements, but the members of the General Council in a meeting
openly condemned the Appellate Body’s practice. Yet, amicus briefs are still accepted in
the WTO, not through some form of judicial activism, but through legal interpretation of
existing clauses in the DSU that indeed allow for innovative fact-finding. When faced
with the option of controversial discourse space, such as this, which clearly carries the
potential of inclusion of many more voices, resorting to constitutionalism will lead to the
end of such initiatives.
Madison and Montesquieu, when they described the structures that became the
foundations of modern constitutionalism, they did so in the context of newborn
democracies. Their analysis was coupled not only with the constitutional legal space that
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emerged, the French and American constitutions, but also the political space that brought
these to life. WTO analysis before discussing the possibility of constitutional principles
or global norms should first explore the same political space and what it can include in
order to expand its reach and inclusiveness. The blank cheque problem may be the
WTO’s saving grace to solve its legitimacy problems. A blank cheque to lock in place
constitutional norms does carry the problems that Peters described. However, a blank
cheque to enable more participants to put forward their concerns during decision making
and a new mandate that moves away from the rigid neoliberalism of Articles I and III to
the exploration of development-specific norms is the type of democratization that Cass
and Nicolaides and Howse argued for.

C.

Forms of legitimacy in the WTO

The least contested form of legitimacy is input legitimacy, through elections and direct
participation of stakeholders in decision making. The nation state possesses the
enforcement mechanisms, which are infamously absent in international law and draws
legitimacy through clearly defined hierarchies or democratic participation. However, the
direct participation of citizens in the operations of the organization is still not possible for
two reasons mainly. First, states, which are still the main units of participation in the
international community would be very reluctant to allow any involvement of
individuals, and consensus to that effect is almost impossible to obtain at least in the near
future. Second, even though participation platforms (elections) have been successfully
established in few cases in regional organizations (such as the EU), the elected organs
themselves are limited in their capacity. Equivalent forms at a global level are currently
seen as utopian.
References to the WTO demos exist in the preambles of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO, and the GATT which mention raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and real income, the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture which refers
to food security, the preamble of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
and Article XX of the GATT referring to human health. The numerous protests against
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the WTO can also be seen as tokens of the existence of a demos, in a reverse fashion.
Citizens of different countries voice jointly their opposition to the policies of the
organization. Moreover, citizens of member states are the WTO demos both in terms of
their government’s membership in the organization but also as “citizens-consumers.”15
The fundamental participant units in trade are the vendor and the buyer.
In order to be a “citizen-consumer” any kind of participation in the national economy of a
WTO member state can be sufficient to delineate the WTO demos as inclusive of all
“citizens-consumers.” Furthermore, it is in the interest of the consumers to find the
cheapest product in the market and the progressive elimination of tariffs is a crucial
mechanism to that effect. 16 Transparency thus can empower actors towards norm
compliance and promote discourse.17 Consumers in WTO member states ultimately enjoy
the benefits from tariff reduction and elimination. A case for the immediacy of
distributional effects of WTO measures to consumers is more than reasonable.18 The
strong civil society opposition during the Seattle Ministerial and other WTO high profile
meetings indicates that citizens also understand themselves as direct recipients of
measures adopted in the WTO context.
At first glance, it seems that the lack of direct participation or global elections could pose
a legitimacy deadlock for the global demos, or the global civil society. Helmut Willke in
his book “Smart Governance” addresses the input legitimacy dead-end and seeks
methods to “compensate for the lack of formal legitimacy and formal democratic
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structures.”19 According to Willke, the main source of the legitimacy complains is that
there is no global government corresponding to the global political system. In the lack of
“normative authority” (majority vote), it should be replaced with forms of “cognitive
authority[…], a complex interplay of minimizing doubts and maximizing revisions in the
framework of “organized skepticism.” 20 Formal democratic legitimacy should be
replaced by “derivatives of (formal) legitimacy” providing also some form of
accountability of the organization or the regime.21 He identifies the WTO as an example
of an institution, which develops this rationale.22
He explains that:
“ In more general terms, the input-legitimacy of formal democratic law
becomes but one side of a polycentric architecture of sources of
legitimacy, including in particular an output-legitimacy as a major form of
derivative legitimacy.”23
Willke concludes that: “…transparency, efficiency, expertise, accountability, and
popularity are as much foundations of legitimacy as are nationality and democratic
process.”24 Facing legitimacy problems that structurally cannot be addressed through
democratic means and input legitimacy the WTO’s institutional response can be to excel
in other legitimacy forms.

25

The most obvious legitimacy form would be output

legitimacy. Currently one of the main output legitimacy processes in international law is
transparency, and considering the prominent Article X transparency obligation in the
GATT it is not outside the WTO’s institutional ethos to extend such principles to its own
function. Transparency can contribute to the WTO’s output legitimacy (and marginally,
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with amicus briefs to its input legitimacy). In the legitimacy debate within the WTO,
transparency in its different forms serves as an output legitimacy component (through
Article X, the constant updating of the WTO website, and the public broadcasting of
meetings of various WTO bodies). It simultaneously serves as an expression of input
legitimacy, through the submission of amicus curiae briefs. The costs of publication are
continuously reduced because of information technology developments. Also, countries
that publish their rules and administrative procedures related to trade become potentially
more investor-friendly26. However, costs remain high for developing and least developed
countries who still suffer from huge infrastructural deficits and need assistance to
overcome them.
Overall, input and output legitimacy forms imply that independent of the WTO member
states and whether the government representatives in the WTO are elected through
democratic processes or not, the WTO, in absence of a global democracy has developed a
proto-form of substitutes to its lack of democratic legitimacy. Transparency is currently
the most significant of these substitutes, possibly the only one that is as prevalent.
Transparency can produce two other forms of legitimacy. First, process, or throughput
legitimacy, which echoes the domestic rule of law in decision-making processes. Kjaer’s
analysis approximates a definition of such process legitimacy:
“The question of legitimacy is therefore reduced to an evaluation of the
ability of the relevant legal infrastructure to ensure that the perspectives
emerging from different societal spheres are in concordance or to put it
another way: that the legal infrastructure can achieve convergence
between the different perspectives of science, environment, health,
economics and politics. Taking the complexity of the issues and the
multitude of perspectives into consideration, constant convergence is an
unlikely outcome. […] Hence the classic distinction between input and
output legitimation is replaced by an understanding of the process itself as
the central source of legitimacy.” 27
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However, Vivien Schmidt cautions against this substitution. As this is the most
incomplete legitimacy form, it cannot replace neither input or output legitimacy
deficits.28 As such the WTO cannot rely, and this is evident from its current legitimacy
deadlocks, in mere publication of documents or following established procedures in order
to solve its legitimacy problems.
Finally, to the extent that transparency is part and parcel of WTO official rhetoric and a
general institutional commitment, transparency becomes an integral element of the
organization’s mission legitimacy.29 In the WTO context, the link between transparency
and mission legitimacy does not signal towards the organization’s “destiny” nor does it
point to a “promised land.”30 Rather, it reaffirms trust and openness as the foundations of
the international trading system. Historical periods that preceded both the GATT and the
WTO, namely the Second World War and the Cold War, were characterized by historians
as “dark times.” Consequently, the two international trade structures that emerged after
the end of obscurity have an inherent disposition towards openness, participation and
transparency.

Form of
legitimation
Vertical
legitimation
Executive
representation

Expression

WTO form

Incomplete secondary
vertical legitimation

National legitimacy
processes of WTO member
states’ governments
Internal transparency,
consensus and meaningful
decision-making
Legal and administrative
transparency

General Council,
Ministerial
Conferences
Horizontal
Permanent in trade
mutual control review bodies and
mechanisms,
exceptional during the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Legitimacy
Classification
Input
Input,
Throughput,
Mission
Output,
Throughput

28

Vivien A. Schmidt, Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the
Numbers" in the Euro Crisis in THE FUTURE OF THE EURO” (M. Blyth & M. Matthijs eds. forthcoming,
2015 Final Draft for Chapter on file with the author)
29
J.H.H. Weiler 60 Years since the First European Community: Reflections on Messianism” 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 303-311 (2011), and Gráinne de Búrca, Europe's Raison D'Etre NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PUBLIC
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPERS Paper 385. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/385 (2013)
30
J.H.H. Weiler 60 Years since the First European Community: Reflections on Messianism” 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 303-306 (2011).
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Associative
and expert
representation
IndividualRights’ based
legitimacy

DSU process
Amicus curiae briefs,
expert testimonies,
NGO participation in
Ministerials etc.
Publication of WTO
documents, national
inquiry points, Article
X and equivalents
national administrative
and adjudicatory
recourse mechanisms

External and administrative
transparency

Input,
Throughput

External and legal
transparency

Output,
Throughput,
Mission

Table 11 Legitimacy classifications of different transparency forms

All forms of legitimacy that are mentioned in table 11 are currently deficient and
incomplete in the WTO. Their existence however demonstrates that there is potential to
fix many extant problems in the organization. Transparency cannot be an ad hoc or de
facto substitute for direct democracy deficits in the WTO. Rather, only a coordinated and
committed change of direction in all transparency forms has the potential to act as an
efficient legitimacy substitute and remedy the deficits outlined in the introduction. The
WTO’s performance on transparency is far from optimal. Consequently, such
improvements would improve the legitimacy status of the organization. Most important is
for the WTO officials to be aware of inconsistencies with respect to transparency. The
same applies for the Appellate Body, as it chose to engage with external transparency:
insisting that civil society should be heard means that its voice should be considered
seriously and answered in case law. As we saw, such briefs have only been meaningfully
integrated in WTO case law very few times. However, the overall approach of the Panels
and the Appellate Body creates the necessary conditions for such input legitimacy.
Allowing for a narrow and undisputedly open window for submission of briefs based on a
practical standpoint – the determination of likeness in products – aspires to harvest the
opportunity that the Panels and Appellate Body have chosen to leave open.
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Conclusion
This doctoral dissertation has attempted to collect and discuss all the transparency
elements that appear in the context of the WTO. As an academic project it aspires to act
as a foundation for a systematic review of the WTO’s performance on transparency and
the improvement of all the problematic areas. In view of the Doha deadlock the WTO’s
role as a negotiation forum for multilateral agreements will subside in the next decade.
However, its monitoring function will continue, and perhaps will redirect the mandate of
the organization from trying to promote trade liberalization to maintaining a forum of
information, which can be mainly useful to the WTO’s global citizenry.
First, transparency has received a lot of attention recently in Public International Law,
International Relations and International Economic Law. I expect that there will be a
proliferation of systematic attempts to assess the position of transparency in other
transnational regimes as the field grows bigger and extends beyond the more limited
international/global administrative law analysis.
Second, as international organizations (and international financial institutions more
specifically) have suffered from legitimacy crises at a more structural level in the last
three decades, works geared towards tracing and evaluating democratic elements in
multifaceted principles of these organizations will multiply. By exploring transparency in
all its manifestations, this thesis aspires to provide a model of analysis of composite
democracy at a transnational level, and a case for comparison with other international
organizations, which also lack direct electoral legitimacy.
Lastly, this analysis can be useful for other international organizations in the context of
global governance. The WTO exhibits many of the elements of a global governance
system or regime and transparency contributes an important aspect, that of legitimacy
substitution. Moreover, it is indicative of the dynamic process that David Kennedy
describes when he discusses global governance. According to Kennedy:
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“We will need to think of our work on global governance not only as
description, but also as program for a world in transition. At the same
time, of course, any such program will be but one among many, and will
find itself pushed and pulled by the projects and priorities of all the other
actors on the field. We will need to think about global governance as a
dynamic process, in which legal, political and economic arrangements
unleash interests, change the balance of forces, and lead to further
reinvention of the governance scheme itself.”1
Willke in the same spirit notes that:
Global governance consists in large parts in creating governance regimes
for global contexts by establishing organizations (institutions), structures,
processes and rule systems that have the capabilities to provide intelligent
decisions for highly complex and concatenated problems.2
The transnationalization of legal relationships in the WTO context enables the emergence
of a number of hybrid, public-private forms of participation in the global trade order. As
such, a global governance regime describes the current state of the WTO. It differs from
the international regimes because of a number of additional elements present in the WTO
and evident through the transparency analysis. Considering the transnationalization of
legal relationships, participation to the WTO is not static, but to some extent includes
civil society stakeholders and other transnational actors. This element is very crucial for a
global governance regime. Exclusion of civil society actors is reminiscent of the old
Westphalian international organization instead of a global governance regime. To this
day, direct and indirect participation of non-state actors lato sensu in the WTO has taken
all the different forms that the transparency analysis shows.
It remains a fact, however, that the WTO is a member-driven organization. With this
analysis, I do not negate the relevance of Westphalian state and the results of
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David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. 827-860, 832
(2008).
2
HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 42 (2007).
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multilateralism. 3 It is important at the same time to internalize levels of governance that
extend beyond the nation state. NGOs and the amorphous maze of the global civil
society, either in the form of consumers or in the form of protestors, are relevant to the
WTO. 4 This analysis points towards ways by which the nation state has bound itself
contractually that result in creating rights and information processes for individuals,
corporations and NGOs (and other actors). Such state- non-state interactions at the
international level make relationships incontestably transnational. The WTO is also
responsive to global civil society, aware of the criticism and making efforts to address it
at some level.5 The WTO consists of member states whose constituencies are aware of
the WTO and the way it works. Current technology and the WTO practice of publication
online allows for information on international trade regulation to travel instantly and for a
nominal cost. This flow of information increases the requests for transparency.6 Thus
transparency, which allows for information and the development of knowledge networks
at a national and a global level matters a lot for the characterization of a organization as a
global governance regime. Moreover, WTO has developed over the years many
transnational properties and secondary participation mechanisms for civil society actors
and industry representatives, also contributing to its transparency commitment. The
dynamic process of global governance regime formation, as well as the evolution of
transparency can be useful for other international regimes to embrace hybrid democratic
forms through output legitimacy.
This thesis focused on a socio-legal assessment of democratic elements or traces that
were achieved in the WTO context through consensus and can be expanded through the
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See AM- Slaughter, the emergence of a global rule of law coupled with the nation state structures where
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WTO processes.7 Through this analysis I hope to shed light onto patterns of development
of principles into legal norms. Further, I propose that efforts for reform of the WTO can
concentrate in already functioning processes. Thus future proposals for reform can
explore regulatory spaces where different elements of input and output legitimacy can
exist, potentially adding to the democratization of international law. The challenge, of
course, remains: to find practical ways to improve the WTO’s transparency track record.
This can help create permanent links between output legitimacy and hybrid forms of
global democracy. This may be the future of global democratic structures, at least in the
short term.
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Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform YALE LAW & ECONOMICS
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Table of Abbreviations
ACWL
ATC
DSB
DSU
EU
GAL
GATS
GATT
GDP
IMF
IOs
IPA
IPL
LDCs
MFN
NGOs
PTAs
RTAs
SPS
TBT
TRIPS
UN
UNCTAD
US
WTO

Advisory Centre on WTO Law
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Dispute Settlement Body
Dispute Settlement Understanding
European Union
Global Administrative Law
General Agreement on Trade in Services
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 as amended)
Gross Domestic Product
International Monetary Fund
International Organizations
International Public Authority
International Public Law
Least Developed Countries
Most Favored Nation
Non Governmental Organizations
Preferential Trade Agreements
Regional Trade Agreements
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
United Nations
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development
United States of America
World Trade organization
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